Shifting the Perspectival Landscape: Methods for Encoding, Identifying, and Selecting Perspectives

This dissertation explores the semantics and pragmatics of perspectival expressions. Perspective, or point-of-view, encompasses an individual’s thoughts, perceptions, and location. Many expressions in natural language have components of their meanings that shift depending on whose perspective they are evaluated against. In this dissertation, I explore two sets of questions relating to perspective sensitivity. The first set of questions relate to how perspective is encoded in the semantics of perspectival expressions. The second set of questions relate to how conversation participants treat perspectival expressions: the speaker’s selection of a perspective and the listener’s identification of the speaker’s perspective. In Part I, I explore the landscape of perspectival expressions by exploring different semantic mechanisms for encoding the perspective holder. In Chapter 2, I introduce key properties of perspectival expressions through a discussion of one canonical perspectival expression: the motion verb come. In Chapter 3, I discuss the various ways of encoding the perspective holder in the semantics of perspectival expressions. I contrast the predictions of these approaches and lay out a set of diagnostics to guide the analysis of perspectival expressions. I present two case studies using this set of diagnostics. In Chapter 3, I probe the semantics of the well-studied perspectival expression come in American English, and argue in favor of a perspective-anaphoric analysis. In Chapter 4, I focus on an expression that has not previously been recognized as perspectival, the temporal adverbial tomorrow. Through a series of experimental studies, I make the case that tomorrow is perspective-sensitive for some American English speakers, and narrow the hypothesis space for a perspectival account of tomorrow. I sketch a perspective-anaphoric semantics for tomorrow, while leaving open the possibility of a logophoric analysis. I conclude Part I with a discussion of how perspectival expressions fit into the broader landscape of context sensitivity. In Part II, I turn to a fresh set of questions about perspective: how do conversation participants select and identify perspectives? In Chapter 6, I discuss previous models of perspective production and comprehension, and factors that affect these processes, such as a bias towards the perspective of the speaker. I argue that although the selection and identification of perspective holders may be guided by simple heuristics some of the time, certain cases require a more involved reasoning system. In Chapters 7 and 8, I develop models of perspectival reasoning in comprehension and production rooted in a leading framework for pragmatic reasoning: the Rational Speech Acts framework. In Chapter 7, I propose and implement a computational model of perspective identification. I posit that listeners reason jointly about the speaker’s intended message and their adopted perspective using a mental model of the speaker’s production process. I present two comprehension studies that support a key assumption of the proposed Perspectival Rational Speech Acts model: that listeners reason simultaneously over multiple perspectives to better understand the speaker’s intended meaning. In Chapter 8, I propose a model of perspective selection that mirrors the Perspectival Rational Speech Acts comprehension model. I posit that speakers reason about the listener’s comprehension process in order to pick a perspective and an utterance that will maximize their chance of being understood. However, the results of the production study do not match the model’s predictions. I conclude with a discussion of the challenges that the attested asymmetry between speaker and listeners poses for the Rational Speech Acts framework. The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows: (1) a comparison of four approaches to encoding the semantics of perspective, leading to a diagnostic toolkit for perspectival expressions; (2) an experimental case study that employs the diagnostics to identify a novel perspectival expression; (3) an implemented computational model of perspective identification, supported by experimental evidence; and (4) an implemented computational model of perspective selection, which reveals further challenges in perspective production

Informal Logic: A 'Canadian' Approach to Argument

The informal logic movement began as an attempt to develop – and teach – an alternative logic which can account for the real life arguing that surrounds us in our daily lives – in newspapers and the popular media, political and social commentary, advertising, and interpersonal exchange. The movement was rooted in research and discussion in Canada and especially at the University of Windsor, and has become a branch of argumentation theory which intersects with related traditions and approaches (notably formal logic, rhetoric and dialectics in the form of pragma-dialectics). In this volume, some of the best known contributors to the movement discuss their views and the reasoning and argument which is informal logic’s subject matter. Many themes and issues are explored in a way that will fuel the continued evolution of the field. Federico Puppo adds an insightful essay which considers the origins and development of informal logic and whether informal logicians are properly described as a “school” of thought. In considering that proposition, Puppo introduces readers to a diverse range of essays, some of them previously published, others written specifically for this volume

