Negotiable Auction Based on Mixed Graph: A Novel Spectrum Sharing Framework

© 2015 IEEE. Auction-based spectrum sharing is a promising solution to improve the spectrum utilization in 5G networks. Along with the spatial reuse, we observe that the ability to adjust the coverage of a spectrum bidder can provide room to itself for further negotiation while auctioning. In this paper, we propose a novel economic tool, size-negotiable auction mechanism (SNAM), which provides a hybrid solution between auction and negotiation for multi-buyers sharing spectrum chunks from a common database. Unlike existing auction-based spectrum sharing models, each bidder of the SNAM submits its bid for using the spectrum per unit space and a set of coverage ranges over which the bidder is willing to pay for the spectrum. The auctioneer then coordinates the interference areas (or coverage negotiation) to ensure no two winners interfere with each other while aiming to maximize the auction's total coverage area or revenue. In this scenario, the undirected graph used by existing auction mechanisms fails to model the interference among bidders. Instead, we construct a mixed interference graph and prove that SNAM's auctioning on the mixed graph is truthful and individually rational. Simulation results show that, compared with existing auction approaches, the proposed SNAM dramatically improves the spatial efficiency, hence leads to significantly higher seller revenue and buyer satisfaction under various setups. Thanks to its low complexity and low overhead, SNAM can target fine timescale trading (in minutes or hours) with a large number of bidders and requested coverages

Short-term spectrum sharing with economic awareness in 5G networks

University of Technology Sydney. Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology.The next Generation Mobile Networks 5G is expected to start rolling out by 2020, targeting at significantly faster mobile data speeds and increasingly massive machine communications. As we are entering into a whole new wireless time, where the blend of spectrum policy and technology becomes more important, the networking practices are tightly coupled with economic considerations. Therefore, a novel economic-driven spectrum policy should be designed to support all spectrum access methods with flexibility to take advantage of potentially new spectrum sharing paradigms. In this thesis, we present the feasibility of putting economic models in the existing dynamic spectrum sharing architectures, from three aspects: spectrum sublicensing at a small scale, spectrum auction design, and licensed and unlicensed band selection. We point out the challenges under each scenario and propose solutions to address these problems. First, for the spectrum sublicensing, we introduce the concept of the protection zone to enable multiple operators to spatially share the spectrum and ensure exclusive usage without any interference. Furthermore, the trade-off between the precision of boundary estimation and the cost of sensing networks is analysed. Second, for the spectrum auction, we study how an interference graph influences performance of the auction algorithm and guarantees fairness and truthfulness. Additionally, we further propose a negotiable auction for a more efficient spectrum allocation based on a mixed graph which offers a base station a second chance if the original request is rejected. Unlike the existing work, our proposed solution with a faster grouping scheme performs better in a dense situation, hence it accommodates more base stations. Third, for the licensed and unlicensed band selection from the perspective of operators, we build a finite game and present performance comparisons of different strategies. Moreover, the analysis of the Nash equilibrium is provided and so are the suggestions on how to achieve high benefits for different scales of operators. We apply our design and findings to the potential spectrum sharing architectures, i.e., Licensed Shared Access and Spectrum Sharing System. We strengthen the coupling of the sublicensing scheme with the spectrum sharing platforms by enabling each base station as an individual bidder and let them bid for a contour based sublicense, ensuring the exclusive right and interference protection. Additionally, we also analyse the unlicensed and licensed band selection from the perspective of operators and prove the equilibrium existence in the spectrum market. In conclusion, the short-term sublicensing in the secondary market has not been fully studied and put into practice yet. The thesis has given rise to an integration of spectrum technology and policy. It is believed that, in the future, the economic-aware spectrum policy design could be incorporated into communication technology to realize an innovative, efficient and flexible sharing model

An Agent-Based Model for Secondary Use of Radio Spectrum

Wireless communications rely on access to radio spectrum. With a continuing proliferation of wireless applications and services, the spectrum resource becomes scarce. The measurement studies of spectrum usage, however, reveal that spectrum is being used sporadically in many geographical areas and times. In an attempt to promote efficiency of spectrum usage, the Federal Communications Commission has supported the use of market mechanism to allocate and assign radio spectrum. We focus on the secondary use of spectrum defined as a temporary access of existing licensed spectrum by a user who does not own a spectrum license. The secondary use of spectrum raises numerous technical, institutional, economic, and strategic issues that merit investigation. Central to the issues are the effects of transaction costs associated with the use of market mechanism and the uncertainties due to potential interference.The research objective is to identify the pre-conditions as to when and why the secondary use would emerge and in what form. We use transaction cost economics as the theoretical framework in this study. We propose a novel use of agent-based computational economics to model the development of the secondary use of spectrum. The agent-based model allows an integration of economic and technical considerations to the study of pre-conditions to the secondary use concept. The agent-based approach aims to observe the aggregate outcomes as a result of interactions among agents and understand the process that leads to the secondary use, which can then be used to create policy instruments in order to obtain the favorable outcomes of the spectrum management

