The Strategic Assembly of Global Firms: A Micro-Structural Analysis of Local Learning and Global Adaptation

Strategic Assembly - the comprehensive and coordinated use of internal development, mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and alliances - is a novel approach to the construction and management of global firms. This paper describes the role and characteristics of strategic assembly in the construction and management of the Global Multi-Business Firm, an emerging form of global organization. We present a study of Group Renault and its relationship with two key players in the lucrative and emerging market for autos in Turkey, emphasizing the coevolutionary processes through which local players enter and dominate a local market and the global parent, utilizing local learning and organization, adapts to the global environment. We conclude with a call to action for research on the relationship between the strategic logic of global assemblers and the strategies of the firms at multiple levels of analysis

Leveraging Asymmetry and Interdependence to Enhance Social Connectedness in Cooperative Digital Games

Play is a fundamental component of human development and is an important means of forming healthy relationships throughout life. Research has shown that the types of digital games people play, how they play them, and who they play them with can have significant impacts on players' social and psychological well-being. Playing games with preexisting social relations, such as family and friends, has been shown to help strengthen relationships, but it can be difficult to find games that provide both enriching social interactions and are able to accommodate the wide variety of player types, ability levels, genre preferences, and social roles that each player brings to the group dynamic. Asymmetric cooperative games---games that present their players with sharply contrasting aesthetic experiences in the same shared play space---are a unique but relatively understudied style of game that is well-positioned to tackle this multi-faceted problem by providing different players with different interfaces, challenges, abilities, and information while tightly coupling their interactions through shared goals and feedback. My research focuses on better understanding the design of asymmetric cooperative games and how they can leverage interdependence to enhance players' perceptions of social connectedness. Based on a review of existing asymmetric cooperative games and related literature, I developed an initial conceptual framework that identified several mechanical forms of asymmetry common to these games. I adopted a ``research through design'' approach to then apply several forms of mechanical asymmetry to the iterative design of two prototype asymmetric cooperative games, “Goombagrams” and “Beam Me ‘Round, Scotty!” (BMRS). I then conducted a series of focused player experience studies examining and refining different aspects of the conceptual framework using the most promising of those prototypes, BMRS. The first study established several characteristic dynamics of asymmetric cooperative play including considerations of directional dependence, synchronicity, necessity, leadership and primacy. These insights were used to evolve the BMRS prototype and mount a second study demonstrating that, even when controlling for visual and narrative aesthetic details, asymmetric cooperative play is perceived as more socially engaging than symmetric cooperative play. My third and final study closed the theoretical loop between the mechanical design elements identified in my framework and the socially enriching effects of interdependence by demonstrating how deliberately increasing the mechanical coupling between players could generate corresponding increases in perceptions of social connectedness. Collectively, my research contributions can help both game developers and researchers to design more effective asymmetric cooperative experiences through a better understanding of this uniquely social style of game

Competitive Bidding in Supply Chains

This thesis is primarily concerned with the competition between suppliers for a buyer’s procurement business with consideration of subcontracting, commitment and capacity reservation. Under the circumstance where suppliers face diseconomies of scale, it may be cost effective for a buyer to split an order across different suppliers. Even when the buyer chooses only one supplier, the winning supplier may subcontract part of the work to the others subsequently. Motivated by these observations, Chapter 2 studies a supplier bidding game where a buyer requests quotes from two competing suppliers. We consider two procurement scenarios: (1) Order Splitting where each supplier submits a function bid which specifies different payments for different quantities, and the buyer may split the order; (2) Single-Sourcing Commitment where the buyer commits to purchasing from only one supplier before suppliers submit their bids, and the winning supplier may subsequently subcontract with the losing one. The second and third papers investigate the competitive behaviour of suppliers with capacity reservation. To hedge against financial risks, the suppliers often require a buyer to reserve capacity in advance by paying an upfront fee. In Chapter 3, we consider a discrete version of this problem where competing suppliers each choose a reservation price and an execution price for blocks of capacity, and the buyer needs to decide which blocks to reserve. Chapter 4 studies a continuous version of the problem where we allow general cost functions. The suppliers compete by offering the price functions (for reservation and execution) and the buyer decides how much to reserve from each supplier. This thesis sheds light on how suppliers compete with each other by considering a variety of factors. We believe an in-depth look at the competitive behaviour of suppliers will deepen our understanding of a buyer’s procurement process, and hence helps a buyer make a better sourcing decision

Competitive Bidding in Supply Chains

This thesis is primarily concerned with the competition between suppliers for a buyer’s procurement business with consideration of subcontracting, commitment and capacity reservation. Under the circumstance where suppliers face diseconomies of scale, it may be cost effective for a buyer to split an order across different suppliers. Even when the buyer chooses only one supplier, the winning supplier may subcontract part of the work to the others subsequently. Motivated by these observations, Chapter 2 studies a supplier bidding game where a buyer requests quotes from two competing suppliers. We consider two procurement scenarios: (1) Order Splitting where each supplier submits a function bid which specifies different payments for different quantities, and the buyer may split the order; (2) Single-Sourcing Commitment where the buyer commits to purchasing from only one supplier before suppliers submit their bids, and the winning supplier may subsequently subcontract with the losing one. The second and third papers investigate the competitive behaviour of suppliers with capacity reservation. To hedge against financial risks, the suppliers often require a buyer to reserve capacity in advance by paying an upfront fee. In Chapter 3, we consider a discrete version of this problem where competing suppliers each choose a reservation price and an execution price for blocks of capacity, and the buyer needs to decide which blocks to reserve. Chapter 4 studies a continuous version of the problem where we allow general cost functions. The suppliers compete by offering the price functions (for reservation and execution) and the buyer decides how much to reserve from each supplier. This thesis sheds light on how suppliers compete with each other by considering a variety of factors. We believe an in-depth look at the competitive behaviour of suppliers will deepen our understanding of a buyer’s procurement process, and hence helps a buyer make a better sourcing decision

