Formal Concept Analysis from the Standpoint of Possibility Theory (ICFCA 2015)

International audienceFormal concept analysis (FCA) and possibility theory (PoTh) have been developed independently. They address different concerns in information processing: while FCA exploits relations linking objects and properties, and has applications in data mining and clustering, PoTh deals with the modeling of (graded) epistemic uncertainty. However, making a formal parallel between FCA and PoTh is fruitful. The four set-functions at work in PoTh have meaningful counterparts in FCA; this leads to consider operators neglected in FCA, and thus new fixed point equations. One of these pairs of equations, paralleling the one defining formal concepts in FCA, defines independent sub-contexts of objects and properties that have nothing in common. The similarity of the structures underlying FCA and PoTh is still more striking, using a cube of opposition (a device extending the traditional square of opposition in logic). Beyond the parallel between FCA and PoTh, this invited contribution, which largely relies on several past publications by the authors, also addresses issues pertaining to the possible meanings, degree of satisfaction vs. degree of certainty, of graded object-property links, which calls for distinct manners of handling the degrees. Other lines of interest for further research are briefly mentioned

Phenomenology, Empiricism, and Constructivism in Paolo Parrini's Positive Philosophy

In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s positive philosophy. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point out some lines of development of the phenomenological form of empirical realism as revealed in Parrini’s reflection, through a comparison of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, Mary Hesse’s network model and the tradition of neutral monism

Modernity and morality in Habermas's discourse ethics

Discourse ethics is originally conceived as a programme of philosophical justification of morality. This depends on the formal derivation of the moral principle (U) from non-moral principles. The moral theory is supposed to fall out of a pragmatic theory of meaning. The original programme plays a central role in Habermas's social theory: the moral theory, if true, provides good evidence for the more general theory of modernization. But neither Habermas nor his followers have succeeded in providing a formal derivation. This essay shows how and why Habermas's proposed derivation is impossible. As if aware of the lacuna, Habermas has recently suggested that (U) can be derived by 'abduction' rather than deduction. The proposal draws heavily on modernization theory; hence the only justification for (U) now available to him rests on premises drawn from that theory. The original programme of the justification of morality has thus given way to the weaker programme of the philosophical elucidation of morality. Further, since Habermas's moral theory is no longer justified independently of modernization theory, but at least partly by it, the moral theory cannot without circularity provide evidence for the modernization theory

Husserl’s Concept of the ‘Transcendental Person’: Another Look at the Husserl–Heidegger Relationship

This paper offers a further look at Husserl’s late thought on the transcendental subject and the Husserl–Heidegger relationship. It attempts a reconstruction of how Husserl hoped to assert his own thoughts on subjectivity vis-à-vis Heidegger, while also pointing out where Husserl did not reach the new level that Heidegger attained. In his late manuscripts, Husserl employs the term ‘transcendental person’ to describe the transcendental ego in its fullest ‘concretion’. I maintain that although this concept is a consistent development of Husserl’s earlier analyses of constitution, Husserl was also defending himself against Heidegger, who criticized him for framing the subject in terms of transcendental ego rather than as Dasein. Husserl was convinced that he could successfully respond to Heidegger’s critique, but he did not grasp that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was an immanent development, rather than a scathing criticism, of his own phenomenology

The Concept of Experience in Husserl's Phenomenology and James' Radical Empiricism

In this paper, I develop a comparison between the philosophies of Husserl and James in relation to their concepts of experience. Whereas various authors have acknowledged the affinity between James’ early psychology and Husserl’s phenomenology, the late development of James’ philosophy is often considered in opposition to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. This is because James’ radical empiricism achieves a non-dual dimension of experience that precedes the functional division into subject and object, thus contrasting with the phenomenological analysis of the dual structure of intentionality. However, I argue that the later “genetic” development of phenomenology converges with some central aspects of James’ radical empiricism. This is because genetic phenomenology leads us to conceive of the flow of primal impressions as a fundamental dimension of experience that precedes the subject-object duality and is at the base of the process of co-constitution of the subject and the object in reciprocal dependence. At the same time, Husserl conceives of the impressional core of experience as structured by formal conditions that depend on the concrete constitution of an embodied subject. For this reason, I argue that Husserl’s genetic phenomenology can complement James’ radical empiricism, thus leading to the development of the doctrine of pure experience as a form of empirical and not metaphysical realism

