Fostering cooperation through dynamic coalition formation and partner switching

In this article we tackle the problem of maximizing cooperation among self-interested agents in a resource exchange environment. Our main concern is the design of mechanisms for maximizing cooperation among self-interested agents in a way that their profits increase by exchanging or trading with resources. Although dynamic coalition formation and partner switching (rewiring) have been shown to promote the emergence and maintenance of cooperation for self-interested agents, no prior work in the literature has investigated whether merging both mechanisms exhibits positive synergies that lead to increase cooperation even further. Therefore, we introduce and analyze a novel dynamic coalition formation mechanism, that uses partner switching, to help self-interested agents to increase their profits in a resource exchange environment. Our experiments show the effectiveness of our mechanism at increasing the agents' profits, as well as the emergence of trading as the preferred behavior over different types of complex networks. © 2014 ACM.The first author thanks the grant Formación de Profesorado Universitario (FPU), reference AP2010-1742. J.Ll.A. and J.A.R-A are partially funded by projects EVE (TIN2009-14702-C02-01), AT (CSD2007-0022), COR (TIN2012-38876-C02-01), MECER (201250E053), and the Generalitat of Catalunya grant 2009-SGR-1434Peer Reviewe

The World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund and China

As the first global carbon fund, the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) aims to catalyze the market for project-based greenhouse gas emission reductions while promoting sustainable development and offering a learning-by-doing opportunity to its stakeholders. Since the inception in 2000, the PCF has engaged in a dialogue with China to get it to sign up as a host country, because the World Bank and other international and bilateral donors expect great potential of the clean development mechanism (CDM) in China and feel the significant need for building CDM capacity in China to enable it to gain more insight into the CDM and increase its capacity to initiate and undertake CDM projects. This paper first discusses why China had hesitated to sign up as a host country of PCF projects until September 2003. Then the paper explains what has led China to endorse the PCF projects. The paper ends with discussions on the implications of the PCF’s offering prices for the emerging global carbon market.Carbon prices, Carbon market, China, Prototype Carbon Fund, The World Bank

Oil Security Short- and Long-Term Policies

Increasing oil security represents one of the most important policy actions, especially within IEA countries. Short and long term mechanisms could help such goal. On the short term side, revision of IEA emergency response oil stock system has been discussed. The attention is mainly focused on three issues: the high costs of stock management for private industries, the possible use of strategic reserves to smooth price when no high supply disruption has taken, the extension of IEA emergency system to non-OECD countries. The main actions specifically proposed by the European Commission are: an harmonisation of national storage systems, with the institution of public and private agency, a wider co-ordinated use of security stocks, and an increase in the physical amount of oil stocks. Long term measures for enhancing oil supply security can be seen on the demand-side and the supply-side. Main demand-side policies could be the following: energy saving and efficiency, investments in research and technology, and reduction of oil price inelasticity especially for transport sector. Main supply-side policies can be summarized into co-operation and institutional promotion for supply diversification of suppliers/routes. Main factors that could affect described policies could be the liberalization of international trade even in the energy sector and the increasing role of oil demand from developing countries.Oil, Security, Energy

Multi-Sectoral Uses of Water & Approaches to DSS in Water Management in the NOSTRUM Partner Countries of the Mediterranean

Agriculture contributes an average of about 10% to the GDP of the partner countries of the Mediterranean involved in the project NOSTRUM. On the other hand, industry contributes an average of about 30% in these countries. It is to remark that in almost all countries the weight of industry accounts between 20% and 30% of the national economy, with the exception of Algeria, where this weight is at about 60%, mainly imputable to the great development of oil extraction and energy sector. In the majority of participating countries, agriculture sector is the greatest consumer of water (more than 65% of total water consumption). Although the case from France where agriculture water use is only about 10% of total water consumption and Italy with around 45%, but this may be due to the fact that most countries reporting for their agricultural water consumption do not include the amount of rain-fed to cultivated lands as a part of their agriculture water use. Most agriculture water use is limited to irrigation water from streams/rivers and groundwater. Rain-fed cultivated-lands in France is almost 90% of its total cultivated area. For Croatia, data given in National Report indicate a 0% of water use for agriculture. The average of water use for agriculture for all the basin is of 62.3% but with a great scatter expressed by a high standard deviation (26.8%) that reflects a wide variation range of water use for agriculture among different countries. The average of water use for agriculture is weakly less on northern countries (52.7%) than on southern countries (75.2) but the twice values are still on the range of the average of the all basin and cannot be taken as indication of difference between north and south. Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) plans are currently developed and implemented by various countries to organize the multi-sectoral water uses. On the other hand, the need for Decision Support System (DSS) as a tool in developing and implementing Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is in growing demand. In spite of the great potential for the research and the development of DSS, the utilization of DSS in water management is not widely spread in the partner countries. In some countries, DSS was planned and developed at the scale of territorial integrated water management. Integration of DSS application to the existing IWRM systems at the partner countries would assist in satisfying the water related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).Integrated Water Resources Management, Decision Support Systems, Mediterranean Basin

