Brexit: A New Dawn for Animals Used in Research, or a Threat to the ‘Most Stringent Regulatory System in the World’? A report on the development of a Brexit manifesto for Animals Used in Science.

As Britain prepares to leave the European Union, much discussion is taking place as to how this will affect the law relating to animals in the United Kingdom. Does Brexit present a threat to animal welfare, or an opportunity for positive reform? This article discusses the impact of Brexit in the context of animals used in research. In particular, it examines work of the Association of Lawyers for Animal Welfare (ALAW), its advisors and other campaign groups, to influence the Brexit agenda and create a manifesto for animals. How does this discussion fit with the link between science, philosophy and law and where will this leave the United Kingdom as it makes its own way in the world? Is UK law, often lauded by those who use animals in experimentation as a beacon of animal welfare regulation, likely to emerge stronger or weaker? We argue that Brexit presents an opportunity to address issues around severe suffering, freedom of information and continued reform to take account of developing knowledge of suffering and sentience. The need for funding to research alternatives is identified as paramount. We suggest that, if adopted by the UK government, the manifesto presents an opportunity for the United Kingdom to, once again, become the initiator of legislation to reform the protection of animals used in science

The Human Rights Act 1998, section 12 - press freedom over privacy?

Whether drafting of s.12 of 1998 Act resolves potential conflict between "right to private life", Art.8 of ECHR, and right to freedom of expression, Art.10 of ECHR, by favouring press freedom over individual rights

'Notice and staydown' and social media: amending Article 13 of the Proposed Directive on Copyright

© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.This paper critically assesses the compatibility of content recognition and filtering technology or so-called notice and staydown approach with the right of social network platforms and users to a fair trial, privacy and freedom of expression under Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (ECHR). The analysis draws on Article 13 of the European Commission’s proposal for a Directive on Copyright, the case-law of the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Court and academic literature. It argues that the adoption of content recognition and filtering technology could pose a threat to social network platforms and user human rights. It considers the compliance of ‘notice and staydown’ with the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) three-part, non-cumulative test, to determine whether a ‘notice and staydown’ approach is, firstly, ‘in accordance with the law’, secondly, pursues one or more legitimate aims included in Article 8(2) and 10(2) ECHR and thirdly, is ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’. It concludes that ‘notice and staydown’ could infringe part one and part three of the ECtHR test as well as the ECtHR principle of equality of arms, thereby violating the rights of social network platforms and users under Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the Convention.Peer reviewe

Study of Fundamental Rights Limitations for Online Enforcement through Self-Regulation

The use of self-regulatory or privatized enforcement measures in the online environment can give rise to various legal issues that affect the fundamental rights of internet users. First, privatized enforcement by internet services, without state involvement, can interfere with the effective exercise of fundamental rights by internet users. Such interference may, on occasion, be disproportionate, but there are legal complexities involved in determining the precise circumstances in which this is the case. This is because, for instance, the private entities can themselves claim protection under the fundamental rights framework (e.g. the protection of property and the freedom to conduct business). Second, the role of public authorities in the development of self-regulation in view of certain public policy objectives can become problematic, but has to be carefully assessed. The fundamental rights framework puts limitations on government regulation that interferes with fundamental rights. Essentially, such limitations involve the (negative) obligation for States not to interfere with fundamental rights. Interferences have to be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. At the same time, however, States are also under the (positive) obligation to take active measures in order to ensure the effective exercise of fundamental rights. In other words, States must do more than simply refrain from interference. These positive obligations are of specific interest in the context of private ordering impact on fundamental rights, but tend to be abstract and hard to operationalize in specific legal constellations. This study’s central research question is: What legal limitations follow from the fundamental rights framework for self-regulation and privatized enforcement online? It examines the circumstances in which State responsibility can be engaged as a result of selfregulation or privatized enforcement online. Part I of the study provides an overview and analysis of the relevant elements in the European and international fundamental rights framework that place limitations on privatized enforcement. Part II gives an assessment of specific instances of self-regulation or other instances of privatized enforcement in light of these elements

Lessons from Turkey: anti-terrorism legislation and the protection of free speech

Explores the extent to which the disclosure and other offences under the Terrorism Act 2000 could restrict effective journalistic reporting, drawing on European Court of Human Rights rulings on Turkish cases involving the right to freedom of expression in a context of political violence. Considers the scope of the ss.12, 19 and 35B offences and the implications of the Turkish cases on the protection afforded by the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 Art.10 to freedom of expression per se and to the conditions necessary for that expression. Notes the European Court's emphasis on the issues of proportionality and the need for prosecutions in a democratic society, and its interpretation of the boundary between incitement and the merely offensive, disturbing or shocking

