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    On Neuromechanical Approaches for the Study of Biological Grasp and Manipulation

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    Biological and robotic grasp and manipulation are undeniably similar at the level of mechanical task performance. However, their underlying fundamental biological vs. engineering mechanisms are, by definition, dramatically different and can even be antithetical. Even our approach to each is diametrically opposite: inductive science for the study of biological systems vs. engineering synthesis for the design and construction of robotic systems. The past 20 years have seen several conceptual advances in both fields and the quest to unify them. Chief among them is the reluctant recognition that their underlying fundamental mechanisms may actually share limited common ground, while exhibiting many fundamental differences. This recognition is particularly liberating because it allows us to resolve and move beyond multiple paradoxes and contradictions that arose from the initial reasonable assumption of a large common ground. Here, we begin by introducing the perspective of neuromechanics, which emphasizes that real-world behavior emerges from the intimate interactions among the physical structure of the system, the mechanical requirements of a task, the feasible neural control actions to produce it, and the ability of the neuromuscular system to adapt through interactions with the environment. This allows us to articulate a succinct overview of a few salient conceptual paradoxes and contradictions regarding under-determined vs. over-determined mechanics, under- vs. over-actuated control, prescribed vs. emergent function, learning vs. implementation vs. adaptation, prescriptive vs. descriptive synergies, and optimal vs. habitual performance. We conclude by presenting open questions and suggesting directions for future research. We hope this frank assessment of the state-of-the-art will encourage and guide these communities to continue to interact and make progress in these important areas

    A quantitative taxonomy of human hand grasps

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    Background: A proper modeling of human grasping and of hand movements is fundamental for robotics, prosthetics, physiology and rehabilitation. The taxonomies of hand grasps that have been proposed in scientific literature so far are based on qualitative analyses of the movements and thus they are usually not quantitatively justified. Methods: This paper presents to the best of our knowledge the first quantitative taxonomy of hand grasps based on biomedical data measurements. The taxonomy is based on electromyography and kinematic data recorded from 40 healthy subjects performing 20 unique hand grasps. For each subject, a set of hierarchical trees are computed for several signal features. Afterwards, the trees are combined, first into modality-specific (i.e. muscular and kinematic) taxonomies of hand grasps and then into a general quantitative taxonomy of hand movements. The modality-specific taxonomies provide similar results despite describing different parameters of hand movements, one being muscular and the other kinematic. Results: The general taxonomy merges the kinematic and muscular description into a comprehensive hierarchical structure. The obtained results clarify what has been proposed in the literature so far and they partially confirm the qualitative parameters used to create previous taxonomies of hand grasps. According to the results, hand movements can be divided into five movement categories defined based on the overall grasp shape, finger positioning and muscular activation. Part of the results appears qualitatively in accordance with previous results describing kinematic hand grasping synergies. Conclusions: The taxonomy of hand grasps proposed in this paper clarifies with quantitative measurements what has been proposed in the field on a qualitative basis, thus having a potential impact on several scientific fields

    Against requirements of rationality

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    Are inferences, theoretical and practical, subject to requirements of rationality? If so, are these of the form 'if … ought …' or 'ought … if …'? If the latter, how are we to understand the 'if'? It seems that, in all cases, we get unintuitive implications (often involving bootstrapping) if 'ought' connotes having reason. It is difficult to formulate such requirements, and obscure what they explain. There might also be a requirement forbidding self-contradiction (not that one's current beliefs can be consciously contradictory). It is a good question whether self-contradiction constitutes, or evidences, irrationality; but talk of a rational requirement causes trouble
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