Evolution of opinions on social networks in the presence of competing committed groups

Public opinion is often affected by the presence of committed groups of individuals dedicated to competing points of view. Using a model of pairwise social influence, we study how the presence of such groups within social networks affects the outcome and the speed of evolution of the overall opinion on the network. Earlier work indicated that a single committed group within a dense social network can cause the entire network to quickly adopt the group's opinion (in times scaling logarithmically with the network size), so long as the committed group constitutes more than about 10% of the population (with the findings being qualitatively similar for sparse networks as well). Here we study the more general case of opinion evolution when two groups committed to distinct, competing opinions $A$ and $B$, and constituting fractions $p_A$ and $p_B$ of the total population respectively, are present in the network. We show for stylized social networks (including Erd\H{o}s-R\'enyi random graphs and Barab\'asi-Albert scale-free networks) that the phase diagram of this system in parameter space $(p_A,p_B)$ consists of two regions, one where two stable steady-states coexist, and the remaining where only a single stable steady-state exists. These two regions are separated by two fold-bifurcation (spinodal) lines which meet tangentially and terminate at a cusp (critical point). We provide further insights to the phase diagram and to the nature of the underlying phase transitions by investigating the model on infinite (mean-field limit), finite complete graphs and finite sparse networks. For the latter case, we also derive the scaling exponent associated with the exponential growth of switching times as a function of the distance from the critical point.Comment: 23 pages: 15 pages + 7 figures (main text), 8 pages + 1 figure + 1 table (supplementary info

The Naming Game in Social Networks: Community Formation and Consensus Engineering

We study the dynamics of the Naming Game [Baronchelli et al., (2006) J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. P06014] in empirical social networks. This stylized agent-based model captures essential features of agreement dynamics in a network of autonomous agents, corresponding to the development of shared classification schemes in a network of artificial agents or opinion spreading and social dynamics in social networks. Our study focuses on the impact that communities in the underlying social graphs have on the outcome of the agreement process. We find that networks with strong community structure hinder the system from reaching global agreement; the evolution of the Naming Game in these networks maintains clusters of coexisting opinions indefinitely. Further, we investigate agent-based network strategies to facilitate convergence to global consensus.Comment: The original publication is available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/70370l311m1u0ng3

Consensus and ordering in language dynamics

We consider two social consensus models, the AB-model and the Naming Game restricted to two conventions, which describe a population of interacting agents that can be in either of two equivalent states (A or B) or in a third mixed (AB) state. Proposed in the context of language competition and emergence, the AB state was associated with bilingualism and synonymy respectively. We show that the two models are equivalent in the mean field approximation, though the differences at the microscopic level have non-trivial consequences. To point them out, we investigate an extension of these dynamics in which confidence/trust is considered, focusing on the case of an underlying fully connected graph, and we show that the consensus-polarization phase transition taking place in the Naming Game is not observed in the AB model. We then consider the interface motion in regular lattices. Qualitatively, both models show the same behavior: a diffusive interface motion in a one-dimensional lattice, and a curvature driven dynamics with diffusing stripe-like metastable states in a two-dimensional one. However, in comparison to the Naming Game, the AB-model dynamics is shown to slow down the diffusion of such configurations.Comment: 7 pages, 6 figure

In-depth analysis of the Naming Game dynamics: the homogeneous mixing case

Language emergence and evolution has recently gained growing attention through multi-agent models and mathematical frameworks to study their behavior. Here we investigate further the Naming Game, a model able to account for the emergence of a shared vocabulary of form-meaning associations through social/cultural learning. Due to the simplicity of both the structure of the agents and their interaction rules, the dynamics of this model can be analyzed in great detail using numerical simulations and analytical arguments. This paper first reviews some existing results and then presents a new overall understanding.Comment: 30 pages, 19 figures (few in reduced definition). In press in IJMP

The Emergence of Consensus: a primer

The origin of population-scale coordination has puzzled philosophers and scientists for centuries. Recently, game theory, evolutionary approaches and complex systems science have provided quantitative insights on the mechanisms of social consensus. This paper overviews the main dimensions over which the debate has unfolded and discusses some representative results, with a focus on those situations in which consensus emerges `spontaneously' in absence of centralised institutions. Covered topics include the macroscopic consequences of the different microscopic rules of behavioural contagion, the role of social networks, and the mechanisms that prevent the formation of a consensus or alter it after it has emerged. Special attention is devoted to the recent wave of experiments on the emergence of consensus in social systems

The spontaneous emergence of conventions: An experimental study of cultural evolution

How do shared conventions emerge in complex decentralized social systems? This question engages fields as diverse as linguistics, sociology, and cognitive science. Previous empirical attempts to solve this puzzle all presuppose that formal or informal institutions, such as incentives for global agreement, coordinated leadership, or aggregated information about the population, are needed to facilitate a solution. Evolutionary theories of social conventions, by contrast, hypothesize that such institutions are not necessary in order for social conventions to form. However, empirical tests of this hypothesis have been hindered by the difficulties of evaluating the real-time creation of new collective behaviors in large decentralized populations. Here, we present experimental results-replicated at several scales-that demonstrate the spontaneous creation of universally adopted social conventions and show how simple changes in a population's network structure can direct the dynamics of norm formation, driving human populations with no ambition for large scale coordination to rapidly evolve shared social conventions

Nonequilibrium dynamics of language games on complex networks

The naming game is a model of nonequilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a linguistic convention or a communication system in a population of agents with pairwise local interactions. We present an extensive study of its dynamics on complex networks, that can be considered as the most natural topological embedding for agents involved in language games and opinion dynamics. Except for some community structured networks on which metastable phases can be observed, agents playing the naming game always manage to reach a global consensus. This convergence is obtained after a time generically scaling with the population’s size N as tconv∼N1.4±0.1, i.e., much faster than for agents embedded on regular lattices. Moreover, the memory capacity required by the system scales only linearly with its size. Particular attention is given to heterogenous networks, in which the dynamical activity pattern of a node depends on its degree. High-degree nodes have a fundamental role, but require larger memory capacity. They govern the dynamics acting as spreaders of (linguistic) conventions. The effects of other properties, such as the average degree and the clustering, are also discussed

Polarization inhibits the phase transition of Axelrod''s model

We study the effect of polarization in Axelrod''s model of cultural dissemination. This is done through the introduction of a cultural feature that takes only two values, while the other features can present a larger number of possible traits. Our numerical results and mean-field approximations show that polarization reduces the characteristic phase transition of the original model to a finite-size effect, since at the thermodynamic limit only the ordered phase is present. Furthermore, for finite system sizes, the stationary state depends on the percolation threshold of the network where the model is implemented: a polarized phase is obtained for percolation thresholds below 1/2, and a fragmented multicultural one otherwise. © 2021 American Physical Society