4,032 research outputs found
Non-centralized Control for Flow-based Distribution Networks: A Game-theoretical Insight
This paper solves a data-driven control problem for a flow-based distribution network with two objectives: a resource allocation and a fair distribution of costs. These objectives represent both cooperation and competition directions. It is proposed a solution that combines either a centralized or distributed cooperative game approach using the Shapley value to determine
a proper partitioning of the system and a fair communication cost distribution. On the other hand, a decentralized noncooperative game approach computing the Nash equilibrium is used to achieve the control objective of the resource allocation under a non-complete information topology. Furthermore, an invariant-set property is presented and the closed-loop system stability is analyzed for the non cooperative game approach. Another contribution regarding the cooperative game approach is an alternative way to compute the Shapley value for the proposed specific characteristic function. Unlike the classical
cooperative-games approach, which has a limited application due to the combinatorial explosion issues, the alternative method allows calculating the Shapley value in polynomial time and hence can be applied to large-scale problems.Generalitat de Catalunya FI 2014Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación DPI2016-76493-C3-3-RMinisterio de Ciencia y Educación DPI2008-05818Proyecto europeo FP7-ICT DYMASO
The diplomat's dilemma: Maximal power for minimal effort in social networks
Closeness is a global measure of centrality in networks, and a proxy for how
influential actors are in social networks. In most network models, and many
empirical networks, closeness is strongly correlated with degree. However, in
social networks there is a cost of maintaining social ties. This leads to a
situation (that can occur in the professional social networks of executives,
lobbyists, diplomats and so on) where agents have the conflicting objectives of
aiming for centrality while simultaneously keeping the degree low. We
investigate this situation in an adaptive network-evolution model where agents
optimize their positions in the network following individual strategies, and
using only local information. The strategies are also optimized, based on the
success of the agent and its neighbors. We measure and describe the time
evolution of the network and the agents' strategies.Comment: Submitted to Adaptive Networks: Theory, Models and Applications, to
be published from Springe
R&D Subsidization effect and network centralization. Evidence from an agent-based micro-policy simulation
This paper presents an agent-based micro-policy simulation model assessing public R&D policy effect when R&D and non-R&D performing companies are located within a network. We set out by illustrating the behavioural structure and the computational logic of the proposed model; then, we provide a simulation experiment where the pattern of the total level of R&D activated by a fixed amount of public support is analysed as function of companies’ network topology. More specifically, the suggested simulation experiment shows that a larger “hubness” of the network is more likely accompanied with a decreasing median of the aggregated total R&D performance of the system. Since the aggregated firm idiosyncratic R&D (i.e., the part of total R&D independent of spillovers) is slightly increasing, we conclude that positive cross-firm spillover effects - in the presence of a given amount of support - have a sizeable impact within less centralized networks, where fewer hubs emerge. This may question the common wisdom suggesting that larger R&D externality effects should be more likely to arise when few central champions receive a support
Scientific collaboration networks: how little differences can matter a lot
Empirical studies such as Goyal, van der Leij and Moraga (2006) or Newman (2004) show that scientific collaboration networks present a highly unequal and hierarchical distribution of links. This implies that some researchers can be much more active and productive than others and, consequently, they can enjoy a much better scientific eputation. One may think that big intrinsical differences among researchers can constitute the main driving force behind these huge inequalities. We propose a model that show how almost identical individuals self-organize themselves in a very unequal and hierarchical structure as is observed in the real-world co-authorship networks. In consequence, this model provides an incentives-based explanation of that empirical evidence.network formation game, scientific collaboration, co-authroship networks, inequality
Position and Orientation Based Formation Control of Multiple Rigid Bodies with Collision Avoidance and Connectivity Maintenance
This paper addresses the problem of position- and orientation-based formation
control of a class of second-order nonlinear multi-agent systems in a D
workspace with obstacles. More specifically, we design a decentralized control
protocol such that each agent achieves a predefined geometric formation with
its initial neighbors, while using local information based on a limited sensing
radius. The latter implies that the proposed scheme guarantees that the
initially connected agents remain always connected. In addition, by introducing
certain distance constraints, we guarantee inter-agent collision avoidance as
well as collision avoidance with the obstacles and the boundary of the
workspace. The proposed controllers employ a novel class of potential functions
and do not require a priori knowledge of the dynamical model, except for
gravity-related terms. Finally, simulation results verify the validity of the
proposed framework
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