Secure wireless powered and cooperative jamming D2D communications

This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered device-to-device (D2D) communication network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, where a hybrid base station (BS) in a cellular network not only provides power wirelessly for the D2D transmitter to guarantee power efficiency for the D2D network, but also serves as a cooperative jammer (CJ) to interfere with the eavesdroppers. The cellular and D2D networks can belong to different service providers, which means that the D2D transmitter would need to pay for the energy service released by the hybrid BS to guarantee secure D2D communication. In order to exploit the hierarchical interaction between the BS and the D2D transmitter, we first formulate a Stackelberg game based energy trading scheme, where the quadratic energy cost model is considered. Then, a non-energy trading based Stackelberg game is investigated to study the reversed roles of the BS and the D2D users. For comparison, we also formulate and resolve the social welfare optimization problem. We derive the closed-form Stackelberg equilibriums of the formulated games and the optimal solutions for the social welfare optimization problem. Simulation results are provided to validate our proposed schemes to highlight the importance of energy trading interaction between cellular and D2D networks

Secure wireless powered and cooperative jamming D2D communications

This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered device-to-device (D2D) communication network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, where a hybrid base station (BS) in a cellular network not only provides power wirelessly for the D2D transmitter to guarantee power efficiency for the D2D network, but also serves as a cooperative jammer (CJ) to interfere with the eavesdroppers. The cellular and D2D networks can belong to different service providers, which means that the D2D transmitter would need to pay for the energy service released by the hybrid BS to guarantee secure D2D communication. In order to exploit the hierarchical interaction between the BS and the D2D transmitter, we first formulate a Stackelberg game based energy trading scheme, where the quadratic energy cost model is considered. Then, a non-energy trading based Stackelberg game is investigated to study the reversed roles of the BS and the D2D users. For comparison, we also formulate and resolve the social welfare optimization problem. We derive the closed-form Stackelberg equilibriums of the formulated games and the optimal solutions for the social welfare optimization problem. Simulation results are provided to validate our proposed schemes to highlight the importance of energy trading interaction between cellular and D2D networks

Securing Large-Scale D2D Networks Using Covert Communication and Friendly Jamming

We exploit both covert communication and friendly jamming to propose a friendly jamming-assisted covert communication and use it to doubly secure a large-scale device-to-device (D2D) network against eavesdroppers (i.e., wardens). The D2D transmitters defend against the wardens by: 1) hiding their transmissions with enhanced covert communication, and 2) leveraging friendly jamming to ensure information secrecy even if the D2D transmissions are detected. We model the combat between the wardens and the D2D network (the transmitters and the friendly jammers) as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Therein, the wardens are the followers at the lower stage aiming to minimize their detection errors, and the D2D network is the leader at the upper stage aiming to maximize its utility (in terms of link reliability and communication security) subject to the constraint on communication covertness. We apply stochastic geometry to model the network spatial configuration so as to conduct a system-level study. We develop a bi-level optimization algorithm to search for the equilibrium of the proposed Stackelberg game based on the successive convex approximation (SCA) method and Rosenbrock method. Numerical results reveal interesting insights. We observe that without the assistance from the jammers, it is difficult to achieve covert communication on D2D transmission. Moreover, we illustrate the advantages of the proposed friendly jamming-assisted covert communication by comparing it with the information-theoretical secrecy approach in terms of the secure communication probability and network utility

Secure Two-Way Transmission via Wireless-Powered Untrusted Relay and External Jammer

In this paper, we propose a two-way secure communication scheme where two transceivers exchange confidential messages via a wireless powered untrusted amplify-and-forward (AF) relay in the presence of an external jammer. We take into account both friendly jamming (FJ) and Gaussian noise jamming (GNJ) scenarios. Based on the time switching (TS) architecture at the relay, the data transmission is done in three phases. In the first phase, both the energy-starved nodes, the untrustworthy relay and the jammer, are charged by non-information radio frequency (RF) signals from the sources. In the second phase, the two sources send their information signals and concurrently, the jammer transmits artificial noise to confuse the curious relay. Finally, the third phase is dedicated to forward a scaled version of the received signal from the relay to the sources. For the proposed secure transmission schemes, we derive new closed-form lower-bound expressions for the ergodic secrecy sum rate (ESSR) in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. We further analyze the asymptotic ESSR to determine the key parameters; the high SNR slope and the high SNR power offset of the jamming based scenarios. To highlight the performance advantage of the proposed FJ, we also examine the scenario of without jamming (WoJ). Finally, numerical examples and discussions are provided to acquire some engineering insights, and to demonstrate the impacts of different system parameters on the secrecy performance of the considered communication scenarios. The numerical results illustrate that the proposed FJ significantly outperforms the traditional one-way communication and the Constellation rotation approach, as well as our proposed benchmarks, the two-way WoJ and GNJ scenarios.Comment: 14 pages, 6 figures, Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technolog

A Survey of Physical Layer Security Techniques for 5G Wireless Networks and Challenges Ahead

Physical layer security which safeguards data confidentiality based on the information-theoretic approaches has received significant research interest recently. The key idea behind physical layer security is to utilize the intrinsic randomness of the transmission channel to guarantee the security in physical layer. The evolution towards 5G wireless communications poses new challenges for physical layer security research. This paper provides a latest survey of the physical layer security research on various promising 5G technologies, including physical layer security coding, massive multiple-input multiple-output, millimeter wave communications, heterogeneous networks, non-orthogonal multiple access, full duplex technology, etc. Technical challenges which remain unresolved at the time of writing are summarized and the future trends of physical layer security in 5G and beyond are discussed.Comment: To appear in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication

A Stackelberg-game approach for disaster-recovery communications utilizing cooperative D2D

In this paper, we investigate disaster-recovery com- munications utilizing two-cell cooperative D2D communications. Specifically, one cell is in a healthy area while the other is in a disaster area. A user equipment (UE) in the healthy area aims to assist a UE in the disaster area to recover wireless information transfer (WIT) via an energy harvesting (EH) relay. In the healthy area, the cellular BS shares the spectrum with the UE, however, both of them may belong to different service providers. Thus, the UE pays an amount of price as incentive to the BS as part of two processes: energy trading and interference pricing. We formulate these two processes as two Stackelberg games, where their equilibrium is derived as closed- form solutions. The results help provide a sustainable framework for disaster recovery when the involving parties juggle between energy trading, interference compromise and payment incentives in establishing communications during the recovery process

A Stackelberg-game approach for disaster-recovery communications utilizing cooperative D2D

In this paper, we investigate disaster-recovery com- munications utilizing two-cell cooperative D2D communications. Specifically, one cell is in a healthy area while the other is in a disaster area. A user equipment (UE) in the healthy area aims to assist a UE in the disaster area to recover wireless information transfer (WIT) via an energy harvesting (EH) relay. In the healthy area, the cellular BS shares the spectrum with the UE, however, both of them may belong to different service providers. Thus, the UE pays an amount of price as incentive to the BS as part of two processes: energy trading and interference pricing. We formulate these two processes as two Stackelberg games, where their equilibrium is derived as closed- form solutions. The results help provide a sustainable framework for disaster recovery when the involving parties juggle between energy trading, interference compromise and payment incentives in establishing communications during the recovery process