1,877 research outputs found
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
A Comprehensive Survey of Potential Game Approaches to Wireless Networks
Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral
improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The
potential game approach has been applied to a wide range of wireless network
problems, particularly to a variety of channel assignment problems. In this
paper, the properties of potential games are introduced, and games in wireless
networks that have been proven to be potential games are comprehensively
discussed.Comment: 44 pages, 6 figures, to appear in IEICE Transactions on
Communications, vol. E98-B, no. 9, Sept. 201
Joint Head Selection and Airtime Allocation for Data Dissemination in Mobile Social Networks
Mobile social networks (MSNs) enable people with similar interests to
interact without Internet access. By forming a temporary group, users can
disseminate their data to other interested users in proximity with short-range
communication technologies. However, due to user mobility, airtime available
for users in the same group to disseminate data is limited. In addition, for
practical consideration, a star network topology among users in the group is
expected. For the former, unfair airtime allocation among the users will
undermine their willingness to participate in MSNs. For the latter, a group
head is required to connect other users. These two problems have to be properly
addressed to enable real implementation and adoption of MSNs. To this aim, we
propose a Nash bargaining-based joint head selection and airtime allocation
scheme for data dissemination within the group. Specifically, the bargaining
game of joint head selection and airtime allocation is first formulated. Then,
Nash bargaining solution (NBS) based optimization problems are proposed for a
homogeneous case and a more general heterogeneous case. For both cases, the
existence of solution to the optimization problem is proved, which guarantees
Pareto optimality and proportional fairness. Next, an algorithm, allowing
distributed implementation, for join head selection and airtime allocation is
introduced. Finally, numerical results are presented to evaluate the
performance, validate intuitions and derive insights of the proposed scheme
Markov Decision Processes with Applications in Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of autonomous and resource-limited
devices. The devices cooperate to monitor one or more physical phenomena within
an area of interest. WSNs operate as stochastic systems because of randomness
in the monitored environments. For long service time and low maintenance cost,
WSNs require adaptive and robust methods to address data exchange, topology
formulation, resource and power optimization, sensing coverage and object
detection, and security challenges. In these problems, sensor nodes are to make
optimized decisions from a set of accessible strategies to achieve design
goals. This survey reviews numerous applications of the Markov decision process
(MDP) framework, a powerful decision-making tool to develop adaptive algorithms
and protocols for WSNs. Furthermore, various solution methods are discussed and
compared to serve as a guide for using MDPs in WSNs
Energy Harvesting Wireless Communications: A Review of Recent Advances
This article summarizes recent contributions in the broad area of energy
harvesting wireless communications. In particular, we provide the current state
of the art for wireless networks composed of energy harvesting nodes, starting
from the information-theoretic performance limits to transmission scheduling
policies and resource allocation, medium access and networking issues. The
emerging related area of energy transfer for self-sustaining energy harvesting
wireless networks is considered in detail covering both energy cooperation
aspects and simultaneous energy and information transfer. Various potential
models with energy harvesting nodes at different network scales are reviewed as
well as models for energy consumption at the nodes.Comment: To appear in the IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in Communications
(Special Issue: Wireless Communications Powered by Energy Harvesting and
Wireless Energy Transfer
Dynamic Multi-Arm Bandit Game Based Multi-Agents Spectrum Sharing Strategy Design
For a wireless avionics communication system, a Multi-arm bandit game is
mathematically formulated, which includes channel states, strategies, and
rewards. The simple case includes only two agents sharing the spectrum which is
fully studied in terms of maximizing the cumulative reward over a finite time
horizon. An Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm is used to achieve the
optimal solutions for the stochastic Multi-Arm Bandit (MAB) problem. Also, the
MAB problem can also be solved from the Markov game framework perspective.
Meanwhile, Thompson Sampling (TS) is also used as benchmark to evaluate the
proposed approach performance. Numerical results are also provided regarding
minimizing the expectation of the regret and choosing the best parameter for
the upper confidence bound
Joint Channel Selection and Power Control in Infrastructureless Wireless Networks: A Multi-Player Multi-Armed Bandit Framework
This paper deals with the problem of efficient resource allocation in dynamic
infrastructureless wireless networks. Assuming a reactive interference-limited
scenario, each transmitter is allowed to select one frequency channel (from a
common pool) together with a power level at each transmission trial; hence, for
all transmitters, not only the fading gain, but also the number of interfering
transmissions and their transmit powers are varying over time. Due to the
absence of a central controller and time-varying network characteristics, it is
highly inefficient for transmitters to acquire global channel and network
knowledge. Therefore a reasonable assumption is that transmitters have no
knowledge of fading gains, interference, and network topology. Each
transmitting node selfishly aims at maximizing its average reward (or
minimizing its average cost), which is a function of the action of that
specific transmitter as well as those of all other transmitters. This scenario
is modeled as a multi-player multi-armed adversarial bandit game, in which
multiple players receive an a priori unknown reward with an arbitrarily
time-varying distribution by sequentially pulling an arm, selected from a known
and finite set of arms. Since players do not know the arm with the highest
average reward in advance, they attempt to minimize their so-called regret,
determined by the set of players' actions, while attempting to achieve
equilibrium in some sense. To this end, we design in this paper two joint power
level and channel selection strategies. We prove that the gap between the
average reward achieved by our approaches and that based on the best fixed
strategy converges to zero asymptotically. Moreover, the empirical joint
frequencies of the game converge to the set of correlated equilibria. We
further characterize this set for two special cases of our designed game
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