Because of Sex

Many Americans currently believe that federal law prohibits discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender identity in the workplace. While it is true that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits employers from discriminating because of an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, courts and legislators have historically been slow to extend these protections to LGBT workers. The result of this reluctance is that LGBT employees remain largely unprotected under an unpredictable patchwork of laws and policies, consisting of presidential executive orders, private employer initiatives, city and county ordinances, gubernatorial executive orders, and state legislation. As a result, discrimination in the workforce remains a constant in the lived experience of LGBT persons. As of 2016, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia had taken some steps, either legislatively or through executive action, to limit or prohibit workplace discrimination on the bases of gender identity or sexual orientation. Yet even among these states, victims of workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity were provided redress through a private right of action in only twenty-two states and the District of Columbia. Section I of this article discusses this background. Section II article discusses development of the prohibition against discrimination “because of sex” that is contained in Title VII, including the legislative history of Title VII and the initial interpretations of the meaning of “because of sex” in the Title VII context. Section III is focused on general questions regarding the applications of Title VII to claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation, with Sections IV and V focused more specifically on treatment by the EEOC and the courts, respectively, of the question of whether Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. Section VI, the concluding section of this article, examines the theories through which Title VII has been seen by courts to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Ultimately, this article attempts to propose a unified theory under which discrimination based on sexual orientation would be included under Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because of sex.

PUTUSAN HAKIM ATAS PEMENUHAN HAK-HAK ISTRI PADA KASUS CERAI GUGAT DALAM PERSPEKTIF CEDAW

This study aims to identify the dimension of gender justice in the judge's decision on the divorce case in the Tasikmalaya City Religious Court Decision No. 2000/Pdt. G/2021/PA Tmk which requires the husband (defendant) to pay 'iddah, mut'ah, and madhliyah to the wife (plaintiff). This normative-empirical legal research uses a philosophical approach. The principle of gender equality in CEDAW becomes the theory of analysis of the subject matter of this study. The results of the study show that there is a dimension of gender justice in the judge's decision at the Tasikmalaya City Religious Court No. 2000/Pdt.G/2021/Pa.Tm which is in line with the three principles of the CEDAW convention.  First, the principle of substantive equality in the judge's gender-fair decision for the rights of plaintiffs is manifested juridically in the decision of the Tasikmalaya City Religious Court. Second, the principle of non-discrimination in the judge's decision that is gender fair to the plaintiff's rights based on the defendant has no longer provided a living. Third, the principle of state obligation on gender-fair judges' decisions for plaintiffs' rights based on gender-responsive laws on women's rights after divorce. The theoretical implications of this study show that the principle of gender mainstreaming in the CEDAW convention can be transformed into the decision of a Religious Court judge regarding a lawsuit case. The limitation of this study has not examined the variety of factors that often make judges passive, so that if the plaintiff does not demand a grant from the defendant, then the plaintiff does not get material rights from the plaintiff

Is diversity our strength?

A prominent characteristic of the city of Toronto is its increasing diversity, with half of the city’s population being foreign-born. While the concept of diversity appeals to Toronto’s reputation as a multi-cultural haven, the city’s approach to managing diversity is becoming increasingly instrumentalist, i.e. diversity is considered an asset as long as its benefits are economically valuable. As a result, inner-city neighbourhoods in Toronto are thriving due to development projects and services, while the most diverse neighbourhoods in the inner-suburbs are left in a dire state. This article presents an analysis of how the concept of diversity used within policy euphemises systemic discrimination and inequality based on race, class and gender. It serves to reveal the mismatch between policy rhetoric on diversity and its materialisation in the daily lives of the inhabitants of a low-income Toronto innersuburb, by juxtaposing policy discourses with inhabitants’ everyday experiences. By illustrating how inhabitants reproduce negative essentialised stereotypes based on diversity markers, the article argues that talking diversity as an alternative to or an escape from problematising the intertwined systems of race, class and gender oppression, could potentially serve to perpetuate them

Transgender Need Not Apply: A Report on Gender Identity Job Discrimination

[Excerpt] Make the Road New York investigated possible employment discrimination against transgender job-seekers in Manhattan’s retail sector using the research tool of matched pair testing. We sent out carefully matched pairs of job applicants, one transgender and one not, to apply for the same jobs. Each pair was equivalent in age and ethnicity and equipped with fictionalized resumes that were evenly matched. Both testing pairs underwent extensive training on how to adopt similar interview styles and how to document their job-seeking interactions objectively. Transgender testers were instructed to explicitly inform store managers and interviewers of their transgender status whenever feasible

An Analysis of the Male-Female Earnings Differential in Pakistan

Several articles have examined the status of women in developing countries. But while numerous studies have attempted to estimate the extent of wage discrimination against women in the west, few such studies have been conducted for Third World cOWltries. The only such published study for Pakistan appears to be Ashraf and Ashrafs (1993) examination of the gender earnings differential for Rawalpindi City. Given the very restricted sample (based on just one city in Pakistan) and the relatively dated data (from 1975) used in that study, a need clearly exists for a more comprehensive examination of earnings by gender. This article represents the first intensive look into male-female earnings differentials, not only for Pakistan as a whole, but for each of its four provinces individually as well. Gender earnings differentials have also been calculated for a number of industrial subgroups. Computations have been made for the years 1979 and 1985-86.1 This allows the trend in the gender earnings gap to be tracked over that period. Data from the Household Income and Expenditure Surveys are used in the estimations for both the Oaxaca (1973) model as well as the more recently developed Cotton (1988) and Neumark (1988) models. A new twist is the incorporation of correction for selectivity bias in the sample data which strengthens the methodological underpinnings of the model