14,840 research outputs found
Conceptual centrality and property induction
This thesis examines property generalization among concepts. Its primary objective is to investigate the hypothesis that the more central a feature for a concept, the higher its generalizability to other concepts that share a similar structure (features and dependencies). Its secondary objectives are to examine the relative contributions of feature centrality and feature variability in property induction, whether centrality offers a domain-general or a domain-specific constraint, and whether centrality can operate under conditions of vagueness. Experiments 1 and 2 addressed the centrality hypothesis with centrality measured, whereas Experiments 3 to 14 and 17 with centrality manipulated. Relative feature centrality was manipulated as follows: from a single-dependency chain (Experiments 3 to 7), from the number of properties that depended upon a feature (Experiments 8 to 11 and 17), and from the centrality of the properties that depended upon the critical features (Experiments 12 to 14). The results support the centrality hypothesis. Experiments 12 to 16 addressed the relative contributions of centrality and variability in property induction. Experiments 12 to 14 pitted a central and variable property against a less central and less variable property in judgments of frequency and inductive strength. The results suggest that property induction depends on centrality rather than frequency information, and that centrality can bias the perception of frequency (although the latter results were not clear-cut). Experiments 15 and 16 pitted centrality against variability in information seeking. The results show that centrality information is sought more often than variability information to make an inference, especially amongst dissimilar concepts. Experiments 1 to 16 used animal categories. Experiment 17 examined the centrality hypothesis with artifact categories. The results show centrality effects. Taken together, the Experiments suggest that centrality offers a domain-general constraint. Experiments 5, 8 to 11, and 17 left the properties that depended upon a candidate feature unspecified. A centrality effect was still obtained. The results suggest that centrality can operate under conditions of vagueness. The results are discussed in terms of theories of conceptual structure and models of category-based inference. A model to capture the present findings is also sketched
Recommended from our members
The inverse conjunction fallacy
If people believe that some property is true of all members of a class such as sofas, then they should also believe that the same property is true of all members of a conjunctively defined subset of that class such as uncomfortable handmade sofas. A series of experiments demonstrated a failure to observe this constraint, leading to what is termed the inverse conjunction fallacy. Not only did people often express a belief in the more general statement but not in the more specific, but also when they accepted both beliefs, they were inclined to give greater confidence to the more general. It is argued that this effect underlies a number of other demonstrations of fallacious reasoning, particularly in category-based induction. Alternative accounts of the phenomenon are evaluated, and it is concluded that the effect is best interpreted in terms of intensional reasoning [Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293–315.]
Nestedness in Networks: A Theoretical Model and Some Applications
We develop a dynamic network formation model that can explain the observed nestedness in real-world networks. Links are formed on the basis of agents’ centrality and have an exponentially distributed life time. We use stochastic stability to identify the networks to which the network formation process converges and find that they are nested split graphs. We completely determine the topological properties of the stochastically stable networks and show that they match features exhibited by real-world networks. Using four different network datasets, we empirically test our model and show that it fits well the observed networks.Nestedness, Bonacich centrality, network formation, nested split graphs
Recommended from our members
The modifier effect and property mutability
The modifier effect is the reduction in perceived likelihood of a generic property sentence, when the head noun is modified. We investigated the prediction that the modifier effect would be stronger for mutable than for central properties, without finding evidence for this predicted interaction over the course of five experiments. However Experiment 6, which provided a brief context for the modified concepts to lend them greater credibility, did reveal the predicted interaction. It is argued that the modifier effect arises primarily from a general lack of confidence in generic statements about the typical properties of unfamiliar concepts. Neither prototype nor classical models of concept combination receive support from the phenomenon
Reichenbach, Russell and the Metaphysics of Induction
Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic treatment of the problem of induction in his later works on inductive inference was, and still is, of great interest. However, it has been dismissed as a pseudo-solution and it has been regarded as problematically obscure. This is, in large part, due to the difficulty in understanding exactly what Reichenbach’s solution is supposed to amount to, especially as it appears to offer no response to the inductive skeptic. For entirely different reasons, the significance of Bertrand Russell’s classic attempt to solve Hume’s problem is also both obscure and controversial. Russell accepted that Hume’s reasoning about induction was basically correct, but he argued that given the centrality of induction in our cognitive endeavors something must be wrong with Hume’s basic assumptions. What Russell effectively identified as Hume’s (and Reichenbach’s) failure was the commitment to a purely extensional empiricism. So, Russell’s solution to the problem of induction was to concede extensional empiricism and to accept that induction is grounded by accepting both a robust essentialism and a form of rationalism that allowed for a priori knowledge of universals.
So, neither of those doctrines is without its critics. On the one hand, Reichenbach’s solution faces the charges of obscurity and of offering no response to the inductive skeptic. On the other hand, Russell’s solution looks to be objectionably ad hoc absent some non-controversial and independent argument that the universals that are necessary to ground the uniformity of nature actually exist and are knowable. This particular charge is especially likely to arise from those inclined towards purely extensional forms of empiricism. In this paper the significance of Reichenbach’s solution to the problem of induction will be made clearer via the comparison of these two historically important views about the problem of induction. The modest but important contention that will be made here is that the comparison of Reichenbach’s and Russell’s solutions calls attention to the opposition between extensional and intensional metaphysical presuppositions in the context of attempts to solve the problem of induction. It will be show that, in effect, what Reichenbach does is to establish an important epistemic limitation of extensional empiricism. So, it will be argued here that there is nothing really obscure about Reichenbach’s thoughts on induction at all. He was simply working out the limits of extensional empiricism with respect to inductive inference in opposition to the sort of metaphysics favored by Russell and like-minded thinkers
- …