The Perilous Dialogue

The master metaphor in the national security dialogue is, indeed, “security or freedom”. It dominates the counterterrorist discourse both in the United States and abroad. Transcripts from debates in Ireland’s Dáil Éireann, Turkey’s Büyük Millet Meclisi, and Australia’s Parliament are filled with reference to the need to weigh the value of liberty against the threat posed by terrorism. Perhaps nowhere is this more pronounced than in the United Kingdom, where, for decades, counterterrorist debates have turned on this framing. Owing in part, though, to different constitutional structures, what “security or freedom” means in America differs from what it means in Britain. In the United States, we tend to treat “security” and “freedom” as distinct phenomena: policy considerations set against pre-existing, political rights. Security becomes linked to decisions taken by the executive to preserve life—e.g., heightening protection against terrorist attacks by restricting entitlements specified in the Bill of Rights. Thus, Judge Richard Posner argues that in dangerous times, we must adjust constitutional rights to meet the demands of security. Professors Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner propose “a basic tradeoff between security and liberty.” As Professor Holmes points out, the tradeoff framework is not limited to those who come down more heavily on the security side of the equation; civil libertarians also refer to the framework, arguing for the protection of rights in the face of security demands. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, scholars and policy makers tend to consider security versus freedom as a case of competing rights: the right to life or the right to freedom from fear set against the right to move freely. As Prime Minister Tony Blair announced on 9/11, the exercise of state power would be necessary to protect “the basic civil liberty that people have to go about their business free form [sic] terror.” This framing—competing rights in tension—reflects Britain’s constitutional structure. Measures introduced by Parliament do not have to conform to a written constitution. While some documents, such as the 1215 Magna Carta, or the 1689 Bill of Rights, carry special significance, they are part of a broader system that encompasses legal and non-legal rules. The multiplicity and fluidity of rights, and the constant effort to balance them, reflect Britain’s relationship with Europe, where the European Convention on Human Rights (incorporated into British domestic law through the 1998 Human Rights Act) and European Communities law weave together to create a complex system of rights and rules protecting them. Despite the manner in which the United States and United Kingdom interpret “security or freedom,” reflective of their respective constitutional differences, in both countries the dichotomy between rights and security dominates the counterterrorist discourse. And in both regions, because the dichotomy ignores in its narrow terms of reference the far-reaching effects of counterterrorism, it stifles the debate. The “hydraulic” assumption inherent in the “security or freedom” framework overlooks the possibility that rules—indeed, the rule of law itself—provide security. There are multiple types of securities and liberties at stake. And the framework distorts the “real tradeoffs” that are being made, such as the risks inevitably entailed in the allocation of limited resources. Most importantly, “security or freedom” fails to capture the single most important characteristic of counterterrorist law: increased executive power that shifts the balance of power between the branches of government. This article suggests that at each point where the legislature would be expected to push back against the executive’s power—at the introduction of measures, at the renewal of temporary provisions, and in the exercise of oversight—its ability to do so is limited. The judiciary’s role is similarly restricted: constitutional structure and cultural norms narrow the courts’ ability to check the executive at anything but the margins. With the long-term political and economic effects of this expanded executive strength masked by the immediacy of the “security or freedom” dichotomy, the true costs of anti-terror legislation in the United States and in the United Kingdom have gone uncalculated. Over the past four decades, both countries have seen the relationship between governmental branches altered, individual rights narrowed, and the relationship of the citizens to the state changed. Counterterrorist law has alienated important domestic and international communities, created bureaucratic inefficiencies, and interrupted commercial activity. As these two countries set global counterterrorist norms through important multilateral and bilateral organizations, such as the United Nations (“UN”), the UN Security Council, the G7/G8, and the Financial Action Task Force, the risk increases that these detrimental effects will be transferred to other constitutional democracies. American and British provisions, moreover, have evolved outside the specter of terrorist groups actually using weapons of mass destruction to inflict mass casualties. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—and I would add biological weapons to Professor Holmes’s concern about fissile material—together with a growing willingness on the part of extremists to sacrifice themselves, may drive the two countries to take increasingly severe measures. Such provisions could lead to a shift in the basic constitutional structure of both countries

New Media and the Arab Spring of 2011

About media and the Arab sprin

Rethinking transparency and accountability in medicines regulation in the United Kingdom

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