Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences

From fundamental concepts and results to recent advances in computational social choice, this open access book provides a thorough and in-depth look at multi-winner voting based on approval preferences. The main focus is on axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results and several applications that are relevant in artificial intelligence, computer science and elections of any kind. What is the best way to select a set of candidates for a shortlist, for an executive committee, or for product recommendations? Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of candidates based on the preferences expressed by the voters. A wide variety of decision processes in settings ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer applications (collaborative filtering, dynamic Q&A platforms, diversity in search results, etc.) share the problem of identifying a representative subset of alternatives. The study of multi-winner voting provides the principled analysis of this task. Approval-based committee voting rules (in short: ABC rules) are multi-winner voting rules particularly suitable for practical use. Their usability is founded on the straightforward form in which the voters can express preferences: voters simply have to differentiate between approved and disapproved candidates. Proposals for ABC rules are numerous, some dating back to the late 19th century while others have been introduced only very recently. This book explains and discusses these rules, highlighting their individual strengths and weaknesses. With the help of this book, the reader will be able to choose a suitable ABC voting rule in a principled fashion, participate in, and be up to date with the ongoing research on this topic

Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences

Approval-based committee (ABC) rules are voting rules that output a fixed-size subset of candidates, a so-called committee. ABC rules select committees based on dichotomous preferences, i.e., a voter either approves or disapproves a candidate. This simple type of preferences makes ABC rules widely suitable for practical use. In this book, we summarize the current understanding of ABC rules from the viewpoint of computational social choice. The main focus is on axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results, and relevant applications.Comment: This is a draft of the upcoming book "Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences

Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules

We consider the manipulability of tournament rules for round-robin tournaments of $n$ competitors. Specifically, $n$ competitors are competing for a prize, and a tournament rule $r$ maps the result of all $\binom{n}{2}$ pairwise matches (called a tournament, $T$) to a distribution over winners. Rule $r$ is Condorcet-consistent if whenever $i$ wins all $n-1$ of her matches, $r$ selects $i$ with probability $1$. We consider strategic manipulation of tournaments where player $j$ might throw their match to player $i$ in order to increase the likelihood that one of them wins the tournament. Regardless of the reason why $j$ chooses to do this, the potential for manipulation exists as long as $\Pr[r(T) = i]$ increases by more than $\Pr[r(T) = j]$ decreases. Unfortunately, it is known that every Condorcet-consistent rule is manipulable (Altman and Kleinberg). In this work, we address the question of how manipulable Condorcet-consistent rules must necessarily be - by trying to minimize the difference between the increase in $\Pr[r(T) = i]$ and decrease in $\Pr[r(T) = j]$ for any potential manipulating pair. We show that every Condorcet-consistent rule is in fact $1/3$-manipulable, and that selecting a winner according to a random single elimination bracket is not $\alpha$-manipulable for any $\alpha > 1/3$. We also show that many previously studied tournament formats are all $1/2$-manipulable, and the popular class of Copeland rules (any rule that selects a player with the most wins) are all in fact $1$-manipulable, the worst possible. Finally, we consider extensions to match-fixing among sets of more than two players.Comment: 20 page

Apportionment and districting by Sum of Ranking Differences

Sum of Ranking Differences is an innovative statistical method that ranks competing solutions based on a reference point. The latter might arise naturally, or can be aggregated from the data. We provide two case studies to feature both possibilities. Apportionment and districting are two critical issues that emerge in relation to democratic elections. Theoreticians invented clever heuristics to measure malapportionment and the compactness of the shape of the constituencies, yet, there is no unique best method in either cases. Using data from Norway and the US we rank the standard methods both for the apportionment and for the districting problem. In case of apportionment, we find that all the classical methods perform reasonably well, with subtle but significant differences. By a small margin the Leximin method emerges as a winner, but—somewhat unexpectedly—the non-regular Imperiali method ties for first place. In districting, the Lee-Sallee index and a novel parametric method the so-called Moment Invariant performs the best, although the latter is sensitive to the function’s chosen parameter

Refinements and Randomised Versions of Some Tournament Solutions

We consider voting rules that are based on the majority graph. Such rules typically output large sets of winners. Our goal is to investigate a general method which leads to refinements of such rules. In particular, we use the idea of parallel universes, where each universe is connected with a permutation over alternatives. The permutation allows us to construct resolute voting rules (i.e. rules that always choose unique winners). Such resolute rules can be constructed in a variety of ways: we consider using binary voting trees to select a single alternative. In turn this permits the construction of neutral rules that output the set the possible winners of every parallel universe. The question of which rules can be constructed in this way has already been partially studied under the heading of agenda implementability. We further propose a randomised version in which the probability of being the winner is the ratio of universes in which the alternative wins. We also investigate (typically novel) rules that elect the alternatives that have maximal winning probability. These rules typically output small sets of winners, thus provide refinements of known tournament solutions

