4 research outputs found
The Functional Contributions of Consciousness
Most existing research programs are occupied with the difficult question of what consciousness is, overlooking what the more interesting and fruitful research question: what does consciousness do? My dissertation develops a philosophical method for identifying the functional capacities that conscious experience contributes to information processing systems.
My strategy involves systematically consolidating and interpreting a range of psychological and neuroscientific research in order to compare conscious and unconscious processing in different psychological domains, namely, vision, emotion, and social cognition. I also defend the principle of functional pluralism: given that conscious experiences presumably form a relatively diverse class in the natural world, we should expect them to facilitate a diverse range of functions in different psychological domains. My pluralist account implies that we will be able to amass a collection of functional markers that can guide future ascriptions of experience to all sorts of natural and artificial systems. Understanding consciousness functional profile should also ultimately help us answer the general but elusive question of what consciousness is as a feature of psychological systems.
After laying out the general framework and critically evaluating prominent theories of consciousness in the first chapter, I begin the process of identifying FCCs in particular psychological domains. In my second chapter, I identify some candidate functional markers of consciousness in the functionally-complex domain of visual perception, including the processing of semantic information inherent in more informationally-complex visual stimuli, increased spatiotemporal precision, and representational integration over larger spatiotemporal intervals. My third chapter discusses the domain of emotional processing, where I argue that experience facilitates the inhibition of, the conceptualization of, and flexible response to emotionally valenced representational content. In my fourth chapter, I review a range of bias-intervention strategies that explicitly draw on the functional resources of conscious experience. In my final chapter, I draw some conclusions about the nature of consciousness based on my functional analysis. I introduce what I call a Local Workspace Theory, argue that consciousness is at least in part characterized by a high degree of representational complexity afforded by the structural mechanisms that realize it and reflected in the psychological functions that it facilitates
The Functional Contributions of Consciousness
Most existing research programs are occupied with the difficult question of what consciousness is, overlooking what the more interesting and fruitful research question: what does consciousness do? My dissertation develops a philosophical method for identifying the functional capacities that conscious experience contributes to information processing systems.
My strategy involves systematically consolidating and interpreting a range of psychological and neuroscientific research in order to compare conscious and unconscious processing in different psychological domains, namely, vision, emotion, and social cognition. I also defend the principle of functional pluralism: given that conscious experiences presumably form a relatively diverse class in the natural world, we should expect them to facilitate a diverse range of functions in different psychological domains. My pluralist account implies that we will be able to amass a collection of functional markers that can guide future ascriptions of experience to all sorts of natural and artificial systems. Understanding consciousnessâ functional profile should also ultimately help us answer the general but elusive question of what consciousness is as a feature of psychological systems.
After laying out the general framework and critically evaluating prominent theories of consciousness in the first chapter, I begin the process of identifying FCCs in particular psychological domains. In my second chapter, I identify some candidate functional markers of consciousness in the functionally-complex domain of visual perception, including the processing of semantic information inherent in more informationally-complex visual stimuli, increased spatiotemporal precision, and representational integration over larger spatiotemporal intervals. My third chapter discusses the domain of emotional processing, where I argue that experience facilitates the inhibition of, the conceptualization of, and flexible response to emotionally valenced representational content. In my fourth chapter, I review a range of bias-intervention strategies that explicitly draw on the functional resources of conscious experience. In my final chapter, I draw some conclusions about the nature of consciousness based on my functional analysis. I introduce what I call a Local Workspace Theory, argue that consciousness is at least in part characterized by a high degree of representational complexity afforded by the structural mechanisms that realize it and reflected in the psychological functions that it facilitates
Descartes, the Cogito, and the Mind-Body Problem in the Context of Modern Neuroscience
Thesis advisor: Marilee OgrenThe suggestion of a mind-brain duality that emerges out of Descartesâ cogito argument is assessed in the context of twenty-first century neuroscience. The Cartesian texts are explored in order to qualify the extent to which the cogito necessitates such dualism and the functions that Descartes attributes to a non-corporeal soul are precisely defined. The relationship between the mind and brain is explored in the context of a number neuroscientific phenomena, including sensory perception, blindsight, amusia, phantom limb syndrome, frontal lobe lesions, and the neurodevelopmental disorder Williams syndrome, with an attempt to illuminate the physiological basis for each. Juxtaposing the two perspectives, the author concludes that Descartes hypothesis of a disembodied soul is no longer necessary and that a purely physiological understanding of the human mind is now possible, and that there is an underlying affinity between this assertion and Descartes theory of mind.Thesis (BS) â Boston College, 2009.Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences.Discipline: College Honors Program.Discipline: Psychology
An Agent of Attention: An Inquiry into the Source of Our Control
When performing a skilled actionâwhether something impressive like a double somersault or something mundane like reaching for a glass of waterâyou exercise control over your bodily movements. Specifically, you guide their course. In what does that control consist? In this dissertation, I argue that it consists in attending to what you are doing. More specifically, in attending, agents harness their perceptual and perceptuomotor states directly and practically in service of their goals and, in doing so, settle the fine-grained manner in which their bodies will moveâdetails an intention alone leaves unsettled. This requires, among other things, that we reject views on which agentsâ control is identical with their practical rationality. When all goes well, agents attentionally prioritize what is motivationally relevant to them to the exclusion of what would otherwise distract them from achieving their goals. However, sometimes agents attend distractedlyâi.e., without prioritizing. As the aim of attention is to avoid distraction, this entails the possibility of defective attention. Defective attention, in turn, casts light on scenarios in which agents lose control over what they are doing, as when a skilled practitioner âchokes under pressureâ. A complaint sometimes levelled against accounts, like mine, that claim to reduce agentsâ control of their behaviour to that of causally efficacious mental states or events is that these accounts invariably deprive agents themselves of their rightful role in the generation of behaviour. This is the âDisappearing Agent Problemâ for âreductiveâ or âevent-causalâ theories of action. I argue that, correctly understood, extant reductive theories do face a genuine Disappearing Agent Problem. However, it is a problem we solve by recognizing the role that conscious attention plays in making an action the agentâs own. Accordingly, I develop and defend an attentional account of action ownership. On this view, allocating conscious attention in service of your goals is sufficient for a kind of conscious perspective (âmotivational perspectiveâ), which, when active in controlling your behaviour, constitutes the behaviour as your own doing. As I explain, such perspective also contributes to explaining the subjective structure of your perceptual awareness of the world around you