Generating Property-Directed Potential Invariants By Backward Analysis

This paper addresses the issue of lemma generation in a k-induction-based formal analysis of transition systems, in the linear real/integer arithmetic fragment. A backward analysis, powered by quantifier elimination, is used to output preimages of the negation of the proof objective, viewed as unauthorized states, or gray states. Two heuristics are proposed to take advantage of this source of information. First, a thorough exploration of the possible partitionings of the gray state space discovers new relations between state variables, representing potential invariants. Second, an inexact exploration regroups and over-approximates disjoint areas of the gray state space, also to discover new relations between state variables. k-induction is used to isolate the invariants and check if they strengthen the proof objective. These heuristics can be used on the first preimage of the backward exploration, and each time a new one is output, refining the information on the gray states. In our context of critical avionics embedded systems, we show that our approach is able to outperform other academic or commercial tools on examples of interest in our application field. The method is introduced and motivated through two main examples, one of which was provided by Rockwell Collins, in a collaborative formal verification framework.Comment: In Proceedings FTSCS 2012, arXiv:1212.657

On formal verification of arithmetic-based cryptographic primitives

Cryptographic primitives are fundamental for information security: they are used as basic components for cryptographic protocols or public-key cryptosystems. In many cases, their security proofs consist in showing that they are reducible to computationally hard problems. Those reductions can be subtle and tedious, and thus not easily checkable. On top of the proof assistant Coq, we had implemented in previous work a toolbox for writing and checking game-based security proofs of cryptographic primitives. In this paper we describe its extension with number-theoretic capabilities so that it is now possible to write and check arithmetic-based cryptographic primitives in our toolbox. We illustrate our work by machine checking the game-based proofs of unpredictability of the pseudo-random bit generator of Blum, Blum and Shub, and semantic security of the public-key cryptographic scheme of Goldwasser and Micali.Comment: 13 page

Formal Verification of an Iterative Low-Power x86 Floating-Point Multiplier with Redundant Feedback

We present the formal verification of a low-power x86 floating-point multiplier. The multiplier operates iteratively and feeds back intermediate results in redundant representation. It supports x87 and SSE instructions in various precisions and can block the issuing of new instructions. The design has been optimized for low-power operation and has not been constrained by the formal verification effort. Additional improvements for the implementation were identified through formal verification. The formal verification of the design also incorporates the implementation of clock-gating and control logic. The core of the verification effort was based on ACL2 theorem proving. Additionally, model checking has been used to verify some properties of the floating-point scheduler that are relevant for the correct operation of the unit.Comment: In Proceedings ACL2 2011, arXiv:1110.447

A UML-based static verification framework for security

Secure software engineering is a new research area that has been proposed to address security issues during the development of software systems. This new area of research advocates that security characteristics should be considered from the early stages of the software development life cycle and should not be added as another layer in the system on an ad-hoc basis after the system is built. In this paper, we describe a UML-based Static Verification Framework (USVF) to support the design and verification of secure software systems in early stages of the software development life-cycle taking into consideration security and general requirements of the software system. USVF performs static verification on UML models consisting of UML class and state machine diagrams extended by an action language. We present an operational semantics of UML models, define a property specification language designed to reason about temporal and general properties of UML state machines using the semantic domains of the former, and implement the model checking process by translating models and properties into Promela, the input language of the SPIN model checker. We show that the methodology can be applied to the verification of security properties by representing the main aspects of security, namely availability, integrity and confidentiality, in the USVF property specification language

Program Derivation by Correctness Enhacements

Relative correctness is the property of a program to be more-correct than another program with respect to a given specification. Among the many properties of relative correctness, that which we found most intriguing is the property that program P' refines program P if and only if P' is more-correct than P with respect to any specification. This inspires us to reconsider program derivation by successive refinements: each step of this process mandates that we transform a program P into a program P' that refines P, i.e. P' is more-correct than P with respect to any specification. This raises the question: why should we want to make P' more-correct than P with respect to any specification, when we only have to satisfy specification R? In this paper, we discuss a process of program derivation that replaces traditional sequence of refinement-based correctness-preserving transformations starting from specification R by a sequence of relative correctness-based correctness-enhancing transformations starting from abort.Comment: In Proceedings Refine'15, arXiv:1606.0134