9 research outputs found
Forging Attacks on two Authenticated Encryptions COBRA and POET
In FSE 2014, an authenticated encryption mode COBRA [4], based on pseudorandom permutation (PRP) blockcipher, and POET [3], based on Almost XOR-Universal (AXU) hash and strong pseudorandom permutation (SPRP), were proposed. Few weeks later, COBRA mode and a simple variant of the original proposal of POET (due to a forging attack [13] on the original proposal) with AES as an underlying blockcipher, were submitted in CAESAR, a competition [1] of authenticated encryption
(AE). In this paper we show a forging attack on the mode COBRA based on any n-bit blockcipher. Our attack on COBRA requires about O(n) queries with success probability about 1/2. This disproves the
claim proved in FSE 2014 paper. We also show both privacy and forging attack on the parallel version of POET, denoted POET-m. In case of the modes POET or POE (the underlying modes for encryption), we show one query distinguishing attack when we instantiate the underlying AXU-hash function with some other AXU hash function, namely uniform random involution. Thus, our result violates the designer\u27s main claim (Theorem 8.1 in [1]). However, the attacks can not be extended directly for the specific choices of existing submitted versions to the CAESAR competition
General Classification of the Authenticated Encryption Schemes for the CAESAR Competition
An Authenticated encryption scheme is a scheme which provides privacy and integrity by using a secret key. In 2013, CAESAR (the ``Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness\u27\u27) was co-founded by NIST and Dan Bernstein with the aim of finding authenticated encryption schemes
that offer advantages over AES-GCM and are suitable for widespread adoption.
The first round started with 57 candidates in March 2014; and nine of these
first-round candidates where broken and withdrawn from the competition. The
remaining 48 candidates went through an intense process of review, analysis
and comparison. While the cryptographic community benefits greatly from the
manifold different submission designs, their sheer number
implies a challenging amount of study. This paper provides
an easy-to-grasp overview over functional aspects, security parameters, and
robustness offerings by the CAESAR candidates, clustered by their underlying
designs (block-cipher-, stream-cipher-, permutation-/sponge-,
compression-function-based, dedicated). After intensive review and analysis of all 48 candidates by the community, the CAESAR committee selected only 30 candidates for the second round. The announcement for the third round candidates was made on 15th August 2016 and 15 candidates were chosen for the third round
Twisted Polynomials and Forgery Attacks on GCM
Polynomial hashing as an instantiation of universal hashing is a widely employed method for the construction of MACs and authenticated encryption
(AE) schemes, the ubiquitous GCM being a prominent example. It is also
used in recent AE proposals within the CAESAR competition which aim at
providing nonce misuse resistance, such as POET. The algebraic structure
of polynomial hashing has given rise to security concerns: At
CRYPTO~2008, Handschuh and Preneel describe key recovery attacks, and at
FSE~2013, Procter and Cid provide a comprehensive framework for forgery
attacks. Both approaches rely heavily on the ability to construct
\emph{forgery polynomials} having disjoint sets of roots, with many roots
(``weak keys\u27\u27) each. Constructing such polynomials beyond naĂŻve
approaches is crucial for these attacks, but still an open problem.
In this paper, we comprehensively address this issue. We propose to use
\emph{twisted polynomials} from Ore rings as forgery polynomials. We
show how to construct sparse forgery polynomials with full control over
the sets of roots. We also achieve complete and explicit disjoint
coverage of the key space by these polynomials. We furthermore leverage
this new construction in an improved key recovery algorithm.
As cryptanalytic applications of our twisted polynomials, we
develop the first universal forgery attacks on GCM in the weak-key
model that do not require nonce reuse. Moreover, we present universal
weak-key forgery attacks for the recently proposed nonce-misuse resistant
AE schemes POET, Julius, and COBRA
Avalanche Effect in Improperly Initialized CAESAR Candidates
Cryptoprimitives rely on thorough theoretical background, but often lack basic usability features making them prone to unintentional misuse by developers. We argue that this is true even for the state-of-the-art designs. Analyzing 52 candidates of the current CAESAR competition has shown none of them have an avalanche effect in authentication tag strong enough to work properly when partially misconfigured. Although not directly decreasing their security profile, this hints at their security usability being less than perfect. Paper details available at crcs.cz/papers/memics201
On Modes of Operations of a Block Cipher for Authentication and Authenticated Encryption
This work deals with the various requirements of encryption and authentication in cryptographic applications. The approach
is to construct suitable modes of operations of a block cipher to achieve the relevant goals. A variety
of schemes suitable for specific applications are presented. While none of the schemes are built completely from scratch,
there is a common unifying framework which connects them. All the schemes described have been implemented and the implementation
details are publicly available. Performance figures are presented when the block cipher is the AES and the Intel AES-NI
instructions are used. These figures suggest that the constructions presented here compare well with previous works
such as the famous OCB mode of operation. In terms of features, the constructions provide several new offerings which
are not present in earlier works. This work significantly widens the range of choices of an actual designer of
cryptographic system
Critical Perspectives on Provable Security: Fifteen Years of Another Look Papers
We give an overview of our critiques of âproofsâ of security and a guide to
our papers on the subject that have appeared over the past decade and a half. We also
provide numerous additional examples and a few updates and errata
Provably Secure Authenticated Encryption
Authenticated Encryption (AE) is a symmetric key cryptographic primitive that ensures confidentiality and authenticity of processed messages at the same time. The research
of AE as a primitive in its own right started in 2000.
