DYVERSE: DYnamic VERtical Scaling in Multi-tenant Edge Environments

Multi-tenancy in resource-constrained environments is a key challenge in Edge computing. In this paper, we develop 'DYVERSE: DYnamic VERtical Scaling in Edge' environments, which is the first light-weight and dynamic vertical scaling mechanism for managing resources allocated to applications for facilitating multi-tenancy in Edge environments. To enable dynamic vertical scaling, one static and three dynamic priority management approaches that are workload-aware, community-aware and system-aware, respectively are proposed. This research advocates that dynamic vertical scaling and priority management approaches reduce Service Level Objective (SLO) violation rates. An online-game and a face detection workload in a Cloud-Edge test-bed are used to validate the research. The merits of DYVERSE is that there is only a sub-second overhead per Edge server when 32 Edge servers are deployed on a single Edge node. When compared to executing applications on the Edge servers without dynamic vertical scaling, static priorities and dynamic priorities reduce SLO violation rates of requests by up to 4% and 12% for the online game, respectively, and in both cases 6% for the face detection workload. Moreover, for both workloads, the system-aware dynamic vertical scaling method effectively reduces the latency of non-violated requests, when compared to other methods

Coalition Formation and Combinatorial Auctions; Applications to Self-organization and Self-management in Utility Computing

In this paper we propose a two-stage protocol for resource management in a hierarchically organized cloud. The first stage exploits spatial locality for the formation of coalitions of supply agents; the second stage, a combinatorial auction, is based on a modified proxy-based clock algorithm and has two phases, a clock phase and a proxy phase. The clock phase supports price discovery; in the second phase a proxy conducts multiple rounds of a combinatorial auction for the package of services requested by each client. The protocol strikes a balance between low-cost services for cloud clients and a decent profit for the service providers. We also report the results of an empirical investigation of the combinatorial auction stage of the protocol.Comment: 14 page

On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular, we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing cyber risks due to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market, which is composed of the infrastructure provider, the blockchain provider, the cyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from the infrastructure provider, e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain the blockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. The blockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and the service price charged to the users, in order to improve the security of the blockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provider also purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer to protect itself from the potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjusts the insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain service. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, we model the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and the cyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and then the users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service. Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a series of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market game