54 research outputs found
New Preimage Attacks Against Reduced SHA-1
This paper shows preimage attacks against reduced SHA-1 up to 57 steps. The best previous attack has been presented at CRYPTO 2009 and was for 48 steps finding a two-block preimage with incorrect padding at the cost of 2159.3 evaluations of the compression function. For the same variant our attacks find a one-block preimage at 2150.6 and a correctly padded two-block preimage at 2151.1 evaluations of the compression function. The improved results come out of a differential view on the meet-in-the-middle technique originally developed by Aoki and Sasaki. The new framework closely relates meet-in-the-middle attacks to differential cryptanalysis which turns out to be particularly useful for hash functions with linear message expansion and weak diffusion properties
(Pseudo) Preimage Attack on Round-Reduced Grøstl Hash Function and Others (Extended Version)
The Grøstl hash function is one of the 5 final round candidates of the SHA-3 competition hosted by NIST. In this paper, we study the preimage resistance of the Grøstl hash function. We propose pseudo preimage attacks on Grøstl hash function for both 256-bit and 512-bit versions, i.e. we need to choose the initial value in order to invert the hash function. Pseudo preimage attack on 5(out of 10)-round Grøstl-256 has a complexity of (in time and memory) and pseudo preimage attack on 8(out of 14)-round Grøstl-512 has a complexity of . To the best of our knowledge, our attacks are the first (pseudo) preimage attacks on round-reduced Grøstl hash function, including its compression function and output transformation. These results are obtained by a variant of meet-in-the-middle preimage attack framework by Aoki and Sasaki. We also improve the time complexities of the preimage attacks against 5-round Whirlpool and 7-round AES hashes by Sasaki in FSE~2011
Preimages for Step-Reduced SHA-2
In this paper, we present a preimage attack for 42 step-reduced SHA-256 with time complexity and memory requirements of order . The same attack also applies to 42 step-reduced SHA-512 with time complexity and memory requirements of order . Our attack is meet-in-the-middle preimage attack
Preimage Attacks on 41-Step SHA-256 and 46-Step SHA-512
In this paper, we propose preimage attacks on 41-step SHA-256 and 46-step SHA-512,
which drastically increase the number of attacked steps compared to the best previous preimage attack working for only 24 steps.
The time complexity for 41-step SHA-256 is compression function operations and the memory requirement is
words.
The time complexity for 46-step SHA-512 is compression function operations and the memory requirement is
words.
Our attack is a meet-in-the-middle attack.
We first consider the application of previous meet-in-the-middle attack techniques to SHA-2.
We then analyze the message expansion of SHA-2 by considering all previous techniques
to find a new independent message-word partition.
We first explain the attack on 40-step SHA-256 whose complexity is to describe the ideas.
We then explain how to extend the attack
Cryptanalysis of the Round-Reduced Kupyna Hash Function
The Kupyna hash function was selected as the new Ukrainian standard DSTU 7564:2014 in 2015. It is designed to
replace the old Independent States (CIS) standard GOST 34.311-95. The Kupyna hash function is an AES-based primitive, which uses Merkle-DamgĂĄrd compression function based on Even-Mansour design. In this paper, we show the first cryptanalytic attacks on the round-reduced Kupyna hash function. Using the rebound attack, we present a collision attack on 5-round of the Kupyna-256 hash
function. The complexity of this collision attack is () (in time and memory). Furthermore, we use guess-and-determine MitM attack to construct pseudo-preimage attacks on 6-round Kupyna-256 and Kupyna-512 hash function, respectively. The complexity of these preimage attacks are () and () (in time and memory), respectively
Improved Preimage Attack on One-block MD4
We propose an improved preimage attack on one-block MD4 with the
time complexity MD4 compression function operations, as
compared to in \cite{AokiS-sac08}. We research the attack
procedure in \cite{AokiS-sac08} and formulate the complexity for
computing a preimage attack on one-block MD4. We attain the result
mainly through the following two aspects with the help of the
complexity formula. First, we continue to compute two more steps
backward to get two more chaining values for comparison during the
meet-in-the-middle attack. Second, we search two more neutral words
in one independent chunk, and then propose the multi-neutral-word
partial-fixing technique to get more message freedom and skip ten
