Content-Centric Networking at Internet Scale through The Integration of Name Resolution and Routing

We introduce CCN-RAMP (Routing to Anchors Matching Prefixes), a new approach to content-centric networking. CCN-RAMP offers all the advantages of the Named Data Networking (NDN) and Content-Centric Networking (CCNx) but eliminates the need to either use Pending Interest Tables (PIT) or lookup large Forwarding Information Bases (FIB) listing name prefixes in order to forward Interests. CCN-RAMP uses small forwarding tables listing anonymous sources of Interests and the locations of name prefixes. Such tables are immune to Interest-flooding attacks and are smaller than the FIBs used to list IP address ranges in the Internet. We show that no forwarding loops can occur with CCN-RAMP, and that Interests flow over the same routes that NDN and CCNx would maintain using large FIBs. The results of simulation experiments comparing NDN with CCN-RAMP based on ndnSIM show that CCN-RAMP requires forwarding state that is orders of magnitude smaller than what NDN requires, and attains even better performance

Backscatter from the Data Plane --- Threats to Stability and Security in Information-Centric Networking

Information-centric networking proposals attract much attention in the ongoing search for a future communication paradigm of the Internet. Replacing the host-to-host connectivity by a data-oriented publish/subscribe service eases content distribution and authentication by concept, while eliminating threats from unwanted traffic at an end host as are common in today's Internet. However, current approaches to content routing heavily rely on data-driven protocol events and thereby introduce a strong coupling of the control to the data plane in the underlying routing infrastructure. In this paper, threats to the stability and security of the content distribution system are analyzed in theory and practical experiments. We derive relations between state resources and the performance of routers and demonstrate how this coupling can be misused in practice. We discuss new attack vectors present in its current state of development, as well as possibilities and limitations to mitigate them.Comment: 15 page

Toward incremental FIB aggregation with quick selections (FAQS)

Several approaches to mitigating the Forwarding Information Base (FIB) overflow problem were developed and software solutions using FIB aggregation are of particular interest. One of the greatest concerns to deploy these algorithms to real networks is their high running time and heavy computational overhead to handle thousands of FIB updates every second. In this work, we manage to use a single tree traversal to implement faster aggregation and update handling algorithm with much lower memory footprint than other existing work. We utilize 6-year realistic IPv4 and IPv6 routing tables from 2011 to 2016 to evaluate the performance of our algorithm with various metrics. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that IPv6 FIB aggregation has been performed. Our new solution is 2.53 and 1.75 times as fast as the-state-of-the-art FIB aggregation algorithm for IPv4 and IPv6 FIBs, respectively, while achieving a near-optimal FIB aggregation ratio

Towards Loop-Free Forwarding of Anonymous Internet Datagrams that Enforce Provenance

The way in which addressing and forwarding are implemented in the Internet constitutes one of its biggest privacy and security challenges. The fact that source addresses in Internet datagrams cannot be trusted makes the IP Internet inherently vulnerable to DoS and DDoS attacks. The Internet forwarding plane is open to attacks to the privacy of datagram sources, because source addresses in Internet datagrams have global scope. The fact an Internet datagrams are forwarded based solely on the destination addresses stated in datagram headers and the next hops stored in the forwarding information bases (FIB) of relaying routers allows Internet datagrams to traverse loops, which wastes resources and leaves the Internet open to further attacks. We introduce PEAR (Provenance Enforcement through Addressing and Routing), a new approach for addressing and forwarding of Internet datagrams that enables anonymous forwarding of Internet datagrams, eliminates many of the existing DDoS attacks on the IP Internet, and prevents Internet datagrams from looping, even in the presence of routing-table loops.Comment: Proceedings of IEEE Globecom 2016, 4-8 December 2016, Washington, D.C., US

Multicast Mobility in Mobile IP Version 6 (MIPv6) : Problem Statement and Brief Survey

Publisher PD

ADN: An Information-Centric Networking Architecture for the Internet of Things

Forwarding data by name has been assumed to be a necessary aspect of an information-centric redesign of the current Internet architecture that makes content access, dissemination, and storage more efficient. The Named Data Networking (NDN) and Content-Centric Networking (CCNx) architectures are the leading examples of such an approach. However, forwarding data by name incurs storage and communication complexities that are orders of magnitude larger than solutions based on forwarding data using addresses. Furthermore, the specific algorithms used in NDN and CCNx have been shown to have a number of limitations. The Addressable Data Networking (ADN) architecture is introduced as an alternative to NDN and CCNx. ADN is particularly attractive for large-scale deployments of the Internet of Things (IoT), because it requires far less storage and processing in relaying nodes than NDN. ADN allows things and data to be denoted by names, just like NDN and CCNx do. However, instead of replacing the waist of the Internet with named-data forwarding, ADN uses an address-based forwarding plane and introduces an information plane that seamlessly maps names to addresses without the involvement of end-user applications. Simulation results illustrate the order of magnitude savings in complexity that can be attained with ADN compared to NDN.Comment: 10 page

Internet routing paths stability model and relation to forwarding paths

Analysis of real datasets to characterize the local stability properties of the Internet routing paths suggests that extending the route selection criteria to account for such property would not increase the routing path length. Nevertheless, even if selecting a more stable routing path could be considered as valuable from a routing perspective, it does not necessarily imply that the associated forwarding path would be more stable. Hence, if the dynamics of the Internet routing and forwarding system show different properties, then one can not straightforwardly derive the one from the other. If this assumption is verified, then the relationship between the stability of the forwarding path (followed by the traffic) and the corresponding routing path as selected by the path-vector routing algorithm requires further characterization. For this purpose, we locally relate, i.e., at the router level, the stability properties of routing path with the corresponding forwarding path. The proposed stability model and measurement results verify this assumption and show that, although the main cause of instability results from the forwarding plane, a second order effect relates forwarding and routing path instability events. This observation provides the first indication that differential stability can safely be taken into account as part of the route selection process