65,352 research outputs found
Philosophy Without Belief
Should we believe our controversial philosophical views? Recently, several authors have argued from broadly conciliationist premises that we should not. If they are right, we philosophers face a dilemma: If we believe our views, we are irrational. If we do not, we are not sincere in holding them. This paper offers a way out, proposing an attitude we can rationally take toward our views that can support sincerity of the appropriate sort. We should arrive at our views via a certain sort of ‘insulated’ reasoning – that is, reasoning that involves setting aside certain higher-order worries, such as those provided by disagreement – when we investigate philosophical questions
Mean voting rule and strategical behavior: an experiment
This paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good. An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that arises in the individual vote when the social choice rule is to select the mean of the quantities voted for; conflicting theoretical predictions are available in the literature on this purpose. The political implications of the mean rule and its e.ects upon e.ciency are also discussed. The role of voters' information is considered. A comparison is made with the working of the median rule.
On the Benefits of Costly Voting
We study strategic voting in a Condorcet type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. Voters incur private costs of going to the polls and may abstain if they wish; hence voting is voluntary. We show that under majority rule with voluntary voting, it is an equilibrium to vote sincerely. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. In large elections, the equilibrium is shown to be unique. Furthermore, participation rates are such that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected with probability one. Finally, we show that in large elections, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting.
Voting in the Bicameral Congress: Large Majorities as a Signal of Quality
We estimate a model of voting in Congress that allows for dispersed information
about the quality of proposals in an equilibrium context. The results highlight the
effects of bicameralism on policy outcomes. In equilibrium, the Senate imposes an
endogenous supermajority rule on members of the House. We estimate this super-
majority rule to be about four-fifths on average across policy areas. Moreover, our
results indicate that the value of the information dispersed among legislators is significant, and that in equilibrium a large fraction of House members (40-50 %) vote in
accordance with their private information. Taken together, our results imply a highly
conservative Senate, in the sense that proposals are enacted into law only when it is
extremely likely that their quality is high
Are Condorcet and minimax voting systems the best?
For decades, the minimax voting system was well known to experts on voting
systems, but was not widely considered to be one of the best systems. But in
recent years, two important experts, Nicolaus Tideman and Andrew Myers, have
both recognized minimax as one of the best systems. I agree with that. This
paper presents my own reasons for preferring minimax. The paper explicitly
discusses about 20 systems, though over 50 are known to exist.Comment: 41 pages, no figures. The Introduction has been changed. Also fixed
some version 6 errors in referencing subsection numbers in section
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