System dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory for quality supervision among construction stakeholders

To address the gap, that is, few studies have explored the influence of the participants’ interactions with one another during construction quality supervision, this paper proposes a system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory to describe the complex and dynamic interactions among tripartite stakeholders in China, including the project owner (PO), construction supervising engineer (CSE), and construction contractor (CC). First, the replicated dynamic equation set is established in terms of expense targets. Second, the equilibrium solutions of the equation set are obtained to test strategy options. The trends of system fluctuations caused by penalty and reward changes are also analyzed. Finally, the stability of the proposed model is improved by integrating a dynamic penalty–reward scenario into the evolutionary strategy of the PO. Simulation results show that: 1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in initial interactions, 2) the degrees of penalty and reward considerably affect the CC’s rate variable, and 3) the dynamic penalty–reward scenario could effectively improve the stability of the proposed model. The unsteadiness of the quality supervision system and the stability control scenario could help in understanding the impact of interactions among stakeholders and provide suggestions for optimizing quality supervision procedures

Can command-and-control policy drive low-carbon transition in energy-intensive enterprises? -a study based on evolutionary game theory

There are two views on whether command-and-control policy can promote carbon emission reduction: the “compliance cost” theory and the “innovation compensation” theory. In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model among energy-intensive enterprises, verification agencies, and local governments from the game theory perspective to explore the impact of command-and-control policy on the low-carbon transition of energy-intensive enterprises. The interaction mechanism of the three actors and the main factors affecting the low-carbon transition of the enterprises are further analyzed with the help of the MATLAB simulation method. The study results show that command-and-control policies can promote the low-carbon transition of enterprises and have a suppressive effect on bribery behavior. In the actual game process, enterprises will compare the cost of low-carbon transition with that of no low-carbon transition. The cost of low-carbon transition is higher when the government’s incentives and penalties are small, so there is a “compliance cost” effect, and the government cannot promote low-carbon transition by increasing the intensity of regulation. On the contrary, when the government’s incentives and penalties are strong enough, enterprises will make a low-carbon transition spontaneously in the face of continuously increasing environmental regulation intensity, which supports the theory of “innovation compensation.” In addition, increasing the profitability of product sales and increasing the cost of bribes are also effective ways to promote low-carbon transition. Finally, relevant policy recommendations were proposed based on the main conclusions. This work opens up a new perspective for environmental regulation theory and provides a theoretical reference and practical basis for developing low-carbon transition

Governance strategies for end-of-life electric vehicle battery recycling in China: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

End-of-life (EOL) electric vehicle (EV) batteries have both economic and environmental benefits if recycled in an environmentally friendly manner while they may cause environmental pollution if treated improperly. China is currently working hard to promote the development of a circular economy by EOL EV battery recycling. However, conflicts of interest among electric vehicle manufacturers (EVMs), consumers, and the government often hinder efficient recycling. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model under the condition of bounded rationality, analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy of three participants, and combines with numerical simulation to explore the feasible governance strategies of EOL EV battery recycling. The results show that four evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) correspond to the three stages of the EOL EV battery recycling industry: early stage, development stage, and maturity stage. In the early stage, the punishment strategy is more critical to motivate EVMs and consumers to actively participate in battery recycling. The subsidy mechanisms can influence the strategic choices of the three participants, but the excessive subsidy is not conducive to the sustainable development of the EOL EV battery industry. In addition, when the industry matures, the government will gradually decrease intervention, thereby realizing the development path of EOL EV battery recycling from exogenous government supervision to endogenous profit drive

One Path or Several? Understanding the Varied Development of Tripartism in New European Capitalisms