A Channel Theoretic Approach to Conditional Reasoning

Institute for Communicating and Collaborative SystemsChannel Theory is a recently developed mathematical model of information flow, based on ideas emanating from situation theory.Channel theory addreses a number of important properties of information flow, such as context-dependence, modularity of information, and the possibility of error.This thesis is concerned with the use of channel theory as a formal framework for various constructs relating to conditional sentences. In particular,the main concern is to obtain logics for reasoning about conditionals,generics and default properties within the channel theoretic framework

Reconsidering The Zombie Argument

학위논문(박사)--서울대학교 대학원 :인문대학 철학과(서양철학전공),2019. 8. 김기현.본 논문의 목적은 철학자 데이비드 차머스에 의해 개발된 좀비 논변을 재검토하는 것이다. 좀비 논변은 물리주의에 반대하는 상상가능성 논증으로 알려져 있다. 논변은 우리와 물리적으론 동일하지만 우리 경험의 현상적 느낌, 또는 감각질을 결여한 존재의 상상가능성을 주장하면서 시작한다. 차머스는 좀비의 상상가능성으로부터 그것의 가능성을 끌어낸다. 좀비가 가능하다면 감각질은 물리적 사실들에 수반하지 않는다. 물리주의가 심신 수반을 함축한다는 것은 널리 수용되고 있기에, 좀비의 가능성은 모든 가능한 형태의 물리주의를 논박하게 된다. 그 크나큰 함축으로 인해, 좀비 논변은 의식의 본성과 물리주의에 대한 격렬한 논쟁을 불러일으켰다. 실로 그것이 처음 제시된 이후로 좀비 논변은 논쟁적이기를 그친 적이 없다. 좀비 논변에는 의미론, 형이상학, 인식론과 관련된 까다로운 문제들이 뒤얽혀있다. 본 논문에서, 나는 좀비 논변의 핵심 개념들과 전제들을 비판적으로 검토하고 관련된 문제들을 탐색해 볼 것이다. 본고는 4장으로 구성된다. 1장은 좀비 논변에서 사용되는 상상가능성 개념을 다룬다. 좀비 논변에서 상정된 상상가능성 개념은 문제적이다. 좀비의 상상가능성과 관련하여 차머스는 몇 가지 구분을 제시한다: 일견적/이상적, 적극적/소극적, 일차적/이차적 상상가능성이 그것이다. 이상적 상상가능성의 개념이 문제적인 것으로 밝혀진다. 그것이 잘 작동할지 의심스럽기 때문이다. 좀비의 적극적 상상가능성 또한 의심스럽다. 그것은 지나치게 직관에 민감하고 또한 감각질에 대한 완전한 이론을 요구하는데, 그런 이론은 아직 주어지지 않았다. 만약 상상가능성의 개념이 문제적이라면 좀비 논변은 시작조차 할 수 없게 된다. 2장은 좀비 논변의 첫 번째 전제, 즉 좀비의 이상적 적극적 일차적 상상가능성에 대한 나의 귀류 논변을 다룬다. 좀비의 상상가능성은 감각질 부수현상론, 러셀일원론, 그리고 상호작용론적 이원론의 선언을 함축한다. 이 모든 선언지들이 틀렸음을 보이기 위해, 나는 감각질의 인지적 친밀성을 논증했다: 의식적 경험의 현상적 질은 훼손되지 않은 배경조건 하에서, 경험의 주체에 의해 반드시 잠재적으로 주의를 받거나 알아차려질 수 있어야만 한다. 인지적 친밀성은 선험적으로 참이며, 따라서 인지적으로 친밀하지 않은, 소외된 감각질이란 소극적으로조차 상상불가능하다. 그러나 모든 선언지들은 인지적으로 소외된 감각질의 소극적 상상가능성에 개입한다. 귀류에 의해, 좀비는 이상적 적극적 일차적으로 상상불가능해진다. 만약 이러한 귀류논변이 통한다면, 설사 이상적 적극적일차적 상상가능성 개념이 옹호될 수 있더라도, 좀비 논변의 첫째 전제는 거짓이 된다. 3장에서는 좀비 논변의 두 번째 전제가 검토된다. 두 번째 전제는 이상적 적극적 일차적 상상가능성은 일차적 상상가능성을 함축한다는 원리(CP+)의 한 적용이다. CP+에 맞서, 몇몇 철학자들은 좀비 논변을 패러디하려 했다. 그러나 이러한 반-좀비 논변들은 그들 나름의 문제가 있다. 러셀 일루미나티 논변은 내 버전의 반-좀비 논변으로 그러한 문제들을 피할 수 있다. 러셀 일루미나티 논변은 CP+를 전제하고 그로부터 모순을 끌어낸다. 만약 이 논변이 건전하다면, 이상적 적극적 일차적 상상가능성은 일차적 가능성에 대한 가이드가 될 수 없을 것이다. 따라서, 설사 좀비가 이상적 일차적 적극적으로 상상가능하더라도, 그것이 일차적으로 가능하리라는 보장은 없다. 좀비 논변의 첫째 전제가 참이라도, 두 번째 전제는 거짓인 것이다. 4장은 좀비 논변에 대한 물리주의자들이 또다른 대응, 현상적 개념 전략(PCS)을 다룬다. 어떤 철학자들은 현상적 개념의 특수한 본성에 호소하면서 설명적 간극이나 좀비의 상상가능성 등을 포함한, 의식과 관련된 우리의 문제적인 인식적 상황들을 설명해치워버리려 시도한 바 있다. PCS에 의존하여, 물리주의자들은 좀비 논변의 핵심 전제들을 받아들이면서도 그 결론은 부정할 수 있다. 그러나 차머스의 만능 논변에 따르면, 현상적 개념이 물리적으로 해명가능한 한 그것은 우리의 인식적 상황을 설명할 수 없다. 만능 논변에 맞서, 나는 인식적 상황이 주제-중립적 용어에 의해 특성화되어야 하는 한 PCS는 그 설명적 잠재력을 유지할 수 있음을 주장했다. 그러므로 만능 논변은 실패하며 오히려 그 나름의 딜레마에 봉착 하게 된다. PCS는 여전히 물리주의자들에게 살아있는 선택지인 것이다. 즉 설사 좀비 논변의 첫째 전제와 둘째 전제가 옳다고 하더라도, 물리주의자들에게는 좀비 논변을 거부할 수 있는 제3의 길이 있는 셈이다. 만약 본고에서 제시된 논변들이 성공적이라면, 그 모든 작업들은 좀비 논변에 대한 4중의 비판으로 귀결될 것이다: 1) 좀비 논변 은 상상가능성에 대한 문제적인 개념에 기반을 두고 있다. 2) 설사 상상가능성의 개념이 수용되더라도, 좀비 논변의 첫째 전제, 즉 좀비의 상상가능성은 틀렸다. 3) 설사 좀비 논변의 첫째 전제가 옳다고 하더라도, 둘째 전제가 틀렸다. 4) 설사 첫째와 둘째 전제가 모두 옳다고 해도, 이것이 좀비가 형이상학적으로 가능하다는 것을 보장해주진 않는다. 