Local advertising externalities and cooperation in one manufacturer-two retailers channel

In this paper, we consider a static model for advertising strategies and pricing decisions in supply chain with one monopolistic manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers. We assume an additive form of the consumer demand which is influenced by retail price and advertising. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price, invests in advertising (at national level) and offers cooperative advertising to boost the advertising expenditures of their retailers. The retailers set the retail price and invest in advertising (at local level). By means of game theory, we discuss three different relationships between the supply chain members: two non cooperative games including the Stackelberg – Cournot and the Stackelberg – Collusion and one cooperative game. The comparison between the three models reveals that the advertising, the pricing, the consumer demand and the profits are affected by various relationships. Furthermore, under the cooperation situation, we propose a channel coordination mechanism through a manufacturer’s participation rate in retailers’ local advertising cost and wholesale price by using utility function

A Game Theoretic Framework for Competing/Cooperating Retailers under price and advertising dependent demand

In this paper, we develop a game theoretic model for cooperative advertising in a supply chain consisting of a monopolistic manufacturer selling its product to the consumer only through competing duopolistic retailers. We consider a new form of the demand function which is an additive form. The demand is influenced by both retail price and advertising expenditures. To identify optimal advertising and pricing decisions, we discuss three possible games (two non cooperative games including Stackelberg-Cournot and Stackelberg-Collusion, and one cooperative game) and then we compare the various decision variables and the profits for all cases and also with similar results of the existing literature to develop some important insights

Economics of Change in Market Structure, Conduct, and Performance The Baking Industry 1947-1958

Baking is one of the largest industries in the United States. Its sales, which exceed $4 billion annually, rank it third among the food processing industries, and thirteenth among all manufacturing industries. Bakery products account for nearly$1 out of every $10 spent by American consumers for food. Almost half of the domestic consumption of wheat flour is in the form of bread, rolls, cake, pie, doughnuts, sweet goods, and other perishable bakery products. While this study encompasses the perishable bakery products industry as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, it focuses primarily on wholesale markets for white bread. Since World War II, important changes have occurred in the bread baking industry. A decline in the per capita demand for bread products coupled with changes in technology and costs has affected the relationships between baking companies, their market behavior, and the resulting level of efficiency and price performance. In an industrial economy, the farming, milling, baking, retailing, and consuming functions are integrally related. Changes in the organization and practices in one may induce changes in others. The baking industry occupies a strategic position in this process, and as a result, consumers, farmers, millers, and retailers, as well as bakers themselves, have a vital interest in the way the baking industry performs. Changes in market structure and firm behavior in the baking industry have been the subject of study and concern by several interested individuals and groups. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has followed with increased concern the widening of the market margin and the declining farmer share of consumer bread prices. The Senate Agricultural Committee has completed a study of average cost and returns of bakery operations.The Federal Trade Commission has followed the pricing practices of many baking companies with frequent cease and desist orders. I\u3e The Justice Department, through periodic prosecutions, has kept baking firms aware of the limitation imposed by the antitrust laws. The Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly has studied the impact of discriminatory pricing by large baking companies on small independent bakers.7 The industry has encouraged economic study of the historic development of baking and changes in market organization and practices.s Most recently, the F.T.C. studied buyer concentration and the integration of retail grocery organizations into baking and other food processing industries