A one-valued logic for non-one-sidedness

Does it make sense to employ modern logical tools for ancient philosophy? This well-known debate2 has been re-launched by the indologist Piotr Balcerowicz, questioning those who want to look at the Eastern school of Jainism with Western glasses. While plainly acknowledging the legitimacy of Balcerowicz's mistrust, the present paper wants to propose a formal reconstruction of one of the well-known parts of the Jaina philosophy, namely: the saptabhangi, i.e. the theory of sevenfold predication. Before arguing for this formalist approach to philosophy, let us return to the reasons to be reluctant at it

The Subjectivity of Effective History and the Suppressed Husserlian Elements in Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics

This essay makes two claims. The first, exegetical, point shows that there are Husserlian elements in Gadamer’s hermeneutics that are usually overlooked. The second, systematic, claim takes issue with the fact that Gadamer saw himself in alliance with the project of the later Heidegger. It would have been more fruitful had Gadamer aligned himself with Husserl and the enlightenment tradition. following Heidegger in his concept of “effective history,” Gadamer risks betraying the main tenets of the enlightenment by shifting the weight from subjectivity to effective history as the “agent” in history. This is not a wholesale dismissal of Gadamer’s project, however. The problem in Gadamer’s effective history can be remedied by insisting, with Husserl, on the subjective character of effective history. Gadamer was right to criticize Husserl’s idea of a transcendental genesis, but went too far in giving up the idea of human subjectivity as the agent in history

Immanent Powers versus Causal Powers (Propensities, Latencies and Dispositions) in Quantum Mechanics

In this paper we compare two different notions of 'power', both of which attempt to provide a realist understanding of quantum mechanics grounded on the potential mode of existence. For this propose we will begin by introducing two different notions of potentiality present already within Aristotelian metaphysics, namely, irrational potentiality and rational potentiality. After discussing the role played by potentiality within classical and quantum mechanics, we will address the notion of causal power which is directly related to irrational potentiality and has been adopted by many interpretations of QM. We will then present the notion of immanent power which relates to rational potentiality and argue that this new concept presents important advantages regarding the possibilities it provides for understanding in a novel manner the theory of quanta. We end our paper with a comparison between both notions of 'power', stressing some radical differences between them.Comment: Forthcoming in: Probing the Meaning and Structure of Quantum Mechanics, D. Aerts, M.L. Dalla Chiara, C. de Ronde and D. Krause (Eds.), World Scientific, Singapore. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1310.453

Eudaimonia and the Economics of Happiness

In this paper I discuss the major approaches to happiness in the economics of happiness: hedonism and life-satisfaction approaches. It is possible to identify a tension between two important principles in this literature: 1) individuals are the best judges of their own happiness, and 2) the purpose of economics should be the direct endorsement of happiness. I argue that hedonism conflicts with the first principle. In the case of life-satisfaction theories, the restricted approach conflicts with both principles while the unrestricted approach only with the second. I also argue that the field presents difficulties establishing happiness as a consistent normative concept. In order to show this, I return to the theories of Aristotle and Seneca because: 1) both the ancients and these economists consider happiness as the overarching good; 2) even though these economists recognize the importance of eudaimonistic theories, their interpretation and use has not been satisfactory; 3) the debate between Aristotle and Seneca has implications both on the quantitative character of happiness and on the role of public policy regarding its promotion. The main lesson of the ancients is methodological: what made the discussion so rich among them was their awareness that happiness was principally a normative concept whose content had to adjust in order to meet its normative demands; a point contemporary literature seems to have missed.Happiness, hedonism, life-satisfaction approaches, Aristotle, Seneca, aim and scope of Economics.

Probabilistic Knowledge as Objective Knowledge in Quantum Mechanics: Potential Powers Instead of Actual Properties

In classical physics, probabilistic or statistical knowledge has been always related to ignorance or inaccurate subjective knowledge about an actual state of affairs. This idea has been extended to quantum mechanics through a completely incoherent interpretation of the Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein statistics in terms of "strange" quantum particles. This interpretation, naturalized through a widespread "way of speaking" in the physics community, contradicts Born's physical account of {\Psi} as a "probability wave" which provides statistical information about outcomes that, in fact, cannot be interpreted in terms of 'ignorance about an actual state of affairs'. In the present paper we discuss how the metaphysics of actuality has played an essential role in limiting the possibilities of understating things differently. We propose instead a metaphysical scheme in terms of powers with definite potentia which allows us to consider quantum probability in a new light, namely, as providing objective knowledge about a potential state of affairs.Comment: 35 pages, no figures. To be published in Probing the Meaning of Quantum Mechanics, D. Aerts, C. de Ronde, H. Freytes and R. Giuntini (Eds.), World Scientific, Singapore, forthcoming. More comments welcome