INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH ATTRIBUTES AND PREOCCUPATIONS IN PREVENTING AND FIGHTING AGAINST CYBERCRIME AND THEIR MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENTS

At global level, there are various organizations which are constantly concerned with the analysis of the latest manifestations and evolution of cybercrime, setting up work groups to develop strategies for the prevention and fight of cybercrimes. Besides these international organizations which act globally, several other organizations focus on certain regions, dealing with issues related to cybercrime.cybercrime, organizations, declaration, resolution, convention

NIST cybersecurity framework compliance: A generic model for dynamic assessment and predictive requirements

Organizations have become increasingly dependent on information systems to perform their business as usual activities. Moreover, organizations have registered an increase in the number of cyber-attacks, namely: industrial espionage, confidential information leakage, digital theft or pure damage to corporate image and reputation. In order to try to mitigate these issues, organizations like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have made an effort to establish a cybersecurity protection guide. This paper presents a baseline for developing a generic and flexible model for manipulating key factors inside organizations: Processes, Human Resources and Technology, and extrapolate the percentage of compliance with the NIST cybersecurity framework, measure the current cybersecurity risk and allocate financial investments towards specific compliance objectives and reduce the overlapping of existing resources.info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersio

Cyber-Lisbon? The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on European Union Cybersecurity Policy

Cyberspace offers unique opportunities for communication and commerce, but also a wide range of security threats both to individuals and nation states. These threats create specific security challenges. This paper will examine the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the EU's response to those challenges. Prior to the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 EU cybersecurity policy was highly fragmented. Responsibility was split between the three Pillars of the European political system: the Communities, justice and home affairs and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). By abolishing the Pillar system the Lisbon Treaty enabled the EU to develop a single, unified, strategic approach to cybersecurity issues. The 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy was a direct result of this newly-established capacity for coherence. However, the key area of competence relating to the CFSP was left largely undefined in the Lisbon Treaty, limiting the EU's capacity to respond to external cyber-threats. This paper will evaluate how the new legal personality of the Union and the abolition of the Pillar system affected both internal and external cybersecurity policy by examining one of the Treaty's most significant "loose ends": CFSP. It will argue that cybersecurity and external cyber-defence serve as a microcosm of a much wider problem of unresolved and undefined competences. While the Lisbon Treaty facilitated a coherent internal strategy, clarification of EU competence regarding the CFSP was left largely unresolved, a fact demonstrated by the nature of cybersecurity challenges. By examining the EU's cybersecurity policy and strategy this paper will further argue that the EU's approach can be seen as an exemplar of the successes and challenges of post-Lisbon European politics

Defense Support to the Private Sector: New Concepts for the DoD\u27s National Cyber Defense Mission

A primary mission of the Department of Defense (DoD) remains defending the nation in cyberspace, a function which has until this point has been oriented around the traditional Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) framework. However, conceptual confusion as to the most effective mechanisms for DoD support during national cyber emergencies has generated a perpetual “fog” that restricts the frameworks optimal employment. This paper examines the typical forms of DoD cyber support currently employed, and presents four additional pillars for consideration. These proposed pillars highlight the potential value of the DoD’s defined role and functionality as a supporting command to the private sector during national cyber emergencies. Furthermore, this paper recommends new, adaptable structures and defined roles that can serve as a model for the DoD’s future composition, disposition, and employment in cyberspace when called upon to defend the nation. Because the private sector is on the front lines of the conflict, a new model of Defense Support to the Private Sector (DSPS) needs consideration