Some observations regarding the demythification of the comparative advantage’s principle within Manoilescu generalized scheme

The validity in time of the comparative advantage’s principle, also of its application’s denial, can generate certain misunderstandings in the good exchange’s observation for an outsider (common sense), including the expert from other economics’ areas. The resolution for these cases can be made through checking requires’ discharging of the analytical economicity’s principle. In these conditions it can be noticed if the schemes, deducted in the analytical decomposition’s basis of the standard actions, can be used in the more precise and easier measurement than through empirical calculations in order to determine the comparative advantage’s size, of the gains from trade and the productivity effect. Manoilescu generalized scheme has, from this perspective the two main characteristics: its building has started from the empirical reality’s study of the exchange phenomena and the observation has been made only inside the economics’ borders. This way the scheme sustains the unitary explanations’ approaches of some different angles of understanding the comparative advantage on basis of some analytical efforts of other researchers. The suggested scheme separates the strictly economic analysis from the one inside the politic area (commercial politics), also of the productivity effect from more exact connections, decompounding the measurement in two steps. The identification through dialectical judgements, made as a continuation of the analytical ones, of the concordance between the built analytical reality and the empirical one, assures the check of the analytical economy’s principle. This step contributes to the permanent validity’s grounding of the comparative advantage’s principle in the exchange connections within the competitive economies. Meanwhile, the demythification of its full and permanent usage is also supported, in the way of its maximum potential’s capitalization in the manufactured and exchanged goods’ choice. The comparative advantage’s principle is nothing but an application of the minimum effort’s principle – the last one having a wider area of action – and will probably remain in the economies based on the social, competitive, monetary or natural relations.comparative advantage; Manoilescu generalized scheme; measurement; analytical economy principle; minimum effort; total factor productivity; epistemology

Monopoly Pricing in a Vertical Market with Demand Uncertainty

We study a vertical market with an upsteam supplier and multiple downstream retailers. Demand uncertainty falls to the supplier who acts first and sets a uniform wholesale price before the retailers observe the realized demand and engage in retail competition. Our focus is on the supplier's optimal pricing decision. We express the price elasticity of expected demand in terms of the mean residual demand (MRD) function of the demand distribution. This allows for a closed form characterization of the points of unitary elasticity that maximize the supplier's profits and the derivation of a mild unimodality condition for the supplier's objective function that generalizes the widely used increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) condition. A direct implication is that optimal prices between different markets can be ordered if the markets can be stochastically ordered according to their MRD functions or equivalently to their elasticities. Based on this, we apply the theory of stochastic orders to study the response of the supplier's optimal price to various features of the demand distribution. Our findings challenge previously established economic insights about the effects of market size, demand transformations and demand variability on wholesale prices and indicate that the conclusions largely depend on the exact notion that will be employed. We then turn to measure market performance and derive a distribution free and tight bound on the probability of no trade between the supplier and the retailers. If trade takes place, our findings indicate that ovarall performance depends on the interplay between demand uncertainty and level of retail competition

Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox

We introduce a quantitative approach to comparative statics that allows to bound the maximum effect of an exogenous parameter change on a system's equilibrium. The motivation for this approach is a well known paradox in multimarket Cournot competition, where a positive price shock on a monopoly market may actually reduce the monopolist's profit. We use our approach to quantify for the first time the worst case profit reduction for multimarket oligopolies exposed to arbitrary positive price shocks. For markets with affine price functions and firms with convex cost technologies, we show that the relative profit loss of any firm is at most 25% no matter how many firms compete in the oligopoly. We further investigate the impact of positive price shocks on total profit of all firms as well as on social welfare. We find tight bounds also for these measures showing that total profit and social welfare decreases by at most 25% and 16.6%, respectively. Finally, we show that in our model, mixed, correlated and coarse correlated equilibria are essentially unique, thus, all our bounds apply to these game solutions as well.Comment: 23 pages, 1 figur

Comments on the RGGI Market Design

Auctions, carbon auctions, greenhouse gas auctions

An Energy Sharing Game with Generalized Demand Bidding: Model and Properties

This paper proposes a novel energy sharing mechanism for prosumers who can produce and consume. Different from most existing works, the role of individual prosumer as a seller or buyer in our model is endogenously determined. Several desirable properties of the proposed mechanism are proved based on a generalized game-theoretic model. We show that the Nash equilibrium exists and is the unique solution of an equivalent convex optimization problem. The sharing price at the Nash equilibrium equals to the average marginal disutility of all prosumers. We also prove that every prosumer has the incentive to participate in the sharing market, and prosumers' total cost decreases with increasing absolute value of price sensitivity. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium approaches the social optimal as the number of prosumers grows, and competition can improve social welfare.Comment: 16 pages, 7 figure

Modeling the Psychology of Consumer and Firm Behavior with Behavioral Economics

Marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers actually behave in markets. Marketing models are usually applications of economic theories. These theories are general and produce precise predictions, but they rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms. Theories based on rationality limits could prove similarly general and precise, while grounding theories in psychological plausibility and explaining facts which are puzzles for the standard approach. Behavioral economics explores the implications of limits of rationality. The goal is to make economic theories more plausible while maintaining formal power and accurate prediction of field data. This review focuses selectively on six types of models used in behavioral economics that can be applied to marketing. Three of the models generalize consumer preference to allow (1) sensitivity to reference points (and loss-aversion); (2) social preferences toward outcomes of others; and (3) preference for instant gratification (quasi-hyperbolic discounting). The three models are applied to industrial channel bargaining, salesforce compensation, and pricing of virtuous goods such as gym memberships. The other three models generalize the concept of gametheoretic equilibrium, allowing decision makers to make mistakes (quantal response equilibrium), encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking (cognitive hierarchy), and equilibrate by learning from feedback (self-tuning EWA). These are applied to marketing strategy problems involving differentiated products, competitive entry into large and small markets, and low-price guarantees. The main goal of this selected review is to encourage marketing researchers of all kinds to apply these tools to marketing. Understanding the models and applying them is a technical challenge for marketing modelers, which also requires thoughtful input from psychologists studying details of consumer behavior. As a result, models like these could create a common language for modelers who prize formality and psychologists who prize realism

The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector is Imperfectly Competitive

In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict welfare changes within an open-access fishery transitioning to individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. Although related research has explored the effects of market power in the harvesting sector on ITQ performance, none have considered the implications of an imperfectly competitive processing sector. This study addresses this question specifically in the context of the Atlantic herring fishery, although its implications are relevant to all fisheries with similar industry structure. Our results show that ITQs could have a negative impact on fishermen’s welfare when processors have market power and the cap on aggregate harvest is binding or becomes binding with the implementation of ITQs.ITQ, imperfect competition, welfare analysis, fisheries

Economy-Wide Estimates of the Implications of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise

The economy-wide implications of sea level rise in 2050 are estimated using a static computable general equilibrium model. Overall, general equilibrium effects increase the costs of sea level rise, but not necessarily in every sector or region. In the absence of coastal protection, economies that rely most on agriculture are hit hardest. Although energy is substituted for land, overall energy consumption falls with the shrinking economy, hurting energy exporters. With full coastal protection, GDP increases, particularly in regions that do a lot of dike building, but utility falls, least in regions that build a lot of dikes and export energy. Energy prices rise and energy consumption falls. The costs of full protection exceed the costs of losing land.Impacts of climate change, Sea level rise, Computable general equilibrium