Allocation mechanisms, incentives, and endemic institutional externalities

Whether an economic agent’s decision creates an externality often depends on the institutional context in which the decision was made. Indeed, in orthodox economics, a technological or exogenous externality occurs just in case one agent’s economic welfare or production possibilities are directly affected by the market decisions of other agents. A pecuniary externality occurs just in case one consumer’s economic welfare or producer’s profit is affected indirectly by price changes caused by changes in other agents’ decisions. Similarly, an institutional or endogenous externality may arise whenever allocations are determined by a mechanism that is not strategy proof for some agent. Then even a resource balance constraint creates an institutional externality except in special cases such as when no individual agent’s action can affect market clearing prices — i.e., there are no pecuniary externalities

Internet Marketing for Profit Organizations: A framework for the implementation of strategic internet marketing

Merged with duplicate record 10026.1/828 on 13.03.2017 by CS (TIS)The development of the Internet has significantly changed the face of established markets and operation approaches across a tremendous spectrum of different industries. Within the competitive environment of those industries, the opportunities and risks derived from the new platform are so ubiquitous that unused opportunities quickly translate into potential risks. Those opportunities and risks demand for a structured approach how to implement a sustainable Internet marketing strategy that targets clear business objectives. Marketing and strategic management theory describes very clear structural principles towards their operational implementation. Based on those principles an extensive literature review has been conducted which confirms the result from representative statistics that demonstrate the lack of a comprehensive framework for strategic Internet marketing. The distinct result of this research is such a comprehensive framework which has been directly derived from the illustrated principles of strategic management and Internet marketing. All major components of this generic framework are designed, evaluated in dedicated surveys and validated in extensive case studies. The main achievements of the research are: • A comprehensive review of the current state-of-the-art Internet marketing strategies • Conceptual specification of a strategic Internet marketing framework with generic applicability to profit organizations • Demonstration of the practical feasibility of the proposed framework at the implementation level (via several examples like the SIMTF and SIMPF) • Confirmation of the applicability of the framework based upon a survey of potential beneficiaries • Validation of the effectiveness of the approach via case study scenarios Changing the understanding of a former technical discipline, the thesis describes how Internet marketing becomes a precise strategic instrument for profit organizations. The new structured, complete and self-similar framework facilitates sales organizations to significantly increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their marketing operations. Furthermore, the framework ensures a high level of transparency about the impact and benefit of individual activities. The new model explicitly answers concerns and problems raised and documented in existing research and accommodate for the current limitations of strategic Internet marketing. The framework allows evaluating existing as well as future Internet marketing tactics and provides a reference model for all other definitions of objectives, KPI and work packages. Finally this thesis also matures the subject matter of Internet marketing as a discipline of independent scientific research providing an underlying structure for subsequent studies.Darmstadt Node of the CSCAN Network at University of Applied Sciences, Darmstad

Endogenous games with goals : side-payments among goal-directed agents

Boolean games have been developed as a paradigm for modelling societies of goal-directed agents. In boolean games agents exercise control over propositional variables and strive to achieve a goal formula whose realization might require the opponents’ cooperation. The presence of agents that are goal-directed makes it difficult for an external authority to be able to remove undesirable properties that are inconsistent with agents’ goals, as shown by recent contributions in the multi-agent literature. What this paper does is to analyse the problem of regulation of goal-direct agents from within the system, i.e., what happens when agents themselves are given the chance to negotiate the strategies to be played with one another. Concretely, we introduce endogenous games with goals, obtained coupling a general model of goal-directed agents (strategic games with goals) with a general model of pre-play negotiations (endogenous games) coming from game theory. Strategic games with goals are shown to have a direct correspondence with strategic games (Proposition 1) but, when side-payments are allowed in the pre-play phase, display a striking imbalance (Proposition 4). The effect of side-payments can be fully simulated by taxation mechanisms studied in the literature (Proposition 7), yet we show sufficient conditions under which outcomes can be rationally sustained without external intervention (Proposition 5). Also, integrating taxation mechanisms and side-payments, we are able to transform our starting models in such a way that outcomes that are theoretically sustainable thanks to a pre-play phase can be actually sustained even with limited resources (Proposition 8). Finally, we show how an external authority incentivising a group of agents can be studied as a special agent of an appropriately extended endogenous game with goals (Proposition 11)

Human–agent collaboration for disaster response

In the aftermath of major disasters, first responders are typically overwhelmed with large numbers of, spatially distributed, search and rescue tasks, each with their own requirements. Moreover, responders have to operate in highly uncertain and dynamic environments where new tasks may appear and hazards may be spreading across the disaster space. Hence, rescue missions may need to be re-planned as new information comes in, tasks are completed, or new hazards are discovered. Finding an optimal allocation of resources to complete all the tasks is a major computational challenge. In this paper, we use decision theoretic techniques to solve the task allocation problem posed by emergency response planning and then deploy our solution as part of an agent-based planning tool in real-world field trials. By so doing, we are able to study the interactional issues that arise when humans are guided by an agent. Specifically, we develop an algorithm, based on a multi-agent Markov decision process representation of the task allocation problem and show that it outperforms standard baseline solutions. We then integrate the algorithm into a planning agent that responds to requests for tasks from participants in a mixed-reality location-based game, called AtomicOrchid, that simulates disaster response settings in the real-world. We then run a number of trials of our planning agent and compare it against a purely human driven system. Our analysis of these trials show that human commanders adapt to the planning agent by taking on a more supervisory role and that, by providing humans with the flexibility of requesting plans from the agent, allows them to perform more tasks more efficiently than using purely human interactions to allocate tasks. We also discuss how such flexibility could lead to poor performance if left unchecked

International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO

Multinational corporations ( MNCs ) operate today in an increasingly open global trade environment. While tariff barriers have collapsed dramatically, several states and numerous scholars have raised concerns that the benefits of trade liberalization are undermined by various non-tariff barriers ( NTBs ) to trade, including the anticompetitive business practices of private enterprise. As a result, demands to link trade and antitrust policies more closely by extending the coverage of the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) to incorporate antitrust law have gathered momentum over the last decade. Most advocates of a WTO antitrust agreement base their normative claims on largely intuitive assumptions about the necessity or desirability of international rules. The existing literature contains few examinations of the strategic situation that characterizes international antitrust cooperation and, as a result, has either completely ignored or largely mischaracterized the collective action problem that has impeded the efforts to negotiate any multinational antitrust rules. With the help of insights developed in game theory, this Article seeks to fill the gap in the current debate by analyzing the strategic interactions underlying states\u27 attempts to seek convergence of their antitrust laws. Understanding why attempts to generate formal international antitrust cooperation have thus far been unsuccessful is a critical prerequisite for designing a normatively desirable international antitrust regime. By offering a more accurate descriptive account for the failure to reach a binding international antitrust agreement, the Article can also be expected to inform the normative debate on optimal international antitrust governance