588,270 research outputs found
Playing strategically against nature? – Decisions viewed from a game-theoretic frame
Common research on decision-making investigates non-interdependent situations, i.e., “games against nature”. However, humans are social beings and many decisions are made in social settings, where they mutually influence each other, i.e., “strategic games”. Mathematical game theory gives a benchmark for rational decisions in such situations. The strategic character makes psychological decision-making more complex by introducing the outcomes for others as an additional attribute of that situation; it also broadens the field for potential coordination and cooperation problems. From an evolutionary point of view, behavior in strategic situations was at a competitive edge. This paper demonstrates that even in games against nature, people sometimes decide as if they were in a strategic game; it outlines theoretical and empirical consequences of such a shift of the frame. It examines whether some irrationalities of human decision-making might be explained by such a shift in grasping the situation. It concludes that the mixed strategies in games against nature demand a high expertise and can only be found in situations where these strategies improve the effects of minimax-strategies that are used in cases of risk-aversion.
The core of bicapacities and bipolar games
Bicooperative games generalize classical cooperative games in the sense that a player is allowed to play in favor or against some aim, besides non participation. Bicapacities are monotonic bicooperative games, they are useful in decision making where underlying scales are of bipolar nature, i.e., they distinguish between good/satisfactory values and bad/unsatisfactory ones. We propose here a more general framework to represent such situations, called bipolar game. We study the problem of finding the core of such games, i.e., theset of additive dominating games.fuzzy measure, bicapacity, cooperative game, bipolar scale,core
Uncertainty Averse Preferences
We study uncertainty averse preferences, that is, complete and transitive preferences that are convex and monotone. We establish a representation result, which is at same time general and rich in structure. Many objective functions commonly used in applications are special cases of this representation.ambiguity aversion, games against nature, model uncertainty, smooth ambiguity preferences, variational preferences
Learning in Repeated Games: Human Versus Machine
While Artificial Intelligence has successfully outperformed humans in complex
combinatorial games (such as chess and checkers), humans have retained their
supremacy in social interactions that require intuition and adaptation, such as
cooperation and coordination games. Despite significant advances in learning
algorithms, most algorithms adapt at times scales which are not relevant for
interactions with humans, and therefore the advances in AI on this front have
remained of a more theoretical nature. This has also hindered the experimental
evaluation of how these algorithms perform against humans, as the length of
experiments needed to evaluate them is beyond what humans are reasonably
expected to endure (max 100 repetitions). This scenario is rapidly changing, as
recent algorithms are able to converge to their functional regimes in shorter
time-scales. Additionally, this shift opens up possibilities for experimental
investigation: where do humans stand compared with these new algorithms? We
evaluate humans experimentally against a representative element of these
fast-converging algorithms. Our results indicate that the performance of at
least one of these algorithms is comparable to, and even exceeds, the
performance of people
Transition Semantics - The Dynamics of Dependence Logic
We examine the relationship between Dependence Logic and game logics. A
variant of Dynamic Game Logic, called Transition Logic, is developed, and we
show that its relationship with Dependence Logic is comparable to the one
between First-Order Logic and Dynamic Game Logic discussed by van Benthem. This
suggests a new perspective on the interpretation of Dependence Logic formulas,
in terms of assertions about reachability in games of im- perfect information
against Nature. We then capitalize on this intuition by developing expressively
equivalent variants of Dependence Logic in which this interpretation is taken
to the foreground
Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs
Interactive-proof games model the scenario where an honest party interacts with powerful but strategic provers, to elicit from them the correct answer to a computational question. Interactive proofs are increasingly used as a framework to design protocols for computation outsourcing.
Existing interactive-proof games largely fall into two categories: either as games of cooperation such as multi-prover interactive proofs and cooperative rational proofs, where the provers work together as a team; or as games of conflict such as refereed games, where the provers directly compete with each other in a zero-sum game. Neither of these extremes truly capture the strategic nature of service providers in outsourcing applications. How to design and analyze non-cooperative interactive proofs is an important open problem.
In this paper, we introduce a mechanism-design approach to define a multi-prover interactive-proof model in which the provers are rational and non-cooperative - they act to maximize their expected utility given others\u27 strategies. We define a strong notion of backwards induction as our solution concept to analyze the resulting extensive-form game with imperfect information.
We fully characterize the complexity of our proof system under different utility gap guarantees. (At a high level, a utility gap of u means that the protocol is robust against provers that may not care about a utility loss of 1/u.) We show, for example, that the power of non-cooperative rational interactive proofs with a polynomial utility gap is exactly equal to the complexity class P^{NEXP}
The core of bicapacities and bipolar games
Selected papers from IFSA 2005, 11th World Congress of International Fuzzy Systems Association - Beijing, China, 28-31 July 2005 ED EPSInternational audienceBicooperative games generalize classical cooperative games in the sense that a player is allowed to play in favor or against some aim, besides non participation. Bicapacities are monotonic bicooperative games, they are useful in decision making where underlying scales are of bipolar nature, i.e., they distinguish between good/satisfactory values and bad/unsatisfactory ones. We propose here a more general framework to represent such situations, called bipolar game. We study the problem of finding the core of such games, i.e., theset of additive dominating games
Guaranteed Inertia Functions in Dynamical Games.
This paper deals with inertia functions in control theory introduced in Aubin, Bernardo and Saint-Pierre (2004, 2005) and their adaptation to dynamical games. The inertia function associates with any initial state-control pair the smallest of the worst norms over time of the velocities of the controls regulating viable evolutions. For tychastic systems (parameterized systems where the parameters are tyches, disturbances, perturbations, etc.), the palicinesia of a tyche measure the worst norm over time of the velocities of the tyches. The palicinesia function is the largest palicinesia threshold c such that all evolutions with palicinesia smaller than or equal to c are viable. For dynamical games where one parameter is the control and the other one is a tyche (games against nature or robust control), we define the guaranteed inertia function associated with any initial state-control-tyche triple the best of the worst of the norms of the velocities of the controls and of the tyches and study their properties. Viability Characterizations and Hamilton-Jacobi equations of which these inertia and palicinesia functions are solutions are provided.Viability; dynamical games; inertia function; Tychastic systems; palicinesia;
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