1,559,183 research outputs found

    Customary International Law Acts As Federal Common Law in U.S. Courts

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    This Note discusses how international common law should act as federal common law in U.S. courts. This Note also explores the constitutional challenges involved in incorporating customary international law into U.S. federal common law. Such challenges revolve around the institutions of representative democracy, federal jurisdiction, and the doctrine of separation of powers. Part I of this Note discusses federal common law and customary international law. Part II of this Note presents the negative and positive effects of incorporating customary international law into federal common law. This Note concludes that to preserve national honor among the community of nations, and to protect U.S. citizens from powerful national and international factions, the U.S. federal courts must continue their incorporation of customary international law as a part of federal common law. As in the days of Jonathan Smith, customary international law is the answer to reprehensible oppression

    Federal Corporate Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts

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    To parallelize a sequential source code, a parallelization strategy must be defined that transforms the sequential source code into an equivalent parallel version. Since parallelizing compilers can sometimes transform sequential loops and other well-structured codes into parallel ones automatically, we are interested in finding a solution to parallelize semi-automatically codes that compilers are not able to parallelize automatically, mostly because of weakness of classical data and control dependence analysis, in order to simplify the process of transforming the codes for programmers.Invasive Interactive Parallelization (IIP) hypothesizes that by using anintelligent system that guides the user through an interactive process one can boost parallelization in the above direction. The intelligent system's guidance relies on a classical code analysis and pre-defined parallelizing transformation sequences. To support its main hypothesis, IIP suggests to encode parallelizing transformation sequences in terms of IIP parallelization strategies that dictate default ways to parallelize various code patterns by using facts which have been obtained both from classical source code analysis and directly from the user.In this project, we investigate how automated reasoning can supportthe IIP method in order to parallelize a sequential code with an acceptable performance but faster than manual parallelization. We have looked at two special problem areas: Divide and conquer algorithms and loops in the source codes. Our focus is on parallelizing four sequential legacy C programs such as: Quick sort, Merge sort, Jacobi method and Matrix multipliation and summation for both OpenMP and MPI environment by developing an interactive parallelizing assistance tool that provides users with the assistanceneeded for parallelizing a sequential source code

    Historical Practice and the Contemporary Debate Over Customary International Law

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    Response to: Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2009). A.J. Bellia and Brad Clark have performed a valuable service for other scholars interested in foreign relations law and federal jurisdiction by collecting and illuminating—with their usual care and insight—the historical practice of both English and early American courts with respect to the law of nations. Their recent Article, The Federal Common Law of Nations, demonstrates that, while American courts have not generally treated customary international law (CIL) as supreme federal law, they have applied such law where necessary to vindicate the “perfect rights” of foreign nations. In so doing, American courts have protected the prerogatives of the political branches to “recognize foreign nations, conduct foreign relations, and decide momentous questions of war and peace.” Although Professors Bellia and Clark disavow any attempt “to settle all questions of how customary international law interacts with thefederal system,” they do suggest that their approach represents a middle ground between proponents of the “modern position” that CIL simply is federal common law and critics of that position, who insist that CIL may be applied by American courts only where it is incorporated into the domestic legal system through an affirmative act by the political branches. This response makes three points. First, I quibble with the historical account offered by Professors Bellia and Clark on two minor, yet at least somewhat significant, grounds: The debate over reception of the common law at the federal Constitutional Convention shows greater early skepticism about judge-made common law than Bellia and Clark suggest; also, the jurisdictional provisions of Article III covering cases implicating foreign affairs were not intended fully to centralize power over such cases in federal courts because they left concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts. Second, I question the extent to which the Founding Era history is directly relevant to contemporary debates about how to treat CIL. Finally, I contend that what does the real work in the Bellia and Clark approach is simply constitutionally-grounded concerns about the separation of powers in foreign affairs cases, not anything about CIL per se. Their position thus reduces to the largely uncontroversial claim that federal courts may make federal common law to protect theseconstitutionally-grounded federal interests, and they may sometimes draw the content of federal common law from international law

