The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Simple Stochastic Multiplayer Games

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a game G, does there exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of G where player 0 wins with probability 1. Moreover, this problem remains undecidable if it is restricted to strategies with (unbounded) finite memory. However, if mixed strategies are allowed, decidability remains an open problem. One way to obtain a provably decidable variant of the problem is restricting the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and PSPACE respectively.Comment: 23 pages; revised versio

Decision Problems for Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we single out several decidable restrictions of the problem. First, restricting the search space to stationary, or pure stationary, equilibria results in problems that are typically contained in PSPACE and NP, respectively. Second, we show that the existence of an equilibrium with a binary payoff (i.e. an equilibrium where each player either wins or loses with probability 1) is decidable. We also establish that the existence of a Nash equilibrium with a certain binary payoff entails the existence of an equilibrium with the same payoff in pure, finite-state strategies.Comment: 22 pages, revised versio

The Fixpoint-Iteration Algorithm for Parity Games

It is known that the model checking problem for the modal mu-calculus reduces to the problem of solving a parity game and vice-versa. The latter is realised by the Walukiewicz formulas which are satisfied by a node in a parity game iff player 0 wins the game from this node. Thus, they define her winning region, and any model checking algorithm for the modal mu-calculus, suitably specialised to the Walukiewicz formulas, yields an algorithm for solving parity games. In this paper we study the effect of employing the most straight-forward mu-calculus model checking algorithm: fixpoint iteration. This is also one of the few algorithms, if not the only one, that were not originally devised for parity game solving already. While an empirical study quickly shows that this does not yield an algorithm that works well in practice, it is interesting from a theoretical point for two reasons: first, it is exponential on virtually all families of games that were designed as lower bounds for very particular algorithms suggesting that fixpoint iteration is connected to all those. Second, fixpoint iteration does not compute positional winning strategies. Note that the Walukiewicz formulas only define winning regions; some additional work is needed in order to make this algorithm compute winning strategies. We show that these are particular exponential-space strategies which we call eventually-positional, and we show how positional ones can be extracted from them.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2014, arXiv:1408.556

The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average Games

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is decidable, even if we put a constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. Our undecidability result holds even for a restricted class of concurrent games, where nonzero rewards occur only on terminal states. Moreover, we show that the constrained existence problem is undecidable not only for concurrent games but for turn-based games with the same restriction on rewards. Finally, we prove that the constrained existence problem for Nash equilibria in (pure or randomised) stationary strategies is decidable and analyse its complexity.Comment: 34 page

Infinite games with finite knowledge gaps

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning strategies can be constructed effectively without restricting the direction of information flow. Instead, our condition requires that the players attain common knowledge about the actual state of the game over and over again along every play. We show that it is decidable whether a given game satisfies the condition, and prove tight complexity bounds for the strategy synthesis problem under $\omega$-regular winning conditions given by parity automata.Comment: 39 pages; 2nd revision; submitted to Information and Computatio

How unprovable is Rabin's decidability theorem?

We study the strength of set-theoretic axioms needed to prove Rabin's theorem on the decidability of the MSO theory of the infinite binary tree. We first show that the complementation theorem for tree automata, which forms the technical core of typical proofs of Rabin's theorem, is equivalent over the moderately strong second-order arithmetic theory $\mathsf{ACA}_0$ to a determinacy principle implied by the positional determinacy of all parity games and implying the determinacy of all Gale-Stewart games given by boolean combinations of ${\bf \Sigma^0_2}$ sets. It follows that complementation for tree automata is provable from $\Pi^1_3$- but not $\Delta^1_3$-comprehension. We then use results due to MedSalem-Tanaka, M\"ollerfeld and Heinatsch-M\"ollerfeld to prove that over $\Pi^1_2$-comprehension, the complementation theorem for tree automata, decidability of the MSO theory of the infinite binary tree, positional determinacy of parity games and determinacy of $\mathrm{Bool}({\bf \Sigma^0_2})$ Gale-Stewart games are all equivalent. Moreover, these statements are equivalent to the $\Pi^1_3$-reflection principle for $\Pi^1_2$-comprehension. It follows in particular that Rabin's decidability theorem is not provable in $\Delta^1_3$-comprehension.Comment: 21 page