13,660 research outputs found
Privacy in the Genomic Era
Genome sequencing technology has advanced at a rapid pace and it is now
possible to generate highly-detailed genotypes inexpensively. The collection
and analysis of such data has the potential to support various applications,
including personalized medical services. While the benefits of the genomics
revolution are trumpeted by the biomedical community, the increased
availability of such data has major implications for personal privacy; notably
because the genome has certain essential features, which include (but are not
limited to) (i) an association with traits and certain diseases, (ii)
identification capability (e.g., forensics), and (iii) revelation of family
relationships. Moreover, direct-to-consumer DNA testing increases the
likelihood that genome data will be made available in less regulated
environments, such as the Internet and for-profit companies. The problem of
genome data privacy thus resides at the crossroads of computer science,
medicine, and public policy. While the computer scientists have addressed data
privacy for various data types, there has been less attention dedicated to
genomic data. Thus, the goal of this paper is to provide a systematization of
knowledge for the computer science community. In doing so, we address some of
the (sometimes erroneous) beliefs of this field and we report on a survey we
conducted about genome data privacy with biomedical specialists. Then, after
characterizing the genome privacy problem, we review the state-of-the-art
regarding privacy attacks on genomic data and strategies for mitigating such
attacks, as well as contextualizing these attacks from the perspective of
medicine and public policy. This paper concludes with an enumeration of the
challenges for genome data privacy and presents a framework to systematize the
analysis of threats and the design of countermeasures as the field moves
forward
SoK: Cryptographically Protected Database Search
Protected database search systems cryptographically isolate the roles of
reading from, writing to, and administering the database. This separation
limits unnecessary administrator access and protects data in the case of system
breaches. Since protected search was introduced in 2000, the area has grown
rapidly; systems are offered by academia, start-ups, and established companies.
However, there is no best protected search system or set of techniques.
Design of such systems is a balancing act between security, functionality,
performance, and usability. This challenge is made more difficult by ongoing
database specialization, as some users will want the functionality of SQL,
NoSQL, or NewSQL databases. This database evolution will continue, and the
protected search community should be able to quickly provide functionality
consistent with newly invented databases.
At the same time, the community must accurately and clearly characterize the
tradeoffs between different approaches. To address these challenges, we provide
the following contributions:
1) An identification of the important primitive operations across database
paradigms. We find there are a small number of base operations that can be used
and combined to support a large number of database paradigms.
2) An evaluation of the current state of protected search systems in
implementing these base operations. This evaluation describes the main
approaches and tradeoffs for each base operation. Furthermore, it puts
protected search in the context of unprotected search, identifying key gaps in
functionality.
3) An analysis of attacks against protected search for different base
queries.
4) A roadmap and tools for transforming a protected search system into a
protected database, including an open-source performance evaluation platform
and initial user opinions of protected search.Comment: 20 pages, to appear to IEEE Security and Privac
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