Perspectives on Incorporating Expert Feedback into Model Updates

Machine learning (ML) practitioners are increasingly tasked with developing models that are aligned with non-technical experts' values and goals. However, there has been insufficient consideration on how practitioners should translate domain expertise into ML updates. In this paper, we consider how to capture interactions between practitioners and experts systematically. We devise a taxonomy to match expert feedback types with practitioner updates. A practitioner may receive feedback from an expert at the observation- or domain-level, and convert this feedback into updates to the dataset, loss function, or parameter space. We review existing work from ML and human-computer interaction to describe this feedback-update taxonomy, and highlight the insufficient consideration given to incorporating feedback from non-technical experts. We end with a set of open questions that naturally arise from our proposed taxonomy and subsequent survey

Formal Methods for Trustworthy Voting Systems : From Trusted Components to Reliable Software

Voting is prominently an important part of democratic societies, and its outcome may have a dramatic and broad impact on societal progress. Therefore, it is paramount that such a society has extensive trust in the electoral process, such that the system’s functioning is reliable and stable with respect to the expectations within society. Yet, with or without the use of modern technology, voting is full of algorithmic and security challenges, and the failure to address these challenges in a controlled manner may produce fundamental flaws in the voting system and potentially undermine critical societal aspects. In this thesis, we argue for a development process of voting systems that is rooted in and assisted by formal methods that produce transparently checkable evidence for the guarantees that the final system should provide so that it can be deemed trustworthy. The goal of this thesis is to advance the state of the art in formal methods that allow to systematically develop trustworthy voting systems that can be provenly verified. In the literature, voting systems are modeled in the following four comparatively separable and distinguishable layers: (1) the physical layer, (2) the computational layer, (3) the election layer, and (4) the human layer. Current research usually either mostly stays within one of those layers or lacks machine-checkable evidence, and consequently, trusted and understandable criteria often lack formally proven and checkable guarantees on software-level and vice versa. The contributions in this work are formal methods that fill in the trust gap between the principal election layer and the computational layer by a reliable translation of trusted and understandable criteria into trustworthy software. Thereby, we enable that executable procedures can be formally traced back and understood by election experts without the need for inspection on code level, and trust can be preserved to the trustworthy system. The works in this thesis all contribute to this end and consist in five distinct contributions, which are the following: (I) a method for the generation of secure card-based communication schemes, (II) a method for the synthesis of reliable tallying procedures, (III) a method for the efficient verification of reliable tallying procedures, (IV) a method for the computation of dependable election margins for reliable audits, (V) a case study about the security verification of the GI voter-anonymization software. These contributions span formal methods on illustrative examples for each of the three principal components, (1) voter-ballot box communication, (2) election method, and (3) election management, between the election layer and the computational layer. Within the first component, the voter-ballot box communication channel, we build a bridge from the communication channel to the cryptography scheme by automatically generating secure card-based schemes from a small formal model with a parameterization of the desired security requirements. For the second component, the election method, we build a bridge from the election method to the tallying procedure by (1) automatically synthesizing a runnable tallying procedure from the desired requirements given as properties that capture the desired intuitions or regulations of fairness considerations, (2) automatically generating either comprehensible arguments or bounded proofs to compare tallying procedures based on user-definable fairness properties, and (3) automatically computing concrete election margins for a given tallying procedure, the collected ballots, and the computed election result, that enable efficient election audits. Finally, for the third and final component, the election management system, we perform a case study and apply state-of-the-art verification technology to a real-world e-voting system that has been used for the annual elections of the German Informatics Society (GI – “Gesellschaft für Informatik”) in 2019. The case study consists in the formal implementation-level security verification that the voter identities are securely anonymized and the voters’ passwords cannot be leaked. The presented methods assist the systematic development and verification of provenly trustworthy voting systems across traditional layers, i.e., from the election layer to the computational layer. They all pursue the goal of making voting systems trustworthy by reliable and explainable formal requirements. We evaluate the devised methods on minimal card-based protocols that compute a secure AND function for two different decks of cards, a classical knock-out tournament and several Condorcet rules, various plurality, scoring, and Condorcet rules from the literature, the Danish national parliamentary elections in 2015, and a state-of-the-art electronic voting system that is used for the German Informatics Society’s annual elections in 2019 and following