5,110 research outputs found

    Economic Theory Lost in Translation: Will Behavioral Economics Reshape the Compelled Commercial Speech Doctrine

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    Economic Theory Lost in Translation: Will Behavioral Economics Reshape the Compelled Commercial Speech Doctrine

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    This Article consolidates the economic and legal theory needed to properly analyze the impact of salience measures on the commercial speech doctrine. By walking through various First Amendment scenarios, this Article describes and differentiates between the two main governmental interests motivating graphic image requirements on cigarette labels: reducing smoking and informing consumers. The Article then sets up a game-theoretic model of the compelled commercial speech doctrine and uses Bayesian inference to make assumptions about how the Supreme Court would rule if it eventually rules on similar graphic images placed on cigarette labels. Solving the model by way of forward induction yields the prediction that the constitutionality of the graphic image requirements will depend on whether the images are ideologically neutral

    Economic Theory Lost in Translation: Will Behavioral Economics Reshape the Compelled Commercial Speech Doctrine

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    Integrating pragmatic reasoning in an efficiency-based theory of utterance choice

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    This thesis explores new methods of accounting for discourse-level linguistic phenomena, using computational modeling. When communicating, efficient speakers frequently choose to either omit, or otherwise reduce the length of their utterances wherever possible. Frameworks such as Uniform Information Density (UID) have argued that speakers preferentially reduce or omit those elements that are more predictable in context, and easier to recover. However, these frameworks have nothing to say about the effects of a linguistic choice on how a message is interpreted. I run 3 experiments which show that while UID posits no specific consequences to being "overinformative" (including more information in an utterance than is necessary), in fact overinformativeness can trigger pragmatic inferences which alter comprehenders' background beliefs about the world. In this case, I show that the Rational Speech Act (RSA) model, which models back-and-forth pragmatic reasoning between speakers and comprehenders, predicts both efficiency-based utterance choices, as well as any consequent change in perceived meaning. I also provide evidence that it's critical to model communication as a lossy process (which UID assumes), which allows the RSA model to account for phenomena that it otherwise is not able to. I further show that while UID predicts increased use of pronouns when referring to more contextually predictable referents, existing research does not unequivocally support this. I run 2 experiments which fail to show evidence that speakers use reduced expressions for predictable elements. In contrast to UID and similar frameworks, the RSA model can straightforwardly predict the results that have been observed to date. In the end, I argue that the RSA model is a highly attractive alternative for modeling speaker utterance choice at the discourse level. When it reflects communication as a lossy process, it is able to predict the same predictability-driven utterance reduction that UID does. However, by additionally modeling back-and-forth pragmatic reasoning, it successfully models utterance choice phenomena that simpler frameworks cannot account for.Diese Arbeit erforscht neue Methoden, linguistische PhĂ€nomene auf GesprĂ€chsebene per Computermodellierung zu erfassen. Effiziente Sprecher:innen entscheiden sich bei der Kommunikation hĂ€ufig dazu, wenn immer es möglich ist, Äußerungen entweder ganz auszulassen oder aber ihre LĂ€nge zu reduzieren. Modelle wie Uniform Information Density (UID) argumentieren, dass Sprecher:innen vorzugsweise diejenigen Elemente auslassen, die im jeweiligen Kontext vorhersagbarer und einfacher wiederherzustellen sind. Allerdings sagen diese Modelle nichts ĂŒber die Auswirkungen einer linguistischen Entscheidung bezĂŒglich der Interpretation einer Nachricht aus. Ich fĂŒhre drei Experimente durch, die zeigen, dass wenngleich UID keine spezifischen Auswirkungen von "Überinformation" (einer Äußerung mehr Information als nötig geben) postuliert, Überinformationen doch pragmatische Schlussfolgerungen, die das gedankliche Weltmodell der Versteher:innen Ă€ndern können, auslöst. FĂŒr diesen Fall zeige ich, dass das Rational-Speech-Act-Modell (RSA), welches pragmatische Hin-und-Her-Schlussfolgerungen zwischen Sprecher:innen und Versteher:innen modelliert, sowohl effizienzbasierte Äußerungsauswahl als auch jegliche resultierende VerstĂ€ndnisĂ€nderung vorhersagt. Ich liefere auch Anhaltspunkte dafĂŒr, dass es entscheidend ist, Kommunikation als verlustbehafteten Prozess zu modellieren (wovon UID ausgeht), was es dem RSA-Modell erlaubt, PhĂ€nomene einzubeziehen, wozu es sonst nicht in der Lage wĂ€re. Weiterhin zeige ich, dass obschon UID beim Bezug auf kontextuell vorhersagbarere Bezugswörter eine erhöhte Nutzung von Pronomen vorhersagt, dies von existierender Forschung nicht einstimmig gestĂŒtzt wird. Ich fĂŒhre zwei Experimente durch, die keine Anhaltspunkte dafĂŒr, dass Sprecher:innen reduzierte AusdrĂŒcke fĂŒr vorhersagbare Elemente verwenden, finden. Im Gegensatz zu UID und Ă€hnlichen Modellen kann dass RSA-Modell direkt die bislang beobachteten Resultate vorhersagen. Schließlich lege ich dar, warum das RSA-Modell eine höchst attraktive Alternative zur Modellierung von SprachĂ€ußerungsentscheidungen auf GesprĂ€chsebene ist. Wenn es Kommunikation als einen verlustbehafteten Prozess widerspiegelt, kann es dieselbe vorhersagebasierte Äußerungsreduktion vorhersagen wie auch UID. Modelliert man jedoch zusĂ€tzlich pragmatische Hin-und-Her-Schlussfolgerungen, modelliert RSA erfolgreich PhĂ€nomene bei Äußerungsentscheidungen, die einfachere Modelle nicht abbilden können.German Research Foundation (DFG) as part of SFB 1102 - Information Density and Linguistic Encoding (IDeaL

