Inference Belief and Interpretation in Science

This monograph explores the deeply cognitive roots of human scientific quest. The process of making scientific inferences is continuous with the day-to-day inferential activity of individuals, and is predominantly inductive in nature. Inductive inference, which is fallible, exploratory, and open-ended, is of essential relevance in our incessant efforts at making sense of a complex and uncertain world around us, and covers a vast range of cognitive activities, among which scientific exploration constitutes the pinnacle. Inductive inference has a personal aspect to it, being rooted in the cognitive unconscious of individuals, which has recently been found to be of paramount importance in a wide range of complex cognitive processes. One other major aspect of the process of inference making, including the making of scientific inferences, is the role of a vast web of beliefs lodged in the human mind, as also of a huge repertoire of heuristics, that constitute an important component of ‘unconscious intelligence’. Finally, human cognitive activity is dependent in a large measure on emotions and affects that operate mostly at an unconscious level. Of special importance in scientific inferential activity is the process of hypothesis making, which is examined in this book, along with the above aspects of inductive inference, at considerable depth. The book focuses on the inadequacy of the viewpoint of naive realism in understanding the context-dependence of scientific theories, where a cumulative progress towards an ultimate truth about Nature appears to be too simplistic a generalization. It poses a critique to the commonly perceived image of science where it is seen as the last word in logic and objectivity, the latter in the double sense of being independent of individual psychological propensities and, at the same time, approaching a correct understanding of the workings of a mind-independent nature. Adopting the naturalist point of view, it examines the essential tension between the cognitive endeavors of individuals and scientific communities, immersed in belief systems and cultures, on the one hand, and the engagement with a mind-independent reality on the other. In the end, science emerges as an interpretation of nature, which is perceived by us only contextually, as successively emerging cross-sections of a limited scope and extent. Successive waves of theory building in science appear as episodic and kaleidoscopic changes in perspective as certain in-built borders are crossed, rather than as a cumulative progress towards some ultimate truth. Based on current literature, I aim to set up, in the form of a plausible hypothesis, a framework for understanding the mechanisms underlying inductive inference in general and abduction in particular

Inference Belief and Interpretation in Science

This monograph explores the deeply cognitive roots of human scientific quest. The process of making scientific inferences is continuous with the day-to-day inferential activity of individuals, and is predominantly inductive in nature. Inductive inference, which is fallible, exploratory, and open-ended, is of essential relevance in our incessant efforts at making sense of a complex and uncertain world around us, and covers a vast range of cognitive activities, among which scientific exploration constitutes the pinnacle. Inductive inference has a personal aspect to it, being rooted in the cognitive unconscious of individuals, which has recently been found to be of paramount importance in a wide range of complex cognitive processes. One other major aspect of the process of inference making, including the making of scientific inferences, is the role of a vast web of beliefs lodged in the human mind, as also of a huge repertoire of heuristics, that constitute an important component of ‘unconscious intelligence’. Finally, human cognitive activity is dependent in a large measure on emotions and affects that operate mostly at an unconscious level. Of special importance in scientific inferential activity is the process of hypothesis making, which is examined in this book, along with the above aspects of inductive inference, at considerable depth. The book focuses on the inadequacy of the viewpoint of naive realism in understanding the context-dependence of scientific theories, where a cumulative progress towards an ultimate truth about Nature appears to be too simplistic a generalization. It poses a critique to the commonly perceived image of science where it is seen as the last word in logic and objectivity, the latter in the double sense of being independent of individual psychological propensities and, at the same time, approaching a correct understanding of the workings of a mind-independent nature. Adopting the naturalist point of view, it examines the essential tension between the cognitive endeavors of individuals and scientific communities, immersed in belief systems and cultures, on the one hand, and the engagement with a mind-independent reality on the other. In the end, science emerges as an interpretation of nature, which is perceived by us only contextually, as successively emerging cross-sections of a limited scope and extent. Successive waves of theory building in science appear as episodic and kaleidoscopic changes in perspective as certain in-built borders are crossed, rather than as a cumulative progress towards some ultimate truth. Based on current literature, I aim to set up, in the form of a plausible hypothesis, a framework for understanding the mechanisms underlying inductive inference in general and abduction in particular