따라서, 좀비 논변은 실패한다.In this dissertation, I reexamine the zombie argument developed by philosopher David Chalmers. The zombies argument claims that qualia, phenomenal qualities of our conscious experience do not supervene on physical facts. Since it is widely admitted that physicalism entails mind-body supervenience, the possibility of zombies refutes all possible forms of physicalism. Because of its huge implication, the zombie argument has provoked intense debates about the nature of consciousness and physicalism. In the zombie argument, a number of thorny issues concerning semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology are entangled. I will critically examine central notions and premises of the zombie argument and investigate related issues. This dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the notion of conceivability deployed in the zombie argument. The notion of conceivability supposed by the zombie argument is problematic. Especially, the notion of ideal conceivability turns out to be problematic. It is doubtable that possible formulations of ideal conceivability work well. The positive conceivability is also questionable. It is too intuition-sensitive and requires a complete theory of qualia, which is not given yet. If the notion of conceivability is problematic, the zombie argument may not be able to get off the ground. Chapter 2 covers my reductio argument against the first premise of the zombie argument, the ideal positive primary conceivability of zombies. The consequence of the conceivability of zombies is a disjunction of qualia epiphenomenalism, Russellian monism, and interactionist dualism. In order to show that all of the disjuncts are wrong, I argue for the thesis of cognitive intimacy of qualia. Cognitive intimacy is a priori true, so that cognitively alienated qualia are negatively inconceivable. However, all of the disjuncts commit to a negative conceivability of cognitively alienated qualia. By reductio, zombies are not ideally positively primarily conceivable. In Chapter 3, the second premise of the zombie argument is examined. The second premise is an application of a principle that ideal positive primary conceivability entails primary possibility(CP+). Arguing against CP+, some philosophers have attempted to parody the zombie argument. These anti-zombie arguments, however, have their own problems. The Russellian illuminati argument, which is my own version of the anti-zombie argument, avoids such problems. If the argument is sound, ideal positive primary conceivability cannot be a guide to primary possibility. Thus, even if zombies are ideally positively primarily conceivable, there is no guarantee that they are primarily possible. Chapter 4 concerns another physicalist response against the zombie argument, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy(PCS). Relying on PCS, physicalists can avoid the conclusion of the zombie argument while accepting its central premises. According to Chalmers master argument, however, as far as phenomenal concepts are physically explicable, they cannot explain our epistemic situation. Against the master argument, I argue that PCS can maintain its explanatory potential, insofar as our epistemic situation should be characterized in topic-neutral terms. Thus, the master argument fails and even faces its own dilemma. If my arguments in this dissertation are successful, they will lead to a fourfold argument against the zombie argument: 1) the zombie argument is based on the problematic notion of conceivability. 2) Even if the notion of conceivability is accepted, the first premise of the zombie argument, the conceivability of zombies, is wrong. 3) Even if the first premise of the zombie argument is right, the second premise is wrong. 