Are newly established institutions capable of shaping actors' strategies and coordinating behavior on a single path? Contrary to punctuated equilibrium analyses, this paper suggests that the constraining capacity of a range of newly established institutions in new European capitalisms is weak and that their very interpretation is subject to contention. Focusing on peak-level tripartism - a formally similar institution whose functioning has varied across national contexts - this paper proposes an actor-centered framework to elucidate the logic and consequences of actors' ongoing strategic maneuvering for the interpretation, enactment, and development of these young institutions. Combining insights of rational choice and historical institutionalism, the paper develops a heuristic model which, by focusing on strategic choices of government offi cials and union leaders, links the varied enactment of tripartism to different power balances that become mutually accepted in the course of their repeated interactions. In offering a set of falsifi able propositions, the paper provides a guideline for building analytical narratives to evaluate empirically this model.Sind neu geschaffene Institutionen in der Lage, Akteurstrategien zu determinieren? Der Ansatz dieses Discussion Papers steht im Gegensatz zu "Punctuated-Equilibrium"-Ansätzen. Es wird argumentiert, dass in den neuen osteuropäischen Marktwirtschaften der Einfluss einiger neu geschaffener Institutionen schwach und ihre Interpretation strittig ist. Im Fokus der Betrachtung steht dabei der Tripartismus auf zentraler Ebene - eine Institution, die in verschiedenen nationalen Kontexten unterschiedliche Funktionen entwickelt hat. Von einem akteurzentrierten Ansatz aus werden Logik und Konsequenzen des permanenten strategischen Manövrierens der Akteure für die Interpretation, Inkraftsetzung und Entwicklung dieser jungen Institutionen untersucht. Das Paper kombiniert Erkenntnisse des "Rational-Choice"-Institutionalismus und des historischen Institutionalismus und entwickelt daraus ein heuristisches Modell, das - durch Fokussierung auf die strategischen Entscheidungen von Regierungsbeamten und Gewerkschaftsführern - die unterschiedlichen Inkraftsetzungen des Tripartismus mit unterschiedlichen Kräfteverhältnissen in Verbindung setzt. Diese wiederum werden im Zuge ihrer wiederholten Interaktionen gegenseitig anerkannt. Das Paper stellt eine Reihe falsifizierbarer Hypothesen auf, die Anhaltspunkte für "Analytical Narratives" bieten, anhand derer das Modell empirisch bewertet werden kann.Introduction Postcommunist tripartism: Extensive functions, ambiguous rules Causes or effects? Reconsidering the institutions–behavior link The four pillars of an interactionist approach Shaping postcommunist tripartism: Modeling interactions Initial choices Subsequent choices Interaction outcomes: Distinct institutional paths A guideline for applying the model Conclusions: Power, perceptions and institutional development Reference

パラメトリック設計とロボットによる自動化施工の実用化に影響を与える要因に関する研究

The construction industry has always been an important part of human economic activity. As time goes on, building techniques and construction methods are changing. However, with the increasing acceleration of social development, traditional construction methods have reached their limits. Both in China and Japan are facing the problem of aging population structure and low birth rate. The human demand for complex forms of construction is growing, yet experienced workers are in short supply. The construction industry continues to undergo industrial upgrading, while the rise of digital design and the widespread use of robotics point the way to the future of the construction industry. To explore the possibilities of parametric design and robotic automated construction through two practical projects. We also explore the factors affecting the application of robotic automated construction technology by building an evolutionary game model to provide a policy reference for the government, construction companies and public universities.北九州市立大

All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes

Has globalization diluted the power of national governments to regulate their own economies? Are international governmental and nongovernmental organizations weakening the hold of nation-states on global regulatory agendas? Many observers think so. But in All Politics Is Global , Daniel Drezner argues that this view is wrong. Despite globalization, states--especially the great powers--still dominate international regulatory regimes, and the regulatory goals of states are driven by their domestic interests. As Drezner shows, state size still matters. The great powers--the United States and the European Union--remain the key players in writing global regulations, and their power is due to the size of their internal economic markets. If they agree, there will be effective global governance. If they don't agree, governance will be fragmented or ineffective. And, paradoxically, the most powerful sources of great-power preferences are the least globalized elements of their economies. Testing this revisionist model of global regulatory governance on an unusually wide variety of cases, including the Internet, finance, genetically modified organisms, and intellectual property rights, Drezner shows why there is such disparity in the strength of international regulations.globalization, politics, governance, international regulatory regimes, nongovernmental organizations, states, great powers

