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CP-nets and Nash equilibria
We relate here two formalisms that are used for different purposes in
reasoning about multi-agent systems. One of them are strategic games that are
used to capture the idea that agents interact with each other while pursuing
their own interest. The other are CP-nets that were introduced to express
qualitative and conditional preferences of the users and which aim at
facilitating the process of preference elicitation. To relate these two
formalisms we introduce a natural, qualitative, extension of the notion of a
strategic game. We show then that the optimal outcomes of a CP-net are exactly
the Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic game in the above
sense. This allows us to use the techniques of game theory to search for
optimal outcomes of CP-nets and vice-versa, to use techniques developed for
CP-nets to search for Nash equilibria of the considered games.Comment: 6 pages. in: roc. of the Third International Conference on
Computational Intelligence, Robotics and Autonomous Systems (CIRAS '05). To
appea
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