ECONOMIC APPROACHES AND MARKET STRUCTURES FOR TEMPORAL-SPATIAL SPECTRUM SHARING

In wireless communication systems, economic approaches can be applied to spectrum sharing and enhance spectrum utilization. In this research, we develop a model where geographic information, including licensed areas of primary users (PUs) and locations of secondary users (SUs), plays an important role in the spectrum sharing system. We consider a multi-price policy and the pricing power of noncooperative PUs in multiple geographic areas. Meanwhile, the value assessment of a channel is price-related and the demand from the SUs is price-elastic. By applying an evolutionary procedure, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the optimal payoff for each PU selling channels without reserve. In the scenario of selling channels with reserve, we predict the channel prices for the PUs leading to the optimal supplies of the PUs and hence the optimal payoffs. To increase spectrum utilization, the scenario of spatial spectrum reuse is considered. We consider maximizing social welfare via on-demand channel allocation, which describes the overall satisfaction of the SUs when we involve the supply and demand relationship. We design a receiver-centric spectrum reuse mechanism, in which the optimal channel allocation that maximizes social welfare can be achieved by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction for maximal independent groups (MIGs). We prove that truthful bidding is the optimal strategy for the SUs, even though the SUs do not participate in the VCG auction for MIGs directly. Therefore, the MIGs are bidding truthfully and the requirement for social welfare maximization is satisfied. To further improve user satisfaction, user characteristics that enable heterogeneous channel valuations need to be considered in spatial spectrum reuse. We design a channel transaction mechanism for non-symmetric networks and maximize user satisfaction in consideration of multi-level flexible channel valuations of the SUs. Specifically, we introduce a constrained VCG auction. To facilitate the bid formation, we transform the constrained VCG auction to a step-by-step decision process. Meanwhile, the SUs in a coalition play a coalitional game with transferable utilities. We use the Shapley value to realize fair payoff distribution among the SUs in a coalition

On the efficiency of dynamic licensed shared access for 5G/6G wireless communications

The licensed shared access (LSA) is a spectrum licensing scheme authorizing additional new users (the licensees) to dynamically share the same spectrum with the old users (the incumbents). Contained in the terms of the spectrum usage authorization is a set of strict protective measures for the incumbent system which introduce extra restrictions on the licensee operations. Such measures imply that the licensee’s access to the spectrum can be revoked or restricted at any time which may result in the degradation of critical performance metrics of the latter. Addressing this issue and the accompanying challenges as we enter the 5G zettabytes era motivates the research problems addressed in this thesis. A vertical LSA spectrum sharing involving a mobile network operator (MNO) as the licensee and two categories of incumbent including the aeronautical telemetry, and a group of terrestrial public and ancillary wireless services is adopted in this thesis. Firstly, an analytical examination of the uplink and downlink licensee’s transmit power, when its spectrum access right is revoked (i.e., the limited transmit power) is done. Then a power allocation scheme that maximizes the energy efficiency (EE) of the licensee when it is operating with limited transmit power is proposed. Simulation results reveal the impact of the LSA spectrum access revocation on the allowable transmit power of the licensee as a function of the effect of different interference propagation path and the transmission direction. A comparison of the proposed optimal power allocation method with the equal power allocation (EPA) method further shows considerable improvement in the achievable EE of the licensee. Furthermore, in the LSA, the achievable spectrum efficiency (SE) of the licensee is limited by the interference threshold constraint set by the incumbent’s protective measures. Consequent on this, we propose an SE maximization of the licensee’s system subject to the incumbent interference threshold constraint. Furthermore, the LSA band spectral utilization was characterised as a function of the licensee’s achievable SE and the statistics of the LSA spectrum availability. The obtained results provide quantitative insights for practical system design and deployment of the LSA system, especially when compared to the results obtained in the maximization of the EE. In particular, the effect of variations in critical operational parameters throws up interesting network design trade-off challenge, worthy of consideration. This informs the subsequent multi objective optimization of the EE-SE trade-off investigated next. Interestingly, the obtained results indicate that with careful selection of the licensee eNodeB coverage radius, transmit power, and number of user equipment per eNodeB coverage area, one can engineer the best possible trade-off between the spectrum and energy efficiency in practical LSA deployment. A major LSA feature is guaranteeing predictable quality of service (QoS) for both the incumbent and the licensee systems. In terrestrial implementation, the reduction in the achievable data rate caused by the incumbents’ protective measures, may violate guaranteed QoS in the licensee system. To address this issue, we propose a LSA - based hybrid aerialterrestrial system with drone base station (D-BS). Simulation results show that using the proposed scheme, the licensee, when operating under the incumbents’ imposed restrictions, is able to achieve the QoS data rate requirements of the users on its network. In conclusion, the findings in this research indicates that the dynamic LSA is a practically viable solution to the spectrum management requirements of the emerging vertical wireless technologies in 5G and beyond

Basics of coalitional games with applications to communications and networking

Game theory is the study of decision making in an interactive environment. Coalitional games fulfill the promise of group efficient solutions to problems involving strategic actions. Formulation of optimal player behavior is a fundamental element in this theory. This paper comprises a self-instructive didactic means to study basics of coalitional games indicating how coalitional game theory tools can provide a framework to tackle different problems in communications and networking. We show that coalitional game approaches achieve an improved performance compare to non-cooperative game theoretical solutions

5th International Conference on Advanced Research Methods and Analytics (CARMA 2023)

Research methods in economics and social sciences are evolving with the increasing availability of Internet and Big Data sources of information. As these sources, methods, and applications become more interdisciplinary, the 5th International Conference on Advanced Research Methods and Analytics (CARMA) is a forum for researchers and practitioners to exchange ideas and advances on how emerging research methods and sources are applied to different fields of social sciences as well as to discuss current and future challenges.Martínez Torres, MDR.; Toral Marín, S. (2023). 5th International Conference on Advanced Research Methods and Analytics (CARMA 2023). Editorial Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/CARMA2023.2023.1700