4) Even if the second premise is right, it does not guarantee that zombies are metaphysically possible. Therefore, the zombie argument fails.Abstract ·························································································· i Introduction ··················································································· 1 Chapter 1. The Zombie Argument and Conceivability 4 1.1 Chapter Introduction ···························································· 4 1.2 The Real Zombie Argument ················································· 4 1.3 The Characters of Conceivability ······································· 8 1.3.1 Prima Facie VS Ideal Conceivability ························· 8 1.3.2 Positive VS Negative Conceivability ····························· 13 1.3.3 Primary VS Secondary Conceivability ·························· 20 1.3.4 The Characters of Conceivability ································ 21 Chapter 2. The Inconceivability of Zombies ············· 25 2.1 Chapter Introduction ······························································ 25 2.2 Cognitive Intimacy ······························································· 25 2.2.1 Cognitive intimacy ·························································· 25 2.2.2 Arguments for Cognitive Intimacy ······························· 28 2.3 Epiphenomenalism and Dull Jane ······································ 32 2.3.1 The Conceivability of Zombies and Epiphenomenalism 32 2.3.2 Type-B Materialism and The Conceivability of Zombies 34 2.3.3 The Story of Dull Jane ·················································· 37 2.3.4 On Non-causal Epistemic Relations ···························· 39- v - 2.3.5 Objections and Replies ·················································· 44 2.4 Russellian Monism and Flipping Inscrutables ···················· 49 2.4.1 The Basics of Russellian Monism ································ 50 2.4.2 The Flipping Inscrutables ············································ 56 2.4.3 Objections and Replies ··················································· 60 2.5 Interactionist Dualism and Swapped Psychons ················· 65 2.5.1 The Conceivability of The Gappy Zombie World ··· 66 2.5.2 The Swapped Psychons ·················································· 67 2.5.3 Objections and Replies ··················································· 71 2.6 The Inconceivability of Zombies ········································· 73 Chapter 3. Conceivability and Possibility ··················· 75 3.1 Chapter Introduction ····························································· 75 3.2 The Russellian Illuminati Argument and the Conceivability-Possibility Entailment ········································· 75 3.2.1 Anti-zombie arguments ················································· 76 3.2.2 The Russellian Illuminati Argument ··························· 85 3.2.3 Objections and Replies ················································· 96 Chapter 4. Phenomenal Concept Strategy and the Master Argument ······································································· 109 4.1 Chapter Introduction ·················································· 109 4.2 Epistemic Equilibrium and the Anti-Master Argument ··· 109 4.2.1 Phenomenal Concept Strategy and the Zombie Argument 110 4.2.2. The Master Argument ·········································· 114- vi - 4.2.3 Epistemic Equilibrium between Us and Zombies ···· 120 4.3 The Anti-Master Argument ········································ 129 4.4 Conclusion ·································································· 131 Bibliography ···································································· 134 Abstract(Korean) ····························································· 146 Figures [Figure 1] ··················································································· 66 [Figure 2] ··················································································· 67 [Figure 3] ··················································································· 6Docto