The security goals of AE were captured in formal definitions in the tradition in the tradition of provable security (such as NAE, MRAE, OAE, RAE or the RUP), where the security of a scheme is formally proven assuming the security of an underlying building block. The prevailing syntax moved to nonce-based AE with associated data (which is an additional input that gets authenticated, but not encrypted). Other types of AE schemes appeared as well, e.g. ones that supported stateful sessions.
Numerous AE schemes were designed; in the early years, these were almost exclusively blockcipher modes of operation, most notably OCB in 2001, CCM in 2003 and GCM in 2004. At the same time, issues were discovered both with the security and applicability of the most popular AE schemes, and other applications of symmetric key cryptography.
As a response, the Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) was started in 2013. Its goals were to identify a portfolio of new, secure and reliable AE schemes that would satisfy the needs of practical applications, and also to boost the research in the area of AE. Prompted by CAESAR, 57 new schemes were designed, new types of constructions that gained popularity appeared (such as the Sponge-based AE schemes), and new notions of security were proposed (such as RAE). The final portfolio of the CAESAR competition should be announced in 2018.
In this thesis, we push the state of the art in the field of AE in several directions. All of them are related to provable security, in one way, or another.
We propose OMD, the first provably secure dedicated AE scheme that is based on a compression function. We further modify OMD to achieve nonce misuse-resistant security (MRAE). We also propose another provably secure variant of OMD called pure OMD, which enjoys a great improvement of performance over OMD.
Inspired by the modifications that gave rise to pure OMD, we turn to the popular Sponge-based AE schemes and prove that similar measures can also be applied to the keyed Sponge and keyed Duplex (a variant of the Sponge), allowing a substantial increase of performance without an impact on security.
We then address definitional aspects of AE. We critically evaluate the security notion of OAE, whose authors claimed that it provides the best possible security for online schemes under nonce reuse. We challenge these claims, and discuss what are the meaningful requirements for online AE schemes. Based on our findings, we formulate a new definition of online AE security under nonce-reuse, and demonstrate its feasibility.
We next turn our attention to the security of nonce-based AE schemes under stretch misuse; i.e. when a scheme is used with varying ciphertext expansion under the same key, even though it should not be. We argue that varying the stretch is plausible, and formulate several notions that capture security in presence of variable stretch. We establish their relations to previous notions, and demonstrate the feasibility of security in this setting.
We finally depart from provable security, with the intention to complement it. We compose a survey of universal forgeries, decryption attacks and key recovery attacks on 3rd round CAESAR candidates
Putting Chinese natural knowledge to work in an eighteenth-century Swiss canton: the case of Dr Laurent Garcin
Symposium: S048 - Putting Chinese natural knowledge to work in the long eighteenth centuryThis paper takes as a case study the experience of the eighteenth-century Swiss physician, Laurent Garcin (1683-1752), with Chinese medical and pharmacological knowledge. A NeuchĂątel bourgeois of Huguenot origin, who studied in Leiden with Hermann Boerhaave, Garcin spent nine years (1720-1729) in South and Southeast Asia as a surgeon in the service of the Dutch East India Company. Upon his return to NeuchĂątel in 1739 he became primus inter pares in the small local community of physician-botanists, introducing them to the artificial sexual system of classification. He practiced medicine, incorporating treatments acquired during his travels. taught botany, collected rare plants for major botanical gardens, and contributed to the Journal Helvetique on a range of topics; he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of London, where two of his papers were read in translation and published in the Philosophical Transactions; one of these concerned the mangosteen (Garcinia mangostana), leading Linnaeus to name the genus Garcinia after Garcin. He was likewise consulted as an expert on the East Indies, exotic flora, and medicines, and contributed to important publications on these topics.
During his time with the Dutch East India Company Garcin encountered Chinese medical practitioners whose work he evaluated favourably as being on a par with that of the Brahmin physicians, whom he particularly esteemed. Yet Garcin never went to China, basing his entire experience of Chinese medical practice on what he witnessed in the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia (the âEast Indiesâ). This case demonstrates that there were myriad routes to Europeans developing an understanding of Chinese natural knowledge; the Chinese diaspora also afforded a valuable opportunity for comparisons of its knowledge and practice with other non-European bodies of medical and natural (e.g. pharmacological) knowledge.postprin