Theoretical Studies in Unawareness and Discovery Process

中央大学博士(経済学)【学位授与の要件】中央大学学位規則第4条第1項 【論文審査委員主査】瀧澤　弘和(中央大学経済学部教授) 【論文審査委員副査】浅田　統一郎(中央大学経済学部教授),谷口　洋志(中央大学経済学部教授),石川　竜一郎(早稲田大学国際学術院教授)application/pdfdoctoral thesi

Common Knowledge and Interactive Behaviors: A Survey

This paper surveys the notion of common knowledge taken from game theory and computer science. It studies and illustrates more generally the effects of interactive knowledge in economic and social problems. First of all, common knowledge is shown to be a central concept and often a necessary condition for coordination, equilibrium achievement, agreement, and consensus. We present how common knowledge can be practically generated, for example, by particular advertisements or leadership. Secondly, we prove that common knowledge can be harmful, essentially in various cooperation and negotiation problems, and more generally when there are con icts of interest. Finally, in some asymmetric relationships, common knowledge is shown to be preferable for some players, but not for all. The ambiguous welfare effects of higher-order knowledge on interactive behaviors leads us to analyze the role of decentralized communication in order to deal with dynamic or endogenous information structures.Interactive knowledge, common knowledge, information structure, communication.

Discovery and Equilibrium in Games with Unawareness

Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are ``self-destroying'' as a player's representation of the game may change after playing it once. We define discovery processes where at each state there is an extensive-form game with unawareness that together with the players' play determines the transition to possibly another extensive-form game with unawareness in which players are now aware of actions that they have discovered. A discovery process is rationalizable if players play extensive-form rationalizable strategies in each game with unawareness. We show that for any game with unawareness there is a rationalizable discovery process that leads to a self-confirming game that possesses a self-confirming equilibrium in extensive-form rationalizable strategies. This notion of equilibrium can be interpreted as steady-state of both a discovery and learning process

Operational Decision Making under Uncertainty: Inferential, Sequential, and Adversarial Approaches

Modern security threats are characterized by a stochastic, dynamic, partially observable, and ambiguous operational environment. This dissertation addresses such complex security threats using operations research techniques for decision making under uncertainty in operations planning, analysis, and assessment. First, this research develops a new method for robust queue inference with partially observable, stochastic arrival and departure times, motivated by cybersecurity and terrorism applications. In the dynamic setting, this work develops a new variant of Markov decision processes and an algorithm for robust information collection in dynamic, partially observable and ambiguous environments, with an application to a cybersecurity detection problem. In the adversarial setting, this work presents a new application of counterfactual regret minimization and robust optimization to a multi-domain cyber and air defense problem in a partially observable environment

Contributions to Game Theory and Management. Vol. III. Collected papers presented on the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management.

The collection contains papers accepted for the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 24-26, 2009, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The volume may be recommended for researches and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.

Incentive Contracts in Multi-agent Systems: Theory and Applications

This thesis studies incentive contracts in multi-agent systems with applications to transportation policy. The early adoption of emerging transportation systems such as electric vehicles (EVs), peer-to-peer ridesharing, and automated vehicles (AVs) relies on governmental incentives. Those incentives help achieve a specific market share target, prevent irregular behaviors, and enhance social benefit. Yet, two challenges may impede the implementation of such incentive policies. First, the government and subsidized organizations must confront the uncertainty in a market; Second, the government has no access to the organizations' private information, and thus their strategies are unknown to it. In the face of these challenges, a command-and-control incentive policy fails. In Chapter 2, we revisit the primary setting in which a government agency incentivizes the OEM for accelerating the widespread adoption of AVs. This work aspires to offset the negative externalities of AVs in the ``dark-age'' of AV deployment. More specifically, this chapter designs AV subsidies to shorten the early AV market penetration period and maximize the total expected efficiency benefits of AVs. It seeks a generic optimal AV subsidy structure, so-called ``two-threshold'' subsidy policy, which is proven to be more efficient than the social-welfare maximization approach. In Chapter 3, we develop a multi-agent incentive contracts model to address the issue of stimulating a group of non-cooperating agents to act in the principal's interest over a planning horizon. We extend the single-agent incentive contract to a multi-agent setting with history-dependent terminal conditions. Our contributions include: (a) Finding sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal multi-agent incentive contracts and conditions under which they form a unique Nash Equilibrium; (b) Showing that the optimal multi-agent incentive contracts can be solved by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation with equilibrium constraints; (c) Proposing a backward iterative algorithm to solve the problem. In Chapter 4, we obtain the optimal EV and charging infrastructure subsidies through the multi-agent incentive contracts model. Widespread adoption of Electric Vehicles (EV) mostly depends on governmental subsidies during the early stage of deployment. The governmental incentives must strike a balance between an EV manufacturer and a charging infrastructure installer. Yet, the current supply of charging infrastructure is not nearly enough to support EV growth over the next decades. We model the joint subsidy problem as a two-agent incentive contract. The government observes two correlated processes -- the EV market penetration and the charging infrastructure expansion. It looks for an optimal policy that maximizes the cumulative social benefit in the face of uncertainty. In our case study, we find that the optimal dynamic subsidies can achieve 70% of the target EV market share in China by 2025, and also maintains the ratio of charging stations per EV. Chapter 5 ends the thesis with conclusions and promising future research directions. In summary, this thesis provides a new approach to appraise transportation and energy policies against exogenous and endogenous risks.PHDIndustrial & Operations EngineeringUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/155199/1/luoqi_1.pd

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics

The most fundamental questions of economics are often philosophical in nature, and philosophers have, since the very beginning of Western philosophy, asked many questions that current observers would identify as economic. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is an outstanding reference source for the key topics, problems, and debates at the intersection of philosophical and economic inquiry. It captures this field of countless exciting interconnections, affinities, and opportunities for cross-fertilization. Comprising 35 chapters by a diverse team of contributors from all over the globe, the Handbook is divided into eight sections: I. Rationality II. Cooperation and Interaction III. Methodology IV. Values V. Causality and Explanation VI. Experimentation and Simulation VII. Evidence VIII. Policy The volume is essential reading for students and researchers in economics and philosophy who are interested in exploring the interconnections between the two disciplines. It is also a valuable resource for those in related fields like political science, sociology, and the humanities.</p

Plural Rationality and Interactive Decision Processes; Proceedings of an IIASA Summer Study on Plural Rationality and Interactive Decision Processes, Sopron, Hungary, August 16-26, 1984

These Proceedings report the scientific results of the Summer Study on Plural Rationality and Interactive Decision Processes organized jointly by IIASA and the Hungarian Committee for Applied Systems Analysis. Sixty-eight researchers from sixteen countries participated, most of them contributing papers or experiments. The Study gathered specialists from many disciplines, from philosophy and cultural anthropology, through decision theory, game theory and economics, to engineering and applied mathematics. Twenty-eight of the papers presented during the Study are included in this volume