Time, events and temporal relations: an empirical model for temporal processing of Italian texts

The aim of this work is the elaboration a computational model for the identification of temporal relations in text/discourse to be used as a component in more complex systems for Open-Domain Question-Answers, Information Extraction and Summarization. More specifically, the thesis will concentrate on the relationships between the various elements which signal temporal relations in Italian texts/discourses, on their roles and how they can be exploited. Time is a pervasive element of human life. It is the primary element thanks to which we are able to observe, describe and reason about what surrounds us and the world. The absence of a correct identification of the temporal ordering of what is narrated and/or described may result in a bad comprehension, which can lead to a misunderstanding. Normally, texts/discourses present situations standing in a particular temporal ordering. Whether these situations precede, or overlap or are included one within the other is inferred during the general process of reading and understanding. Nevertheless, to perform this seemingly easy task, we are taking into account a set of complex information involving different linguistic entities and sources of knowledge. A wide variety of devices is used in natural languages to convey temporal information. Verb tense, temporal prepositions, subordinate conjunctions, adjectival phrases are some of the most obvious. Nevertheless even these obvious devices have different degrees of temporal transparency, which may sometimes be not so obvious as it can appear at a quick and superficial analysis. One of the main shortcomings of previous research on temporal relations is represented by the fact that they concentrated only on a particular discourse segment, namely narrative discourse, disregarding the fact that a text/discourse is composed by different types of discourse segments and relations. A good theory or framework for temporal analysis must take into account all of them. In this work, we have concentrated on the elaboration of a framework which could be applied to all text/discourse segments, without paying too much attention to their type, since we claim that temporal relations can be recovered in every kind of discourse segments and not only in narrative ones. The model we propose is obtained by mixing together theoretical assumptions and empirical data, collected by means of two tests submitted to a total of 35 subjects with different backgrounds. The main results we have obtained from these empirical studies are: (i.) a general evaluation of the difficulty of the task of recovering temporal relations; (ii.) information on the level of granularity of temporal relations; (iii.) a saliency-based order of application of the linguistic devices used to express the temporal relations between two eventualities; (iv.) the proposal of tense temporal polysemy, as a device to identify the set of preferences which can assign unique values to possibly multiple temporal relations. On the basis of the empirical data, we propose to enlarge the set of classical finely grained interval relations (Allen, 1983) by including also coarse-grained temporal relations (Freska, 1992). Moreover, there could be cases in which we are not able to state in a reliable way if there exists a temporal relation or what the particular relation between two entities is. To overcome this issue we have adopted the proposal by Mani (2007) which allows the system to have differentiated levels of temporal representation on the basis of the temporal granularity associated with each discourse segment. The lack of an annotated corpus for eventualities, temporal expressions and temporal relations in Italian represents the biggest shortcomings of this work which has prevented the implementation of the model and its evaluation. Nevertheless, we have been able to conduct a series of experiments for the validation of procedures for the further realization of a working prototype. In addition to this, we have been able to implement and validate a working prototype for the spotting of temporal expressions in texts/discourses

Ecological Kinds and the Units of Conservation

Conservation has often been conducted with the implicit internalization of Aldo Leopold’s claim: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community.” This position has been found to be problematic as ecological science has not vindicated the ecological community as an entity which can be stable or coherent. Ecological communities do not form natural kinds, and this has forced ecological scientists to explain ecology in a different manner. Individualist approaches to ecological systems have gained prominence. Individualists claim that ecological systems are better explained at the population level rather than as whole communities. My thesis looks at the implications of the current state of ecological science on conservation biology and emphasizes the importance of biodiversity as assessed at the population level. I defend the position that biodiversity should represent taxonomy and be quantified in reference to phylogenetic structure. This is a defence of biodiversity realism, which conceives of biodiversity as a natural quantity in the world which is measurable, valuable to prudent agents, and causally salient to ecological systems. To address how biodiversity at the population level relates to larger ecological systems I create a methodology designed to identify the relevant ecological system which biodiversity maintains and is maintained by biodiversity. This is done through the context dependent modelling of causal networks indexed to populations. My causal modelling methodology is then utilized to explicate ecological functions. These chapters together provide a framework for conservation science, which can then be applied to novel problems. The final section of the thesis utilises this framework to address whether de-extinction is a worthwhile conservation technique

Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21

TesisSe realizó un análisis clínico-electrocardiográfico integral de los hemibloqueos comprendiendo incidencia, edad, etiología, evaluación cuantitativa de los criterios diagnósticos, relación con los trastornos de conducción aurículo-ventricular, y pronóstico. Con tal motivo se estudiaron 221hemibloqueos encontrados en 7,130 pacientes adultos de sexo masculino en un servicio de cardiología y medicina. Los hemibloqueos fueron diagnosticados mediante los criterios señalados por Rosenbaum, Castellanos, y Prior y Blount

Teoria tradicional da informação semântica sem escândalo da dedução : uma reavaliação moderadamente externalista do tópico baseada em semântica urna e uma aplicação paraconsistente

Orientador: Walter Alexandre CarnielliTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências HumanasResumo: A presente tese mostra que é possível reestabelecer a teoria tradicional da informação semântica (no que segue apenas TSI, originalmente proposta por Bar-Hillel e Carnap (1952, 1953)) a partir de uma descrição adequada das condições epistemológicas de nossa competência semântica. Uma consequência clássica de TSI é o assim chamado escândalo da dedução (no que segue SoD), tese segundo a qual verdades lógicas têm quantidade nula de informação. SoD é problemático dado que conflita com o caráter ampliativo do conhecimento formal. Baseado nisso, trabalhos recentes (e.g., Floridi (2004)) rejeitam TSI apesar de suas boas intuições sobre a natureza da informação semântica. Por outro lado, esta tese reconsidera a estratégia de assumir a semântica urna (RANTALA, 1979) como o pano de fundo metateórico privilegiado para o reestabelecimento de TSI sem SoD. A presente tese tem o seguinte plano. O capítulo 1 introduz o plano geral da tese. No capítulo 2, valendo-se fortemente de trabalhos clássicos sobre o externalismo semântico, eu apresento algum suporte filosófico para essa estratégia ao mostrar que a semântica urna corretamente caracteriza as condições epistemológicas de nossa competência semântica no uso de quantificadores. O capitulo 3 oferece uma descrição precisa da semântica urna a partir da apresentação de suas definições básicas e alguns de seus teoremas mais funda- mentais. No capítulo 4, eu me concentro mais uma vez no tema da informação semântica ao formalizar TSI em semântica urna e provar que nesse contexto SoD não vale. Finalmente, nos capítulos 5 e 6 eu considero resultados modelo-teóricos mais avançados sobre semântica urna e exploro uma possível aplicação paraconsistente das ideias principais dessa tese, respectivamenteAbstract: This thesis shows that it is possible to reestablish the traditional theory of semantic information (TSI, originally proposed by Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1952, 1953)) by providing an adequate account of the epistemological conditions of our semantic competence. A classical consequence of TSI is the so-called scandal of deduction (hereafter SoD) according to which logical truths have null amount of information. SoD is problematic since it does not make room for the ampliative character of formal knowledge. Based on this, recent work on the subject (e.g., Floridi (2004)) rejects TSI despite its good insights on the nature of semantic information. On the other hand, this work reconsiders the strategy of taking urn semantics (RANTALA, 1979) as a privileged metatheoretic framework for the formalization of TSI without SoD. The present thesis is planned in the following way. Chapter 1 introduces the thesis¿ overall plan. In chapter 2, relying heavily on classical works on semantic externalism, I present some philosophical support for this strategy by showing that urn semantics correctly characterizes the epistemological conditions of our semantic competence in the use of quantifiers. Chapter 3 offers a precise description of urn semantics by characterizing its basic definitions and some of its most fundamental theorems. In chapter 4, turning the focus once again to semantic information, I formalize TSI in urn semantics and show that in this context SoD does not hold. Finally, in chapter 5 and 6 I consider more advanced model-theoretic results on urn semantics and explore a paraconsistent possible application of the present idea, respectivelyDoutoradoFilosofiaDoutor em Filosofia142038/2014-8CNP