207 research outputs found
Homomorphic Encryption and the Approximate GCD Problem
With the advent of cloud computing, everyone from Fortune 500 businesses to personal consumers to the US government is storing massive amounts of sensitive data in service centers that may not be trustworthy. It is of vital importance to leverage the benefits of storing data in the cloud while simultaneously ensuring the privacy of the data. Homomorphic encryption allows one to securely delegate the processing of private data. As such, it has managed to hit the sweet spot of academic interest and industry demand. Though the concept was proposed in the 1970s, no cryptosystem realizing this goal existed until Craig Gentry published his PhD thesis in 2009. In this thesis, we conduct a study of the two main methods for construction of homomorphic encryption schemes along with functional encryption and the hard problems upon which their security is based. These hard problems include the Approximate GCD problem (A-GCD), the Learning With Errors problem (LWE), and various lattice problems. In addition, we discuss many of the proposed and in some cases implemented practical applications of these cryptosystems. Finally, we focus on the Approximate GCD problem (A-GCD). This problem forms the basis for the security of Gentry\u27s original cryptosystem but has not yet been linked to more standard cryptographic primitives. After presenting several algorithms in the literature that attempt to solve the problem, we introduce some new algorithms to attack the problem
Lattice-based Group Signature Scheme with Verifier-local Revocation
International audienceSupport of membership revocation is a desirable functionality for any group signature scheme. Among the known revocation approaches, verifier-local revocation (VLR) seems to be the most flexible one, because it only requires the verifiers to possess some up-to-date revocation information, but not the signers. All of the contemporary VLR group signatures operate in the bilinear map setting, and all of them will be insecure once quantum computers become a reality. In this work, we introduce the first lattice-based VLR group signature, and thus, the first such scheme that is believed to be quantum-resistant. In comparison with existing lattice-based group signatures, our scheme has several noticeable advantages: support of membership revocation, logarithmic-size signatures, and weaker security assumption. In the random oracle model, our scheme is proved to be secure based on the hardness of the SIVP_{SoftO(n^{1.5})}$ problem in general lattices - an assumption that is as weak as those of state-of-the-art lattice-based standard signatures. Moreover, our construction works without relying on encryption schemes, which is an intriguing feature for group signatures
Lattice-Based Group Signatures: Achieving Full Dynamicity (and Deniability) with Ease
In this work, we provide the first lattice-based group signature that offers
full dynamicity (i.e., users have the flexibility in joining and leaving the
group), and thus, resolve a prominent open problem posed by previous works.
Moreover, we achieve this non-trivial feat in a relatively simple manner.
Starting with Libert et al.'s fully static construction (Eurocrypt 2016) -
which is arguably the most efficient lattice-based group signature to date, we
introduce simple-but-insightful tweaks that allow to upgrade it directly into
the fully dynamic setting. More startlingly, our scheme even produces slightly
shorter signatures than the former, thanks to an adaptation of a technique
proposed by Ling et al. (PKC 2013), allowing to prove inequalities in
zero-knowledge. Our design approach consists of upgrading Libert et al.'s
static construction (EUROCRYPT 2016) - which is arguably the most efficient
lattice-based group signature to date - into the fully dynamic setting.
Somewhat surprisingly, our scheme produces slightly shorter signatures than the
former, thanks to a new technique for proving inequality in zero-knowledge
without relying on any inequality check. The scheme satisfies the strong
security requirements of Bootle et al.'s model (ACNS 2016), under the Short
Integer Solution (SIS) and the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumptions.
Furthermore, we demonstrate how to equip the obtained group signature scheme
with the deniability functionality in a simple way. This attractive
functionality, put forward by Ishida et al. (CANS 2016), enables the tracing
authority to provide an evidence that a given user is not the owner of a
signature in question. In the process, we design a zero-knowledge protocol for
proving that a given LWE ciphertext does not decrypt to a particular message
On the semantic security of functional encryption schemes
Functional encryption (FE) is a powerful cryptographic primitive that generalizes many asymmetric encryption systems proposed in recent years. Syntax and security definitions for FE were proposed by Boneh, Sahai, and Waters (BSW) (TCC 2011) and independently by O’Neill (ePrint 2010/556). In this paper we revisit these definitions, identify several shortcomings in them, and propose a new definitional approach that overcomes these limitations. Our definitions display good compositionality properties and allow us to obtain new feasibility and impossibility results for adaptive token-extraction attack scenarios that shed further light on the potential reach of general FE for practical applications.ENIAC Joint UndertakingFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT
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