Fixed-point elimination in the intuitionistic propositional calculus

It is a consequence of existing literature that least and greatest fixed-points of monotone polynomials on Heyting algebras-that is, the algebraic models of the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus-always exist, even when these algebras are not complete as lattices. The reason is that these extremal fixed-points are definable by formulas of the IPC. Consequently, the $\mu$-calculus based on intuitionistic logic is trivial, every $\mu$-formula being equivalent to a fixed-point free formula. We give in this paper an axiomatization of least and greatest fixed-points of formulas, and an algorithm to compute a fixed-point free formula equivalent to a given $\mu$-formula. The axiomatization of the greatest fixed-point is simple. The axiomatization of the least fixed-point is more complex, in particular every monotone formula converges to its least fixed-point by Kleene's iteration in a finite number of steps, but there is no uniform upper bound on the number of iterations. We extract, out of the algorithm, upper bounds for such n, depending on the size of the formula. For some formulas, we show that these upper bounds are polynomial and optimal

Fixed-point elimination in the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (extended version)

It is a consequence of existing literature that least and greatest fixed-points of monotone polynomials on Heyting algebras-that is, the alge- braic models of the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus-always exist, even when these algebras are not complete as lattices. The reason is that these extremal fixed-points are definable by formulas of the IPC. Consequently, the $\mu$-calculus based on intuitionistic logic is trivial, every $\mu$-formula being equiv- alent to a fixed-point free formula. We give in this paper an axiomatization of least and greatest fixed-points of formulas, and an algorithm to compute a fixed-point free formula equivalent to a given $\mu$-formula. The axiomatization of the greatest fixed-point is simple. The axiomatization of the least fixed- point is more complex, in particular every monotone formula converges to its least fixed-point by Kleene's iteration in a finite number of steps, but there is no uniform upper bound on the number of iterations. We extract, out of the algorithm, upper bounds for such n, depending on the size of the formula. For some formulas, we show that these upper bounds are polynomial and optimal.Comment: extended version of arXiv:1601.0040

Towards a Proof Theory of G\"odel Modal Logics

Analytic proof calculi are introduced for box and diamond fragments of basic modal fuzzy logics that combine the Kripke semantics of modal logic K with the many-valued semantics of G\"odel logic. The calculi are used to establish completeness and complexity results for these fragments

Classical BI: Its Semantics and Proof Theory

We present Classical BI (CBI), a new addition to the family of bunched logics which originates in O'Hearn and Pym's logic of bunched implications BI. CBI differs from existing bunched logics in that its multiplicative connectives behave classically rather than intuitionistically (including in particular a multiplicative version of classical negation). At the semantic level, CBI-formulas have the normal bunched logic reading as declarative statements about resources, but its resource models necessarily feature more structure than those for other bunched logics; principally, they satisfy the requirement that every resource has a unique dual. At the proof-theoretic level, a very natural formalism for CBI is provided by a display calculus \`a la Belnap, which can be seen as a generalisation of the bunched sequent calculus for BI. In this paper we formulate the aforementioned model theory and proof theory for CBI, and prove some fundamental results about the logic, most notably completeness of the proof theory with respect to the semantics.Comment: 42 pages, 8 figure

Virtual Evidence: A Constructive Semantics for Classical Logics

This article presents a computational semantics for classical logic using constructive type theory. Such semantics seems impossible because classical logic allows the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), not accepted in constructive logic since it does not have computational meaning. However, the apparently oracular powers expressed in the LEM, that for any proposition P either it or its negation, not P, is true can also be explained in terms of constructive evidence that does not refer to "oracles for truth." Types with virtual evidence and the constructive impossibility of negative evidence provide sufficient semantic grounds for classical truth and have a simple computational meaning. This idea is formalized using refinement types, a concept of constructive type theory used since 1984 and explained here. A new axiom creating virtual evidence fully retains the constructive meaning of the logical operators in classical contexts. Key Words: classical logic, constructive logic, intuitionistic logic, propositions-as-types, constructive type theory, refinement types, double negation translation, computational content, virtual evidenc