The Economics of Open Air Markets

Despite their current prevalence and historical significance, little is known about the economics of open air markets. This paper uses open air markets as a natural laboratory to provide initial insights into the underlying operation of such markets. Using data on thousands of individual transactions gathered from May 2005- August 2008, I report several insights. First, the natural pricing and allocation mechanism in open air markets is capable of approaching full efficiency, even in quite austere conditions. Yet, a second result highlights the fragility of this finding: allowance of explicit seller communication frustrates market efficiency in a broad array of situations. Making use of insights gained from a “mole” in the marketplace, a third set of results revolves around economic questions pertaining to collusive arrangements that are otherwise quite difficult to investigate. Overall, I find data patterns that are consistent with certain theoretical predictions, as the evidence suggests that i) cheating rates increase as the coalition is expanded, ii) sellers cheat less when they have collusive arrangements in several spatially differentiated markets, and iii) sellers cheat more when they are experiencing periods of abnormally high profits. These results follow from a combination of insights gained from building a bridge between the lab and the naturally-occurring environment. By doing so, the study showcases that in developing a deeper understanding of economic science, it is desirable to take advantage of the myriad settings in which economic phenomena present themselves.

Modern industrial organization theory of media markets and competition policy implications

This paper outlines the modern industrial organization theory of media markets including competition policy implications. After recapturing fundamentals of industrial organization theory in a non-technical way, the state of the art of (i) modern platform economics, (ii) the economics of the so-called sharing economy, and (iii) the economics of data-based business models and data-driven markets is summarized in a detailed way and illustrated by modern media examples

Dynamics of multinational rivalry

Drawing insights from strategic management and international business literature, the present study develops an integrated model to explain the competitive actions between multinational firms in a global context. Accordingly, two research questions are addressed: What key factors explain the competitive actions of multinational firms? What key factors moderate the competitive tensions experienced by different pairs of multinational firms? Using structured content analysis to identify competitive actions, the empirical findings of the present study suggest that subsidiary control, MNE size, national culture, government regulations and multimarket contact are all likely to exert important impact on a multinational firm's motivation and capability to compete and therefore influence its competitive aggressiveness in foreign markets

Agri-food business: Global challenges â Innovative solutions

The rise of a western-style middle class in many successful emerging economies like China currently is inducing deep structural changes on agricultural world markets and within the global agri-food business. As a result of both higher incomes and concerns over product safety and quality the global demand for high-quality and safe food products is increasing significantly. In order to meet the new required quality, globally minimum quality standards are rising and private standards emerging. All over the world these developments cause adjustments at the enterprise, chain and market levels. At the same time, the tremendously increasing demand for renewable energy has led to the emergence of a highly promising market for biomass production. This has far-reaching consequences for resource allocation in the agri-food business, for the environment, for the poor in developing countries and for agricultural policy reforms. The challenges increase with ongoing liberalisation, globalisation and standardisation, all of which change trade patterns for agricultural and food commodities, and influence production costs and commodity prices. The objective of the IAMO Forum is to show opportunities as well as risks for all participants of the food economy in the ongoing globalisation process: for small peasants in developing countries, farmers in Europe and globally active food enterprises and retailers. The success of enterprises depends on the ability to find innovative solutions with regard to the organisation of enterprises, chains, and markets, as well as future policy design. Concerning bio-energy strategies has to be identified to combat global warming most efficiently and concurrently attenuate the competition between "tank and table" on farmland. IAMO Forum 2008, as well as this book, would not have been possible without the engagement of many people and institutions. We thank the authors of the papers, as well as the referees. Furthermore we are highly indebted to MARLIES LOHR, NADINE GIEMSA and RONNY RECKE who in an outstanding way contributed to the organisation of the Forum. This is true as well for the IAMO administration, whose work we gratefully acknowledge. Many sponsors has funded the IAMO Forum 2008. We are very grateful to the German Research Foundation (DFG), The Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Production in Germany, The Ministry of Cultural Affairs of the Federal State Saxony-Anhalt, Germany and last but not least the City of Halle. Further Conference sponsors are the BIONADE Corporation, Gaensefurther Mineral Water, The Wine Growers Association of the Region Saale-Unstrut, Germany, Obsthof am SüÃen See GmbH, Monsanto Company, KWS Saat AG, Sachsen-Anhalt-Tours, Baumkuchen Salzwedel and the Hallesches Brauhaus.Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Agricultural Finance, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Industrial Organization, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Development, Marketing, Political Economy,