Inference Belief and Interpretation in Science

This monograph explores the deeply cognitive roots of human scientific quest. The process of making scientific inferences is continuous with the day-to-day inferential activity of individuals, and is predominantly inductive in nature. Inductive inference, which is fallible, exploratory, and open-ended, is of essential relevance in our incessant efforts at making sense of a complex and uncertain world around us, and covers a vast range of cognitive activities, among which scientific exploration constitutes the pinnacle. Inductive inference has a personal aspect to it, being rooted in the cognitive unconscious of individuals, which has recently been found to be of paramount importance in a wide range of complex cognitive processes. One other major aspect of the process of inference making, including the making of scientific inferences, is the role of a vast web of beliefs lodged in the human mind, as also of a huge repertoire of heuristics, that constitute an important component of ‘unconscious intelligence’. Finally, human cognitive activity is dependent in a large measure on emotions and affects that operate mostly at an unconscious level. Of special importance in scientific inferential activity is the process of hypothesis making, which is examined in this book, along with the above aspects of inductive inference, at considerable depth. The book focuses on the inadequacy of the viewpoint of naive realism in understanding the context-dependence of scientific theories, where a cumulative progress towards an ultimate truth about Nature appears to be too simplistic a generalization. It poses a critique to the commonly perceived image of science where it is seen as the last word in logic and objectivity, the latter in the double sense of being independent of individual psychological propensities and, at the same time, approaching a correct understanding of the workings of a mind-independent nature. Adopting the naturalist point of view, it examines the essential tension between the cognitive endeavors of individuals and scientific communities, immersed in belief systems and cultures, on the one hand, and the engagement with a mind-independent reality on the other. In the end, science emerges as an interpretation of nature, which is perceived by us only contextually, as successively emerging cross-sections of a limited scope and extent. Successive waves of theory building in science appear as episodic and kaleidoscopic changes in perspective as certain in-built borders are crossed, rather than as a cumulative progress towards some ultimate truth. Based on current literature, I aim to set up, in the form of a plausible hypothesis, a framework for understanding the mechanisms underlying inductive inference in general and abduction in particular

Neuroethics and the Problem of Other Minds: Implications of Neuroscience for the Moral Status of Brain-Damaged Patients and Nonhuman Animals

Our ethical obligations to another being depend at least in part on that being\u27s capacity for a mental life. Our usual approach to inferring the mental state of another is to reason by analogy: If another being behaves as I do in a circumstance that engenders a certain mental state in me, I conclude that it has engendered the same mental state in him or her. Unfortunately, as philosophers have long noted, this analogy is fallible because behavior and mental states are only contingently related. If the other person is acting, for example, we could draw the wrong conclusion about his or her mental state. In this article I consider another type of analogy that can be drawn between oneself and another to infer the mental state of the other, substituting brain activity for behavior. According to most current views of the mind–body problem, mental states and brain states are non-contingently related, and hence inferences drawn with the new analogy are not susceptible to the alternative interpretations that plague the behavioral analogy. The implications of this approach are explored in two cases for which behavior is particularly unhelpful as a guide to mental status: severely brain–damaged patients who are incapable of intentional communicative behavior, and nonhuman animals whose behavioral repertoires are different from ours and who lack language

A Decision Making Construct for Complex Situations

The uncertainty inherently associated with complexity challenges decision-making processes, indicating a need for a construct for decision making in complex situations. A review of the literature on systems, complexity, and paradigms indicates that such a construct must be internally consistent with well-defined philosophical foundations and further that systems and complexity (as used in complex situations) are not necessarily internally consistent with traditional philosophical foundations. Therefore, a decision making construct for complex situations requires research into different foundations. This research addresses these gaps, deriving axiological and methodological components based on a set of principles consistent with the ontology and epistemology of Sousa-Poza and Correa-Martinez (2005). The combination of these four philosophical components is asserted to establish a Complex Situations Paradigm providing a foundational perspective for complexity and systems. The characteristics of this research require particular attention to the appropriate research methodology. Canons for research are typically based on philosophical foundations of rationalism or empiricism; hence this research derives a set of generalized canons based on a specific definition of knowledge, which must be instantiated as specific research canons for a given philosophical foundation. The methodology for this research must be consistent with said canons and the associated definition of knowledge. The product of the research is an internally consistent philosophical foundation for complex situations based on a research methodology using instantiated generalized canons, and an application of the associated methodology to derive a decision making construct. The contributions to the literature are the maturation of underlying theory for complex situations and the generalized research canons. The contribution to theory is the internally consistent philosophical foundation for complex situations, the Complex Situations Paradigm, and the associated discussion of canons. Finally, the contribution to practice is the decision making construct itself, applying the elements of the paradigm to frame action at diverse levels in complex situations. Areas for further research include the derivation of methods based on the CSP methodology; applications of the underlying constructs to facilitate understanding of complexity through a method designated forensic complexity, and exploration of CSP principles to explore ramifications of cognitive aspects

