56,258 research outputs found
Quality-Of-Service Provisioning in Decentralized Networks: A Satisfaction Equilibrium Approach
This paper introduces a particular game formulation and its corresponding
notion of equilibrium, namely the satisfaction form (SF) and the satisfaction
equilibrium (SE). A game in SF models the case where players are uniquely
interested in the satisfaction of some individual performance constraints,
instead of individual performance optimization. Under this formulation, the
notion of equilibrium corresponds to the situation where all players can
simultaneously satisfy their individual constraints. The notion of SE, models
the problem of QoS provisioning in decentralized self-configuring networks.
Here, radio devices are satisfied if they are able to provide the requested
QoS. Within this framework, the concept of SE is formalized for both pure and
mixed strategies considering finite sets of players and actions. In both cases,
sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the SE are presented.
When multiple SE exist, we introduce the idea of effort or cost of satisfaction
and we propose a refinement of the SE, namely the efficient SE (ESE). At the
ESE, all players adopt the action which requires the lowest effort for
satisfaction. A learning method that allows radio devices to achieve a SE in
pure strategies in finite time and requiring only one-bit feedback is also
presented. Finally, a power control game in the interference channel is used to
highlight the advantages of modeling QoS problems following the notion of SE
rather than other equilibrium concepts, e.g., generalized Nash equilibrium.Comment: Article accepted for publication in IEEE Journal on Selected Topics
in Signal Processing, special issue in Game Theory in Signal Processing. 16
pages, 6 figure
Elite capture, political voice and exclusion from aid: An experimental study
We experimentally study the influence of local information conditions on elite capture and social exclusion in community-based development schemes with heterogeneous groups. Not only information on the distribution of aid resources through community-based schemes, but also information on who makes use of an available punishment mechanism through majority voting may be important. The main results are the following. First, many rich community representatives try to satisfy a political majority who would then abstain from using the punishment mechanism, and exclude those community members whose approval is then not required. The frequency of this exclusion strategy is highest with private information on the distribution and public voting. Second, when voting is public, responders are more reluctant to make use of the punishment mechanism, and representatives who follow the exclusion strategy are more inclined to exclude the poorest responder. Third, punishment is largely ineffective as it induces rich representatives to capture all economic resources. Fourth, if a poor agent takes the representative’s role, punishment rates drop, efficiency increases, and final distributions become more equal
Non-cooperative Feedback Rate Control Game for Channel State Information in Wireless Networks
It has been well recognized that channel state information (CSI) feedback is
of great importance for dowlink transmissions of closed-loop wireless networks.
However, the existing work typically researched the CSI feedback problem for
each individual mobile station (MS), and thus, cannot efficiently model the
interactions among self-interested mobile users in the network level. To this
end, in this paper, we propose an alternative approach to investigate the CSI
feedback rate control problem in the analytical setting of a game theoretic
framework, in which a multiple-antenna base station (BS) communicates with a
number of co-channel MSs through linear precoder. Specifically, we first
present a non-cooperative feedback-rate control game (NFC), in which each MS
selects the feedback rate to maximize its performance in a distributed way. To
improve efficiency from a social optimum point of view, we then introduce
pricing, called the non-cooperative feedback-rate control game with price
(NFCP). The game utility is defined as the performance gain by CSI feedback
minus the price as a linear function of the CSI feedback rate. The existence of
the Nash equilibrium of such games is investigated, and two types of feedback
protocols (FDMA and CSMA) are studied. Simulation results show that by
adjusting the pricing factor, the distributed NFCP game results in close
optimal performance compared with that of the centralized scheme.Comment: 26 pages, 10 figures; IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, special issue on Game Theory in Wireless Communications, 201
Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches
Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy
management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the
network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This
poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process
of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to
participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving
different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process
needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can
ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an
overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a
feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various
games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification
to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy
research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key
features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the
paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models
that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important
finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac
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