    Speech Acts: The Contemporary Theoretical Landscape

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    What makes it the case that an utterance constitutes an illocutionary act of a given kind? This is the central question of speech-act theory. Answers to it—i.e., theories of speech acts—have proliferated. Our main goal in this chapter is to clarify the logical space into which these different theories fit. We begin, in Section 1, by dividing theories of speech acts into five families, each distinguished from the others by its account of the key ingredients in illocutionary acts. Are speech acts fundamentally a matter of convention or intention? Or should we instead think of them in terms of the psychological states they express, in terms of the effects that it is their function to produce, or in terms of the norms that govern them? In Section 2, we take up the highly influential idea that speech acts can be understood in terms of their effects on a conversation’s context or “score”. Part of why this idea has been so useful is that it allows speech-act theorists from the five families to engage at a level of abstraction that elides their foundational disagreements. In Section 3, we investigate some of the motivations for the traditional distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force, and some of the ways in which this distinction has been undermined by recent work. In Section 4, we survey some of the ways in which speech-act theory has been applied to issues outside semantics and pragmatics, narrowly construed

    Exploration and Exploitation of Victorian Science in Darwin's Reading Notebooks

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    Search in an environment with an uncertain distribution of resources involves a trade-off between exploitation of past discoveries and further exploration. This extends to information foraging, where a knowledge-seeker shifts between reading in depth and studying new domains. To study this decision-making process, we examine the reading choices made by one of the most celebrated scientists of the modern era: Charles Darwin. From the full-text of books listed in his chronologically-organized reading journals, we generate topic models to quantify his local (text-to-text) and global (text-to-past) reading decisions using Kullback-Liebler Divergence, a cognitively-validated, information-theoretic measure of relative surprise. Rather than a pattern of surprise-minimization, corresponding to a pure exploitation strategy, Darwin's behavior shifts from early exploitation to later exploration, seeking unusually high levels of cognitive surprise relative to previous eras. These shifts, detected by an unsupervised Bayesian model, correlate with major intellectual epochs of his career as identified both by qualitative scholarship and Darwin's own self-commentary. Our methods allow us to compare his consumption of texts with their publication order. We find Darwin's consumption more exploratory than the culture's production, suggesting that underneath gradual societal changes are the explorations of individual synthesis and discovery. Our quantitative methods advance the study of cognitive search through a framework for testing interactions between individual and collective behavior and between short- and long-term consumption choices. This novel application of topic modeling to characterize individual reading complements widespread studies of collective scientific behavior.Comment: Cognition pre-print, published February 2017; 22 pages, plus 17 pages supporting information, 7 pages reference

    Papers from the Austronesian Formal Linguistics Association 24

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    This is a collection of 6 articles from the AFLA 24 conference held in 2017. The papers cover a full range synchronic descriptions of Austronesian languages

    Mechanisms for Automated Negotiation in State Oriented Domains

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    This paper lays part of the groundwork for a domain theory of negotiation, that is, a way of classifying interactions so that it is clear, given a domain, which negotiation mechanisms and strategies are appropriate. We define State Oriented Domains, a general category of interaction. Necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation are outlined. We use the notion of worth in an altered definition of utility, thus enabling agreements in a wider class of joint-goal reachable situations. An approach is offered for conflict resolution, and it is shown that even in a conflict situation, partial cooperative steps can be taken by interacting agents (that is, agents in fundamental conflict might still agree to cooperate up to a certain point). A Unified Negotiation Protocol (UNP) is developed that can be used in all types of encounters. It is shown that in certain borderline cooperative situations, a partial cooperative agreement (i.e., one that does not achieve all agents' goals) might be preferred by all agents, even though there exists a rational agreement that would achieve all their goals. Finally, we analyze cases where agents have incomplete information on the goals and worth of other agents. First we consider the case where agents' goals are private information, and we analyze what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. Then, we consider the situation where the agents' goals (and therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but the worth they attach to their goals is private information. We introduce two mechanisms, one 'strict', the other 'tolerant', and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency of negotiation outcomes.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file

    Complexity and Endogenous Instability

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    The global financial crisis proved the critical impact of the gap between individual rationality and group rationality. This gap is not supposed to arise in a Neoclassical world, but it frequently arises in a world as complex as ours. The paper explores how endogenous instability might arise due to such a gap, and what behavioral rules might help to mitigate its impact.fallacy of composition, empathy, n-person prisoner’s dilemma games, n-person zero-sum games, symmetry, the golden rule.
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