    Why Preemption Proponents are Wrong

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    The basic idea of federal preemption is easily stated: It is a constitutionally mandated principle that demands that federal law trumps state law when the two conflict or in the rare instances when a federal law is so comprehensive that there’s no role left for state law to fill. But in practice, courts have often had difficulty applying the principle. For plaintiff lawyers, preemption is an ever-present worry. When your client has been injured by a defective car, truck, medical device, boat, tobacco product, pesticide, or mislabeled drug, or has been victimized by a bank or other lending institution, the defendant will probably assert that federal law preempts your client’s state law damages claim. You can expect this argument no matter how weak the federal regulatory scheme or how attenuated the connection between that scheme and the harms your client suffered or the state law duties under which your client seeks a remedy. But defendants’ and tort “reformers’” pro-preemption arguments do not reflect current preemption doctrine as established by the courts. A common—and false—argument for preemption, for example, is that state tort law necessarily interferes with federal regulatory objectives. Moreover, preemption of state tort law is a bad idea. Immunizing the makers of products that cause injury simply because, for instance, these products have been approved for marketing by a federal agency harms both the injured people and society generally

    Choosing Law for Attributing Liability Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Proposal for Uniformity

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    This Note argues that federal common law should determine all attribution of liability issues in actions brought under the FSIA. Part I discusses the FSIA, its history and policies, and the sole U.S. Supreme Court decision to discuss the proper choice of law approach for attribution of liability under the FSIA. Part II examines subsequent cases that have either followed or distinguished the Supreme Court\u27s choice of law approach in deciding questions of agency or respondeat superior. Part III argues that congressional intent demands the application of federal common law to determine questions of attribution of liability in actions brought under the FSIA. This Note concludes that federal courts should apply federal common law to determine the limited question of attribution of liability

    The Asymmetry Problem: Reflections on Calvin Massey’s Standing in State Courts, State Law, and Federal Review

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    This paper is based on remarks delivered at a symposium to honor my University of New Hampshire School of Law colleague Calvin Massey, who passed away in the fall of 2015. The paper discusses an asymmetry in federal standing law. The asymmetry lies in the fact that, when a state’s highest court decides the merits of a federal claim brought in circumstances where the claimant has standing under state law but not federal law, the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision only if the state supreme court upholds the federal claim. This asymmetry was the subject of a 2015 essay that was Calvin’s last piece of published scholarship. In the essay, Calvin used a hypothetical state-aid-to-religion fact pattern to illuminate the asymmetry, to emphasize its problematic nature, and to propose a solution. This paper agrees with Calvin that the asymmetry is problematic and advances three preliminary hypotheses, to be developed in future work, about how various federal and state institutional actors could ameliorate the problem. The first hypothesis is that Congress should consider legislating to ensure that a party facing a federal claim in state court in circumstances where a federal justiciability doctrine would bar the claim in federal court can remove the claim and obtain its dismissal. The second hypothesis is that the United States Supreme Court should consider using its power to create constitutional common law to fashion remedy-limiting doctrines drawn from federal justiciability principles and to impose these doctrines on state courts as affirmative defenses to federal claims. The third hypothesis is that, even in the absence of a federal mandate, state courts should apply conflict-of-laws theory to withhold relief for claims based on federal law in circumstances where federal courts would lack the power to afford the claimant a remedy

    Is There a Federal Definitions Power?

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    Although the Supreme Court decided United States v. Windsor on equal protection grounds, that case also raised important and recurring questions about federal power. In particular, defenders of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) argued that Congress may always define the terms used in federal statutes, even if its definition concerns a matter reserved to the States. As the DOMA illustrates, federal definitions concerning reserved matters that depart from state law may impose significant burdens on state governments and private citizens alike. This Article argues that there is no general, freestanding federal definitions power and that sometimes—as with marriage—federal law must incorporate state law definitions

    Is There a Federal Definitions Power?

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    Although the Supreme Court decided United States v. Windsor on equal protection grounds, that case also raised important and recurring questions about federal power. In particular, defenders of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) argued that Congress may always define the terms used in federal statutes, even if its definition concerns a matter reserved to the States. As the DOMA illustrates, federal definitions concerning reserved matters that depart from state law may impose significant burdens on state governments and private citizens alike. This Article argues that there is no general, freestanding federal definitions power and that sometimes—as with marriage—federal law must incorporate state law definitions
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