Fast Simulation of Mass-Spring Systems

We describe a scheme for time integration of mass-spring systems that makes use of a solver based on block coordinate descent. This scheme provides a fast solution for classical linear (Hookean) springs. We express the widely used implicit Euler method as an energy minimization problem and introduce spring directions as auxiliary unknown variables. The system is globally linear in the node positions, and the non-linear terms involving the directions are strictly local. Because the global linear system does not depend on run-time state, the matrix can be pre-factored, allowing for very fast iterations. Our method converges to the same final result as would be obtained by solving the standard form of implicit Euler using Newton’s method. Although the asymptotic convergence of Newton’s method is faster than ours, the initial ratio of work to error reduction with our method is much faster than Newton’s. For real-time visual applications, where speed and stability are more important than precision, we obtain visually acceptable results at a total cost per timestep that is only a fraction of that required for a single Newton iteration. When higher accuracy is required, our algorithm can be used to compute a good starting point for subsequent Newton’s iteration

Efficient Regularized Least-Squares Algorithms for Conditional Ranking on Relational Data

In domains like bioinformatics, information retrieval and social network analysis, one can find learning tasks where the goal consists of inferring a ranking of objects, conditioned on a particular target object. We present a general kernel framework for learning conditional rankings from various types of relational data, where rankings can be conditioned on unseen data objects. We propose efficient algorithms for conditional ranking by optimizing squared regression and ranking loss functions. We show theoretically, that learning with the ranking loss is likely to generalize better than with the regression loss. Further, we prove that symmetry or reciprocity properties of relations can be efficiently enforced in the learned models. Experiments on synthetic and real-world data illustrate that the proposed methods deliver state-of-the-art performance in terms of predictive power and computational efficiency. Moreover, we also show empirically that incorporating symmetry or reciprocity properties can improve the generalization performance

Stochastic learning dynamics and speed of convergence in population games

We study how long it takes for large populations of interacting agents to come close to Nash equilibrium when they adapt their behavior using a stochastic better reply dynamic. Prior work considers this question mainly for 2 × 2 games and potential games; here we characterize convergence times for general weakly acyclic games, including coordination games, dominance solvable games, games with strategic complementarities, potential games, and many others with applications in economics, biology, and distributed control. If players' better replies are governed by idiosyncratic shocks, the convergence time can grow exponentially in the population size; moreover, this is true even in games with very simple payoff structures. However, if their responses are sufficiently correlated due to aggregate shocks, the convergence time is greatly accelerated; in fact, it is bounded for all sufficiently large populations. We provide explicit bounds on the speed of convergence as a function of key structural parameters including the number of strategies, the length of the better reply paths, the extent to which players can influence the payoffs of others, and the desired degree of approximation to Nash equilibrium

“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life

Approachability in Stackelberg Stochastic Games with Vector Costs

The notion of approachability was introduced by Blackwell [1] in the context of vector-valued repeated games. The famous Blackwell's approachability theorem prescribes a strategy for approachability, i.e., for `steering' the average cost of a given agent towards a given target set, irrespective of the strategies of the other agents. In this paper, motivated by the multi-objective optimization/decision making problems in dynamically changing environments, we address the approachability problem in Stackelberg stochastic games with vector valued cost functions. We make two main contributions. Firstly, we give a simple and computationally tractable strategy for approachability for Stackelberg stochastic games along the lines of Blackwell's. Secondly, we give a reinforcement learning algorithm for learning the approachable strategy when the transition kernel is unknown. We also recover as a by-product Blackwell's necessary and sufficient condition for approachability for convex sets in this set up and thus a complete characterization. We also give sufficient conditions for non-convex sets.Comment: 18 Pages, Submitted to Dynamic Games and Application