Measurement in marketing

We distinguish three senses of the concept of measurement (measurement as the selection of observable indicators of theoretical concepts, measurement as the collection of data from respondents, and measurement as the formulation of measurement models linking observable indicators to latent factors representing the theoretical concepts), and we review important issues related to measurement in each of these senses. With regard to measurement in the first sense, we distinguish the steps of construct definition and item generation, and we review scale development efforts reported in three major marketing journals since 2000 to illustrate these steps and derive practical guidelines. With regard to measurement in the second sense, we look at the survey process from the respondent's perspective and discuss the goals that may guide participants' behavior during a survey, the cognitive resources that respondents devote to answering survey questions, and the problems that may occur at the various steps of the survey process. Finally, with regard to measurement in the third sense, we cover both reflective and formative measurement models, and we explain how researchers can assess the quality of measurement in both types of measurement models and how they can ascertain the comparability of measurements across different populations of respondents or conditions of measurement. We also provide a detailed empirical example of measurement analysis for reflective measurement models

Capitalistic Competition as a Communicative Community - Why Politics Is Less “Deliberative” than Markets

Discourse theorists such as Habermas tend to disregard the communicative character and discoursive power of market processes and at the same time overrate the ability of political deliberation to discover and implement social problem solutions. Mainstream economists have little to contribute to this debate since they regard both economic and political “markets” as simple instruments for the aggregation of given preferences. Hayek and other “Austrian” market process theorists, however, provide a rich theory that highlights the role of competition as a process of discovery, persuasion, experimentation and opinion formation. I use this analytical framework in order to show first that real market processes in many respects correspond to most ambitious claims of ideal deliberation such as “domination-free discourse” or “the unforced force of the better argument”. Next, I confront the deliberative ideal with predicaments of real political discourse, stressing opportunity costs (rational ignorance, shortage of attention, decision costs), asymmetric incompetence and the interventionist bias of political deliberation, and problems of “cheap talk” (preference falsification, opinion cascades, enclave deliberation). In order to make political discourse most effective within the limits described above, I argue in favour of privatisation, decentralisation and constitutionalisation as policy conclusions. I end with a summary comparison of economic and political competition as means to discover and disseminate local knowledge in society.discourse theory; market process theory; deliberative democracy; preference falsification; opinion formation; interventionism

Voting in the Bicameral Congress: Large Majorities as a Signal of Quality

We estimate a model of voting in Congress that allows for dispersed information about the quality of proposals in an equilibrium context. The results highlight the effects of bicameralism on policy outcomes. In equilibrium, the Senate imposes an endogenous supermajority rule on members of the House. We estimate this super- majority rule to be about four-fifths on average across policy areas. Moreover, our results indicate that the value of the information dispersed among legislators is significant, and that in equilibrium a large fraction of House members (40-50 %) vote in accordance with their private information. Taken together, our results imply a highly conservative Senate, in the sense that proposals are enacted into law only when it is extremely likely that their quality is high