Hyperplane Separation Technique for Multidimensional Mean-Payoff Games

We consider both finite-state game graphs and recursive game graphs (or pushdown game graphs), that can model the control flow of sequential programs with recursion, with multi-dimensional mean-payoff objectives. In pushdown games two types of strategies are relevant: global strategies, that depend on the entire global history; and modular strategies, that have only local memory and thus do not depend on the context of invocation. We present solutions to several fundamental algorithmic questions and our main contributions are as follows: (1) We show that finite-state multi-dimensional mean-payoff games can be solved in polynomial time if the number of dimensions and the maximal absolute value of the weight is fixed; whereas if the number of dimensions is arbitrary, then problem is already known to be coNP-complete. (2) We show that pushdown graphs with multi-dimensional mean-payoff objectives can be solved in polynomial time. (3) For pushdown games under global strategies both single and multi-dimensional mean-payoff objectives problems are known to be undecidable, and we show that under modular strategies the multi-dimensional problem is also undecidable (whereas under modular strategies the single dimensional problem is NP-complete). We show that if the number of modules, the number of exits, and the maximal absolute value of the weight is fixed, then pushdown games under modular strategies with single dimensional mean-payoff objectives can be solved in polynomial time, and if either of the number of exits or the number of modules is not bounded, then the problem is NP-hard. (4) Finally we show that a fixed parameter tractable algorithm for finite-state multi-dimensional mean-payoff games or pushdown games under modular strategies with single-dimensional mean-payoff objectives would imply the solution of the long-standing open problem of fixed parameter tractability of parity games.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1201.282

Incentive Stackelberg Mean-payoff Games

We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally. In the setting of incentive and leader equilibria, there is a distinguished player called the leader who can assign strategies to all other players, referred to as her followers. A strategy profile is a leader strategy profile if no player, except for the leader, can improve his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally, and a leader equilibrium is a leader strategy profile with a maximal return for the leader. In the proposed case of incentive equilibria, the leader can additionally influence the behaviour of her followers by transferring parts of her payoff to her followers. The ability to incentivise her followers provides the leader with more freedom in selecting strategy profiles, and we show that this can indeed improve the payoff for the leader in such games. The key fundamental result of the paper is the existence of incentive equilibria in mean-payoff games. We further show that the decision problem related to constructing incentive equilibria is NP-complete. On a positive note, we show that, when the number of players is fixed, the complexity of the problem falls in the same class as two-player mean-payoff games. We also present an implementation of the proposed algorithms, and discuss experimental results that demonstrate the feasibility of the analysis of medium sized games.Comment: 15 pages, references, appendix, 5 figure

Exponential Lower Bounds for Solving Infinitary Payoff Games and Linear Programs

Parity games form an intriguing family of infinitary payoff games whose solution is equivalent to the solution of important problems in automatic verification and automata theory. They also form a very natural subclass of mean and discounted payoff games, which in turn are very natural subclasses of turn-based stochastic payoff games. From a theoretical point of view, solving these games is one of the few problems that belong to the complexity class NP intersect coNP, and even more interestingly, solving has been shown to belong to UP intersect coUP, and also to PLS. It is a major open problem whether these game families can be solved in deterministic polynomial time. Policy iteration is one of the most important algorithmic schemes for solving infinitary payoff games. It is parameterized by an improvement rule that determines how to proceed in the iteration from one policy to the next. It is a major open problem whether there is an improvement rule that results in a polynomial time algorithm for solving one of the considered game classes. Linear programming is one of the most important computational problems studied by researchers in computer science, mathematics and operations research. Perhaps more articles and books are written about linear programming than on all other computational problems combined. The simplex and the dual-simplex algorithms are among the most widely used algorithms for solving linear programs in practice. Simplex algorithms for solving linear programs are closely related to policy iteration algorithms. Like policy iteration, the simplex algorithm is parameterized by a pivoting rule that describes how to proceed from one basic feasible solution in the linear program to the next. It is a major open problem whether there is a pivoting rule that results in a (strongly) polynomial time algorithm for solving linear programs. We contribute to both the policy iteration and the simplex algorithm by proving exponential lower bounds for several improvement resp. pivoting rules. For every considered improvement rule, we start by building 2-player parity games on which the respective policy iteration algorithm performs an exponential number of iterations. We then transform these 2-player games into 1-player Markov decision processes ii which correspond almost immediately to concrete linear programs on which the respective simplex algorithm requires the same number of iterations. Additionally, we show how to transfer the lower bound results to more expressive game classes like payoff and turn-based stochastic games. Particularly, we prove exponential lower bounds for the deterministic switch all and switch best improvement rules for solving games, for which no non-trivial lower bounds have been known since the introduction of Howard’s policy iteration algorithm in 1960. Moreover, we prove exponential lower bounds for the two most natural and most studied randomized pivoting rules suggested to date, namely the random facet and random edge rules for solving games and linear programs, for which no non-trivial lower bounds have been known for several decades. Furthermore, we prove an exponential lower bound for the switch half randomized improvement rule for solving games, which is considered to be the most important multi-switching randomized rule. Finally, we prove an exponential lower bound for the most natural and famous history-based pivoting rule due to Zadeh for solving games and linear programs, which has been an open problem for thirty years. Last but not least, we prove exponential lower bounds for two other classes of algorithms that solve parity games, namely for the model checking algorithm due to Stevens and Stirling and for the recursive algorithm by Zielonka

Decision Problems for Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we single out several decidable restrictions of the problem. First, restricting the search space to stationary, or pure stationary, equilibria results in problems that are typically contained in PSPACE and NP, respectively. Second, we show that the existence of an equilibrium with a binary payoff (i.e. an equilibrium where each player either wins or loses with probability 1) is decidable. We also establish that the existence of a Nash equilibrium with a certain binary payoff entails the existence of an equilibrium with the same payoff in pure, finite-state strategies.Comment: 22 pages, revised versio

Energy Parity Games

Energy parity games are infinite two-player turn-based games played on weighted graphs. The objective of the game combines a (qualitative) parity condition with the (quantitative) requirement that the sum of the weights (i.e., the level of energy in the game) must remain positive. Beside their own interest in the design and synthesis of resource-constrained omega-regular specifications, energy parity games provide one of the simplest model of games with combined qualitative and quantitative objective. Our main results are as follows: (a) exponential memory is necessary and sufficient for winning strategies in energy parity games; (b) the problem of deciding the winner in energy parity games can be solved in NP \cap coNP; and (c) we give an algorithm to solve energy parity by reduction to energy games. We also show that the problem of deciding the winner in energy parity games is polynomially equivalent to the problem of deciding the winner in mean-payoff parity games, while optimal strategies may require infinite memory in mean-payoff parity games. As a consequence we obtain a conceptually simple algorithm to solve mean-payoff parity games