229 research outputs found
Generalized Colonel Blotto Game
Competitive resource allocation between adversarial decision makers arises in
a wide spectrum of real-world applications such as in communication systems,
cyber-physical systems security, as well as financial, political, and electoral
competition. As such, developing analytical tools to model and analyze
competitive resource allocation is crucial for devising optimal allocation
strategies and anticipating the potential outcomes of the competition. To this
end, the Colonel Blotto game is one of the most popular game-theoretic
frameworks for modeling and analyzing such competitive resource allocation
problems. However, in many real-world competitive situations, the Colonel
Blotto game does not admit solutions in deterministic strategies and, hence,
one must rely on analytically complex mixed-strategies with their associated
tractability, applicability, and practicality challenges. In this paper, a
generalization of the Colonel Blotto game which enables the derivation of
deterministic, practical, and implementable equilibrium strategies is proposed
while accounting for the heterogeneity of the battlefields. In addition, the
proposed generalized game enables accounting for the consumed resources in each
battlefield, a feature that is not considered in the classical Blotto game. For
the generalized game, the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure-strategies is
shown. Then, closed-form analytical expressions of the equilibrium strategies,
are derived and the outcome of the game is characterized; based on the number
of resources of each player as well as the valuation of each battlefield. The
generated results provide invaluable insights on the outcome of the
competition. For example, the results show that, when both players are fully
rational, the more resourceful player can achieve a better total payoff at the
Nash equilibrium, a result that is not mimicked in the classical Blotto game.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figure
Operations Research Methods for Multi-Domain Campaign Phase Planning
In Antiaccess Warfare as Strategy, Tangredi posits the question and need to consider multiple domains and governmental and warfighting functions in various phases of campaign execution. Multi-domain integration within and across various phases of the joint campaign presents a host of non-linear factors that are compounded and amplified by uncertainties. Colonel Blotto is a simple game that is suited to compare traditional force-on-force military engagements where mass wins the day, but have had limited application to more complex military planning. This thesis explores the formulation schema, data-driven parameters, methods of calculation, and scenarios applicable to a generalized Colonel Blotto (General Blotto) game. It explores this generalized game theory framework, its applicability to multi-domain operations, and recommends future research areas that could help to extend its applicability, enabling planners and commanders to gain similar insight as to those straight-forward applications
Characterizing the interplay between information and strength in Blotto games
In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto
game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two
players over a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to
randomness. One of the two players knows the valuations with certainty. The
other knows only a distribution on the battlefield realizations. However, the
informed player has fewer resources to allocate. We characterize unique
equilibrium payoffs in a two battlefield setup of the Colonel Blotto game. We
then focus on a three battlefield setup in the General Lotto game, a popular
variant of the Colonel Blotto game. We characterize the unique equilibrium
payoffs and mixed equilibrium strategies. We quantify the value of information
- the difference in equilibrium payoff between the asymmetric information game
and complete information game. We find information strictly improves the
informed player's performance guarantee. However, the magnitude of improvement
varies with the informed player's strength as well as the game parameters. Our
analysis highlights the interplay between strength and information in
adversarial environments.Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures. Accepted for presentation at 58th Conference on
Decision and Control (CDC), 201
Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields
This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in multiple component conflicts, commonly termed âbattlefieldsâ. In multi-battlefield conflicts, behavioral linkages across battlefields depend both on the technologies of conflict within each battlefield and the nature of economies or diseconomies in how battlefield out-comes and costs aggregate in determining payoffs in the overall conflict.conflict, contest, battlefield, Colonel Blotto Game, auction, lottery
Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields
This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in multiple component conflicts, commonly termed "battlefields." In multi-battlefield conflicts, behavioral linkages across battlefields depend both on the technologies of conflict within each battlefield and the nature of economies or diseconomies in how battlefield out- comes and costs aggregate in determining payoffs in the overall conflict.Con
ict, Contest, Battleeld, Colonel Blotto Game, Auction, Lottery
A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information
We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N â„ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agentâs vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agentâs resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the agentâs valuation of that battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games
A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information
In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M ℠N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield. We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the case M †N, full-support type distributions, and network games
Finding mixed-strategy equilibria of continuous-action games without gradients using randomized policy networks
We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of
continuous-action game without access to gradients. Such game access is common
in reinforcement learning settings, where the environment is typically treated
as a black box. To tackle this problem, we apply zeroth-order optimization
techniques that combine smoothed gradient estimators with equilibrium-finding
dynamics. We model players' strategies using artificial neural networks. In
particular, we use randomized policy networks to model mixed strategies. These
take noise in addition to an observation as input and can flexibly represent
arbitrary observation-dependent, continuous-action distributions. Being able to
model such mixed strategies is crucial for tackling continuous-action games
that lack pure-strategy equilibria. We evaluate the performance of our method
using an approximation of the Nash convergence metric from game theory, which
measures how much players can benefit from unilaterally changing their
strategy. We apply our method to continuous Colonel Blotto games, single-item
and multi-item auctions, and a visibility game. The experiments show that our
method can quickly find high-quality approximate equilibria. Furthermore, they
show that the dimensionality of the input noise is crucial for performance. To
our knowledge, this paper is the first to solve general continuous-action games
with unrestricted mixed strategies and without any gradient information
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