Formal Verification of Real-Time Wireless Sensor Networks Protocols with Realistic Radio Links

International audienceMany critical applications which rely on Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are proposed. Forest fire detection, land- slide detection and intrusion detection are some examples. Critical applications require correct behavior, reliability, and the respect of time constraints. Otherwise, if they fail, con- sequences on human life and the environment could be catas- trophic. For this reason, the WSN protocols used in these applications must be formally verified. Unfortunately the radio link is unreliable, it is thus difficult to give hard guar- antees on the temporal behavior of the protocols (on wired systems the link error probability is very low [7], so they are considered reliable). Indeed, a message may experience a very high number of retransmissions. The temporal guaran- tee has thus to be given with a probability that it is achieved. This probability must meet the requirements of the applica- tion. Network protocols have been successfully verified on a given network topology without taking into account unre- liable links. Nevertheless, the probabilistic nature of radio links may change the topology (links which appear and dis- appear). Thus instead of a single topology we have a set of possible topologies, each topology having a probability to exist. In this paper, we propose a method that produces the set of topologies, checks the property on every topology, and gives the probability that the property is verified. This technique is independent from the verification technique, i.e. each topology can be verified using any formal method which can give a "yes" or "no" answer to the question: "Does the model of the protocol respect the property?". In this paper we apply this method on f-MAC [23] pro- tocol. F-MAC is a real-time medium access protocol for WSNs. We use UPPAAL model checker [10] as verification tool. We perform simulations to observe the difference be- tween average and worst case behaviors

Model checking medium access control for sensor networks

We describe verification of S-MAC, a medium access control protocol designed for wireless sensor networks, by means of the PRISM model checker. The S-MAC protocol is built on top of the IEEE 802.11 standard for wireless ad hoc networks and, as such, it uses the same randomised backoff procedure as a means to avoid collision. In order to minimise energy consumption, in S-MAC, nodes are periodically put into a sleep state. Synchronisation of the sleeping schedules is necessary for the nodes to be able to communicate. Intuitively, energy saving obtained through a periodic sleep mechanism will be at the expense of performance. In previous work on S-MAC verification, a combination of analytical techniques and simulation has been used to confirm the correctness of this intuition for a simplified (abstract) version of the protocol in which the initial schedules coordination phase is assumed correct. We show how we have used the PRISM model checker to verify the behaviour of S-MAC and compare it to that of IEEE 802.11

Formal analysis techniques for gossiping protocols

We give a survey of formal verification techniques that can be used to corroborate existing experimental results for gossiping protocols in a rigorous manner. We present properties of interest for gossiping protocols and discuss how various formal evaluation techniques can be employed to predict them

RTXP : A Localized Real-Time Mac-Routing Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks

Protocols developed during the last years for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are mainly focused on energy efficiency and autonomous mechanisms (e.g. self-organization, self-configuration, etc). Nevertheless, with new WSN applications, appear new QoS requirements such as time constraints. Real-time applications require the packets to be delivered before a known time bound which depends on the application requirements. We particularly focus on applications which consist in alarms sent to the sink node. We propose Real-Time X-layer Protocol (RTXP), a real-time communication protocol. To the best of our knowledge, RTXP is the first MAC and routing real-time communication protocol that is not centralized, but instead relies only on local information. The solution is cross-layer (X-layer) because it allows to control the delays due to MAC and Routing layers interactions. RTXP uses a suited hop-count-based Virtual Coordinate System which allows deterministic medium access and forwarder selection. In this paper we describe the protocol mechanisms. We give theoretical bound on the end-to-end delay and the capacity of the protocol. Intensive simulation results confirm the theoretical predictions and allow to compare with a real-time centralized solution. RTXP is also simulated under harsh radio channel, in this case the radio link introduces probabilistic behavior. Nevertheless, we show that RTXP it performs better than a non-deterministic solution. It thus advocates for the usefulness of designing real-time (deterministic) protocols even for highly unreliable networks such as WSNs

Resilient networking in wireless sensor networks

This report deals with security in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), especially in network layer. Multiple secure routing protocols have been proposed in the literature. However, they often use the cryptography to secure routing functionalities. The cryptography alone is not enough to defend against multiple attacks due to the node compromise. Therefore, we need more algorithmic solutions. In this report, we focus on the behavior of routing protocols to determine which properties make them more resilient to attacks. Our aim is to find some answers to the following questions. Are there any existing protocols, not designed initially for security, but which already contain some inherently resilient properties against attacks under which some portion of the network nodes is compromised? If yes, which specific behaviors are making these protocols more resilient? We propose in this report an overview of security strategies for WSNs in general, including existing attacks and defensive measures. In this report we focus at the network layer in particular, and an analysis of the behavior of four particular routing protocols is provided to determine their inherent resiliency to insider attacks. The protocols considered are: Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), Gradient-Based Routing (GBR), Greedy Forwarding (GF) and Random Walk Routing (RWR)

Applied Formal Methods in Wireless Sensor Networks

This work covers the application of formal methods to the world of wireless sensor networks. Mainly two different perspectives are analyzed through mathematical models which can be distinct for example into qualitative statements like "Is the system error free?" From the perspective of quantitative propositions we investigate protocol optimal parameter settings for an energy efficient operation