Stochastic Target Games and Dynamic Programming via Regularized Viscosity Solutions

We study a class of stochastic target games where one player tries to find a strategy such that the state process almost-surely reaches a given target, no matter which action is chosen by the opponent. Our main result is a geometric dynamic programming principle which allows us to characterize the value function as the viscosity solution of a non-linear partial differential equation. Because abstract mea-surable selection arguments cannot be used in this context, the main obstacle is the construction of measurable almost-optimal strategies. We propose a novel approach where smooth supersolutions are used to define almost-optimal strategies of Markovian type, similarly as in ver-ification arguments for classical solutions of Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman equations. The smooth supersolutions are constructed by an exten-sion of Krylov's method of shaken coefficients. We apply our results to a problem of option pricing under model uncertainty with different interest rates for borrowing and lending.Comment: To appear in MO

Singular mean-field control games with applications to optimal harvesting and investment problems

This paper studies singular mean field control problems and singular mean field stochastic differential games. Both sufficient and necessary conditions for the optimal controls and for the Nash equilibrium are obtained. Under some assumptions the optimality conditions for singular mean-field control are reduced to a reflected Skorohod problem, whose solution is proved to exist uniquely. Applications are given to optimal harvesting of stochastic mean-field systems, optimal irreversible investments under uncertainty and to mean-field singular investment games. In particular, a simple singular mean-field investment game is studied where the Nash equilibrium exists but is not unique