Cognitivism and Innovation in Economics - Two Lectures

This issue of the Department W.P. reproduces two lectures by Professor Loasby organized by the CISEPS (Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology and the Social Sciences at Bicocca) in collaboration with the IEP, the Istituto di Economia Politica of the Bocconi University in Milan. The first lecture was delivered at the University of Milano-Bicocca on 13 October 2003 and the second was staged the day after at the Bocconi University. The lectures are reproduced here together with a comment by dr. Stefano Brusoni of Bocconi and SPRU. Two further comments were presented at the time by Professor Richard Arena of the University of Nice and by Professor Pier Luigi Sacco of the University of Venice. Both of them deserve gratitude for active participation to the initiative. Unfortunately it has not been possible to include their comments in the printed form. In these lectures Brian Loasby opens under the title of Psychology of Wealth (a title echoing a famous essay by Carlo Cattaneo) and he develops an argument in cognitive economics which is based on Hayek’s theory of the human mind with significant complements and extensions, mainly from Smith and Marshall. The second lecture provides a discussion on organization and the human mind. It can be read independently although it is linked to the former. Indeed, in Professor Loasby’s words, “the psychology of wealth leads to a particular perspective on this problem of organization”. The gist of the argument lies in the need to appreciate the significance of an appropriate “balance between apparently conflicting principles: the coherence, and therefore the effectiveness, of this differentiated system requires some degree of compatibility between its elements, but the creation of differentiated knowledge and skills depends on the freedom to make idiosyncratic patterns by thinking and acting in ways which may be radically different from those of many other people”. This dilemma of compatibility vs. independence can find solution in a variety of contexts, as Loasby’s analysis shows. In his comments Richard Arena had focussed on the rationality issues, so prominent in Loasby’s text. For example, he had suggested that the cleavage between rational choice equilibrium and evolutionary order offers ground to new forms of self-organization. Pier Luigi Sacco had emphasized that Loasby’s approach breaks new ground on the economics of culture and paves the way to less simplistic conceptions of endogenous growth than is suggested by the conventional wisdom of current models. Unfortunately, as hinted above, is has proved impossible to include those comments in the present booklet along with Loasby’s lectures. A special obligation must be recorded to Dr. Stefano Brusoni, who has prepared a written version of his own comment which has been printed in this booklet and can be offered to the reader. Among other participants Roberto Scazzieri, of the University of Bologna, Tiziano Raffaelli, of the University of Pisa, Luigino Bruni of Bicocca, Riccardo Cappellin of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’ and others were able to offer significant comments during the two sessions of the initiative. The organizers are particularly grateful to Professor Brian Loasby for the active and generous support of the initiative. Together with our colleagues and students we have been able to admire his enthusiasm and intellectual creativity in treating some of the more fascinating topics of contemporary economics.

Epistemology and Social Work: Integrating theory, research and practice through philosophical pragmatism

Debates regarding theory and practice in social work have often avoided detailed discussion regarding the nature of knowledge itself and the various ways this can be created. As a result, positivistic conceptions of knowledge are still assumed by many to be axiomatic, such that context-dependent and practitioner-oriented approaches to knowledge creation and use are assumed to lack epistemological rigor and credibility. By drawing on epistemology, this theoretical paper outlines the case for a renewed approach to knowledge definition, creation and use within social work by reference to pragmatism. Pragmatism has the potential to act as an organizing theoretical framework, taking account of the role of both ontology and epistemology, acting as a functional methodology for the further enhancement of practice-based knowledge

The Validity of the General Intellectual Humility Scale as a Measure of Intellectual Humility

Early intellectual humility research has largely relied on questionnaires that require individuals to self-evaluate their own intellectual humility, despite concerns that people low in intellectual humility may lack awareness of their degree of intellectual humility. Because of this potential source of error, it is important that self-report measures of intellectual humility are thoroughly tested for validity. In Chapter 1, I conducted a systematic literature review of measures of intellectual humility. For each measure, validity evidence is summarized and critically evaluated. Validity evidence was found lacking with respect to addressing potentially serious problems with self-report. This finding points to a need for additional validity testing for self-report measures of intellectual humility. In Chapter 2, I conducted a set of pointed tests of validity for one such measure, the General Intellectual Humility Scale (GIHS). In a sample recruited from Prolific (N = 481), GIHS scores were weakly associated with or unassociated with endorsement of epistemically unwarranted beliefs, unassociated with endorsing such beliefs as certainly true, and unassociated with endorsing such beliefs despite claiming to have carefully researched the issue. Additionally, GIHS scores predicted greater bias blind spot, and this effect remained significant when controlling for science intelligence. Finally, GIHS scores predicted belief in anthropogenic global warming when controlling for political orientation but did not attenuate political polarization about global warming. I argue that these findings are clear departures from theory yet are consistent with suspected problems with direct self-report. I conclude by discussing limitations and implications for future research