steps for partial-fixing, as compared to previous four steps. We
also use the initial structure technique and apply the same idea to
improve the pseudo-preimage and preimage attacks on Extended MD4
with and improvement factor, as compared to
previous attacks in \cite{SasakiA-acisp09}, respectively
Automatic Search of Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks on AES-like Hashing
The Meet-in-the-Middle (MITM) preimage attack is highly effective in breaking the preimage resistance of many hash functions, including but not limited to the full MD5, HAVAL, and Tiger, and reduced SHA-0/1/2. It was also shown to be a threat to hash functions built on block ciphers like AES by Sasaki in 2011. Recently, such attacks on AES hashing modes evolved from merely using the freedom of choosing the internal state to also exploiting the freedom of choosing the message state. However, detecting such attacks especially those evolved variants is difficult. In previous works, the search space of the configurations of such attacks is limited, such that manual analysis is practical, which results in sub-optimal solutions. In this paper, we remove artificial limitations in previous works, formulate the essential ideas of the construction of the attack in well-defined ways, and translate the problem of searching for the best attacks into optimization problems under constraints in Mixed-Integer-Linear-Programming (MILP) models. The MILP models capture a large solution space of valid attacks; and the objectives of the MILP models are attack configurations with the minimized computational complexity. With such MILP models and using the off-the-shelf solver, it is efficient to search for the best attacks exhaustively. As a result, we obtain the first attacks against the full (5-round) and an extended (5.5-round) version of Haraka-512 v2, and 8-round AES-128 hashing modes, as well as improved attacks covering more rounds of Haraka-256 v2 and other members of AES and Rijndael hashing modes
Preimage and Pseudo-Collision Attacks on Step-Reduced SM3 Hash Function
SM3~\cite{SM3hf} is the Chinese cryptographic hash standard which was announced in 2010 and designed by Wang . It is based on the Merkle-DamgĂĄrd design and its compression function can be seen as a block cipher used in Davies-Meyer mode. It uses message block of length 512 bits and outputs hash value of length 256 bits.
This paper studies the security of SM3 hash function against preimage attack and pseudo-collision attack. We propose preimage attacks on 29-step and 30-step SM3, and pseudo-preimage attacks on 31-step and 32-step SM3 out of 64 steps. The complexities of these attacks are 29-step operations, 30-step operations, 31-step operations and 32-step operations, respectively. These (pseudo) preimage attacks are all from the first step of the reduced SM3. Meanwhile, these (pseudo) preimage attacks can be converted into pseudo-collision attacks on SM3 reduced to 29 steps, 30 steps, 31 steps and 32 steps with complexities of , , and respectively. As far as we know, the previously best known preimage attacks on SM3 cover 28 steps (from the first step) and 30 steps (from the 7-th step), and there is no publicly published result on (pseudo) collision attack on SM3
Linear Structures: Applications to Cryptanalysis of Round-Reduced Keccak
In this paper, we analyze the security of round-reduced versions of the Keccak hash function family. Based on the work pioneered by Aumasson and Meier, and Dinur et al., we formalize and develop a technique named linear structure, which allows linearization of the underlying permutation of Keccak for up to 3 rounds with large number of variable spaces. As a direct application, it extends the best zero-sum distinguishers by 2 rounds without increasing the complexities. We also apply linear structures to preimage attacks against Keccak. By carefully studying the properties of the underlying Sbox, we show bilinear structures and find ways to convert the information on the output bits to linear functions on input bits. These findings, combined with linear structures, lead us to preimage attacks against up to 4-round Keccak with reduced complexities. An interesting feature of such preimage attacks is low complexities for small variants. As extreme examples, we can now find preimages of 3-round SHAKE128 with complexity 1, as well as the first practical solutions to two 3-round instances of Keccak challenge. Both zero-sum distinguishers and preimage attacks are verified by implementations. It is noted that the attacks here are still far from threatening the security of the full 24-round Keccak
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