Still Dirty After All These Years: Political Leadership, Knowledge, and Socialization and Regional Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia

This dissertation examines the microprocesses of regime creation in Northeast Asia regarding transboundary environmental problems. Despite the growing need for international environmental cooperation and policy coordination at the regional and global levels, Northeast Asia has not yet succeeded in reaching any binding regional agreement on any environmental issue, even though it has developed various environmental cooperative mechanisms regarding transboundary pollution. Rather than characterizing regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia as “non-regime,” this study unpacks the varying forms of collective action in terms of the speed of development of cooperative mechanisms and the substantive content of the development undertaken by states in the region. The causal relationships between specific forms of political leadership, knowledge, and socialization and the degrees and forms of regional collective action is explored regarding the transboundary air pollution issues of the region, including acid rain, dust and sandstorms, and various long-range transboundary air pollutants. In addition to comparing the participation of countries in this region in broader Northeast Asian cooperative mechanisms, the study also analyzes the differences between European and East Asian experiences on this topic. An analysis of the three cases indicates that all three independent variables areonly partly associated with varying degrees of collective action as measured by formal features and concrete collective action in Northeast Asia. The study’s comparison of the varying degrees of collective action in Northeast Asia and Europe and among the three studied Northeast Asian environmental cooperative mechanisms discovers two useful insights. First, the analysis supports the hypothesis on social mechanisms among political leadership, shared knowledge, and socialization, which asserts that the stronger the political leadership and the greater the shared knowledge in the region, the more likely participants in regional cooperation are to engage in the learning process of socialization and thereby create the most formal and concrete collective action. The study finds that st strong rong political leadership is not itself sufficient to lead member countries to engage in the learning process of socialization and that a lack of shared scientific knowledge is positively associated with the adaption process of socialization among participants in the cooperative activities of these three regional mechanisms. Another insight is that the lack of shared knowledge and of the learning mode of socialization helps explain why all three regional cooperative mechanisms have failed to advance to becomethe legally binding regional environmental regimes rather than the comparatively higher degrees of collective action in terms of formalization and concreteness among regional entities within the UNEP’s second category of regional action. This study argues that knowledge and socialization barriers are key determinants of the development of regulatory regional environmental regimes. Without shared scientific knowledge and engagement in the learning process of socialization, even given strong political leadership by a participating country, it is not likely for a region to develop a legally binding regional environmental regime.Therefore, this study concludes that to make the transformation from the least formal and concrete collective action to the most formal and concrete depends on creating shared knowledge and the learning process of socialization

Joint stewardship of the Barents Sea: Russian and Norwegian policy expectations for preventing offshore oil spills

Thesis (M.A.) University of Alaska Fairbanks, 2016As Arctic environmental conditions fluctuate, ongoing economic-related agreements established for the Barents Region continue to support and attract Norwegian and Russian oil-producing expeditions within the shared maritime zone. Increased industrial activity throughout the Circumpolar North heightens the need to understand the factors that influence policies responsible for protecting the environment – in particular, preventive measures. Agency theory provides the framework for an analysis of various dynamics that influence the Norwegian and Russian governments (principals) as they develop and enforce rules that regulate petroleum industries (agents). The research question asks about differences between the prevention policies of the two nations even though both acknowledge a very similar need to protect the Barents. Since the regulatory and governance structures cannot fully explain the differences between the two countries’ prevention policies, the hypothesis presents an argument that the strategic goals of Norway and Russia in the global political economy provide sufficient conditions for policy divergence. This research presents case studies of economic and environmental factors that influence how Russia and Norway develop energy-related prevention policies in the Barents Sea. The findings suggest that differing strategic goals between the two countries influence their oil spill prevention policies. Russia’s oil spill prevention policy enables it to maintain high production levels that it can leverage to further its geopolitical aims. Norway’s more cautious prevention policies promote domestic economic stability. In a progressively interdependent world, this study contributes insight into contemporary international relations regarding aspects of partnerships, energy economics, and geostrategic policy