Cloud Storage Performance and Security Analysis with Hadoop and GridFTP

Even though cloud server has been around for a few years, most of the web hosts today have not converted to cloud yet. If the purpose of the cloud server is distributing and storing files on the internet, FTP servers were much earlier than the cloud. FTP server is sufficient to distribute content on the internet. Therefore, is it worth to shift from FTP server to cloud server? The cloud storage provider declares high durability and availability for their users, and the ability to scale up for more storage space easily could save users tons of money. However, does it provide higher performance and better security features? Hadoop is a very popular platform for cloud computing. It is free software under Apache License. It is written in Java and supports large data processing in a distributed environment. Characteristics of Hadoop include partitioning of data, computing across thousands of hosts, and executing application computations in parallel. Hadoop Distributed File System allows rapid data transfer up to thousands of terabytes, and is capable of operating even in the case of node failure. GridFTP supports high-speed data transfer for wide-area networks. It is based on the FTP and features multiple data channels for parallel transfers. This report describes the technology behind HDFS and enhancement to the Hadoop security features with Kerberos. Based on data transfer performance and security features of HDFS and GridFTP server, we can decide if we should replace GridFTP server with HDFS. According to our experiment result, we conclude that GridFTP server provides better throughput than HDFS, and Kerberos has minimal impact to HDFS performance. We proposed a solution which users authenticate with HDFS first, and get the file from HDFS server to the client using GridFTP

Forward Private Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Optimized I/O Efficiency

Recently, several practical attacks raised serious concerns over the security of searchable encryption. The attacks have brought emphasis on forward privacy, which is the key concept behind solutions to the adaptive leakage-exploiting attacks, and will very likely to become mandatory in the design of new searchable encryption schemes. For a long time, forward privacy implies inefficiency and thus most existing searchable encryption schemes do not support it. Very recently, Bost (CCS 2016) showed that forward privacy can be obtained without inducing a large communication overhead. However, Bost's scheme is constructed with a relatively inefficient public key cryptographic primitive, and has a poor I/O performance. Both of the deficiencies significantly hinder the practical efficiency of the scheme, and prevent it from scaling to large data settings. To address the problems, we first present FAST, which achieves forward privacy and the same communication efficiency as Bost's scheme, but uses only symmetric cryptographic primitives. We then present FASTIO, which retains all good properties of FAST, and further improves I/O efficiency. We implemented the two schemes and compared their performance with Bost's scheme. The experiment results show that both our schemes are highly efficient, and FASTIO achieves a much better scalability due to its optimized I/O

Distributed operating systems

In the past five years, distributed operating systems research has gone through a consolidation phase. On a large number of design issues there is now considerable consensus between different research groups.\ud \ud In this paper, an overview of recent research in distributed systems is given. In turn, the paper discusses overall system structure, protection issues, file system designs, problems and solutions for fault tolerance and a mechanism that is rapidly becoming very important for efficient distributed systems design: hints.\ud \ud An attempt was made to provide sufficient references to interesting research projects for the reader to find material for more detailed study

SAFIUS - A secure and accountable filesystem over untrusted storage

We describe SAFIUS, a secure accountable file system that resides over an untrusted storage. SAFIUS provides strong security guarantees like confidentiality, integrity, prevention from rollback attacks, and accountability. SAFIUS also enables read/write sharing of data and provides the standard UNIX-like interface for applications. To achieve accountability with good performance, it uses asynchronous signatures; to reduce the space required for storing these signatures, a novel signature pruning mechanism is used. SAFIUS has been implemented on a GNU/Linux based system modifying OpenGFS. Preliminary performance studies show that SAFIUS has a tolerable overhead for providing secure storage: while it has an overhead of about 50% of OpenGFS in data intensive workloads (due to the overhead of performing encryption/decryption in software), it is comparable (or better in some cases) to OpenGFS in metadata intensive workloads.Comment: 11pt, 12 pages, 16 figure

Chinese Wall Security Policy

This project establishes a Chinese wall security policy model in the environment of cloud computing. In 1988 Brewer and Nash proposed a very nice commercial security policy in British financial world. Though the policy was well accepted, but the model was incorrect. A decade later, Dr. Lin provided a model in 2003 that meets Brewer & Nash’s Policy. One of the important components in Cloud computing is data center. In order for any company to store data in the center, a trustable security policy model is a must; Chinese wall security policy model will provide this assurance. The heart of the Chinese Wall Security Policy Model is the concept of Conflict of Interest (COI). The concept can be modeled by an anti-reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation. In this project, by extending Dr. Lin’s Model, we explore the security issues in the environment of cloud computing and develop a small system of the Chinese Wall Security Model