Governance and Water Management: Progress and Tools in Mediterranean Countries

This paper reviews the progress with respect to Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) in Mediterranean countries, as addressed within the activities of the Nostrum-Dss project, a Coordination Action funded by the 6th Framework Programme of the EC, with a particular emphasis on the current use of decision support tools (DSS). The IWRM paradigm is a comprehensive management framework, which integrates the different aspects of water resources – from the underlying ecological and physical aspects, to the socio-economic values and needs (horizontal integration); and calls for increasing decentralisation and privatisation of water services (vertical integration), and the devolution of planning authority, without however forgetting the need to ensure equitable access to water resources. Substantial progress has been made in the last decades in Nostrum-Dss Partner countries, although a disparity can still be seen between the Northern and Southern banks. New institutions have been established for implementing IWRM, existing institutions have been reformed, and decision making processes increasingly require public participation. Decentralisation of decision making, implementation and monitoring are also well underway, although improvements are still needed to ensure that the traditional power structures do not prevail. More efficient technologies and infrastructures are in place, especially for the production of high value goods or in agriculture. Finally, several DSS have been developed: yet, while operational/technical DSS instruments have been successfully employed, DSSs tools developed in a participatory way, or tackling more complex, political as well as environmental and economic problems are still de-linked from actual decision making processes. Laws and regulations for water management in most Mediterranean countries embrace and support the paradigms of IWRM – and EU framework directives have played an important role in fostering this shift from more traditional, vertical governance to new, horizontal governance based on soft laws. Yet, the implementation of such laws and regulations is often only partial – often because of the lack of a clear monitoring and enforcement strategy, but also because of governments’ financial and human resources constraints. Strong overlaps of roles and competences among different government institutions remain, hampering effective implementation of water management. The tendency to centralisation of decision making persists, and actors’ involvement is scanty. The shift towards the use of demand side policies as opposed to supply side policies is not yet completed: yet, supply side policies are very costly, as they are based on greater mobilisation of financial resources. Full cost recovery pricing is not practiced widely. This reluctance to introduce full cost recovery pricing in developing countries may be due to ethical and moral considerations, but in developed countries it is often associated with strong lobbying power of interest groups. This study was supported by funding under the Sixth Research Framework of the European Union within the project "Network on Governance, Science and Technology for Sustainable Water Resource Management in the Mediterranean- The role of Dss tools” (NOSTRUM-Dss, contract number INCO-CT-2004-509158).Integrated Water Resources Management, Decision Support Systems, Environmental Governance

International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems

This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the problem of transboundary pollution. It then argues that most actual IEAs can be considered at best as third best solutions. Therefore, three questions are raised: 1) Why is there a difference between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions? 2) Which factors determine this difference? 3) Which measures can help to narrow this difference? This article attempts to answer these questions after giving an informal introduction to coalition models.International pollution, International environmental agreements, Treaty design, Coalition theory

The Value of Flexibility in the Italian Water Service Sector: A Real Option Analysis

We analyze the optimal investment strategy of a monopolist which has subscribed a concession contract to provide a public utility, i.e. water service. We present a strategic model in which a monopolist chooses both the timing of the investment and the capacity. We focus not only on the value of the immediate investment, but rather on the value of the investment opportunity. We then extend the model to two interdependent projects, where investing in the first project provides the opportunity to acquire the benefits of the new investment by making a new outlay. We show that flexibility to defer an investment may generate, ceteris paribus, additional profits which may induce positive effects in terms of policy and consumers surplus.Irreversible investment, Flexibility to defer, Capacity expansion choice

Evolutionary cooperative games

This thesis proposes a new approach to deriving cooperative solution concepts from dynamic interactive learning models. For different classes of cooperative games, the procedures implement the core. Within the core, tendencies towards equity are revealed and equitable outcomes are favoured in the long run

Modelling Dynamic Conditional Correlations in WTI Oil Forward and Futures Returns

This paper estimates the dynamic conditional correlations in the returns on WTI oil one-month forward prices, and one-, three-, six-, and twelve-month futures prices, using recently developed multivariate conditional volatility models. The dynamic correlations enable a determination of whether the forward and various futures returns are substitutes or complements, which are crucial for deciding whether or not to hedge against unforeseen circumstances. The models are estimated using daily data on WTI oil forward and futures prices, and their associated returns, from 3 January 1985 to 16 January 2004. At the univariate level, the estimates are statistically significant, with the occasional asymmetric effect in which negative shocks have a greater impact on volatility than positive shocks. In all cases, both the short- and long-run persistence of shocks are statistically significant. Among the five returns, there are ten conditional correlations, with the highest estimate of constant conditional correlation being 0.975 between the volatilities of the three-month and six-month futures returns, and the lowest being 0.656 between the volatilities of the forward and twelve-month futures returns. The dynamic conditional correlations can vary dramatically, being negative in four of ten cases and being close to zero in another five cases. Only in the case of the dynamic volatilities of the three-month and six-month futures returns is the range of variation relatively narrow, namely (0.832, 0.996). Thus, in general, the dynamic volatilities in the returns in the WTI oil forward and future prices can be either independent or interdependent over time.Constant conditional correlations, Dynamic conditional correlations, Multivariate GARCH models, Forward prices and returns, Futures prices and returns, WTI oil prices

Modesty Pays: Sometimes!

Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more success. In order to explain this phenomenon, this paper departs from the standard assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and strong free-riding. Instead, it considers that countries agree on modest emission reduction targets. This may sufficiently raise participation so that the success of treaties improves in terms of global emission reduction and global welfare. Thus, modesty may pay, though the first best optimum cannot be achieved.International environmental agreements, Internal&external stability, Modest emission reduction