Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering. At a high level, the goal is to design mechanisms to select a set of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective and ensure desirable properties based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information such as their locations. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research

Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games

ABSTRACT We consider the problem of locating facilities in a metric space to serve a set of selfish agents. The cost of an agent is the distance between her own location and the nearest facility. The social cost is the total cost of the agents. We are interested in designing strategy-proof mechanisms without payment that have a small approximation ratio for social cost. A mechanism is a (possibly randomized) algorithm which maps the locations reported by the agents to the locations of the facilities. A mechanism is strategy-proof if no agent can benefit from misreporting her location in any configuration. This setting was first studied by Procaccia and Tennenholtz We first prove an Ω(n) lower bound of the social cost approximation ratio for deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms. Our lower bound even holds for the line metric space. This significantly improves the previous constant lower bound

Verifiably Truthful Mechanisms

It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms, whose truthfulness can be verified efficiently (in the computational sense). Our approach involves three steps: (i) specifying the structure of mechanisms, (ii) constructing a verification algorithm, and (iii) measuring the quality of verifiably truthful mechanisms. We demonstrate this approach using a case study: approximate mechanism design without money for facility location

NETWORK TRAFFIC CHARACTERIZATION AND INTRUSION DETECTION IN BUILDING AUTOMATION SYSTEMS

The goal of this research was threefold: (1) to learn the operational trends and behaviors of a realworld building automation system (BAS) network for creating building device models to detect anomalous behaviors and attacks, (2) to design a framework for evaluating BA device security from both the device and network perspectives, and (3) to leverage new sources of building automation device documentation for developing robust network security rules for BAS intrusion detection systems (IDSs). These goals were achieved in three phases, first through the detailed longitudinal study and characterization of a real university campus building automation network (BAN) and with the application of machine learning techniques on field level traffic for anomaly detection. Next, through the systematization of literature in the BAS security domain to analyze cross protocol device vulnerabilities, attacks, and defenses for uncovering research gaps as the foundational basis of our proposed BA device security evaluation framework. Then, to evaluate our proposed framework the largest multiprotocol BAS testbed discussed in the literature was built and several side-channel vulnerabilities and software/firmware shortcomings were exposed. Finally, through the development of a semi-automated specification gathering, device documentation extracting, IDS rule generating framework that leveraged PICS files and BIM models.Ph.D

Facility Reallocation on the Line

We consider a multi-stage facility reallocation problems on the real line, where a facility is being moved between time stages based on the locations reported by $n$ agents. The aim of the reallocation algorithm is to minimise the social cost, i.e., the sum over the total distance between the facility and all agents at all stages, plus the cost incurred for moving the facility. We study this problem both in the offline setting and online setting. In the offline case the algorithm has full knowledge of the agent locations in all future stages, and in the online setting the algorithm does not know these future locations and must decide the location of the facility on a stage-per-stage basis. We derive the optimal algorithm in both cases. For the online setting we show that its competitive ratio is $(n+2)/(n+1)$. As neither of these algorithms turns out to yield a strategy-proof mechanism, we propose another strategy-proof mechanism which has a competitive ratio of $(n+3)/(n+1)$ for odd $n$ and $(n+4)/n$ for even $n$, which we conjecture to be the best possible. We also consider a generalisation with multiple facilities and weighted agents, for which we show that the optimum can be computed in polynomial time for a fixed number of facilities