Questions, Presuppositions and Fallacies

[EN] In this paper I focus on the fallacy known as Complex Question or Many Ques tions. After a brief introduction, in Sect. 2 I highlight its pragmatic dimension, and in Sect. 3 its dialectical dimension. In Sect. 4 I present two accounts of this fallacy developed in argumentation theory, Douglas Walton’s and the Pragma-Dialectics’, which have resources to capture both its pragmatic and its dialectical nature. How ever, these accounts are unsatisfactory for various reasons. In Sect. 5 I focus on the pragmatic dimension of the fallacy and I suggest amendments to the accounts mentioned drawing on the study of the phenomenon of presupposition in theoretical pragmatics. I argue that the central notion in the defnition of the fallacy is that of an informative presupposition. In Sect. 6 I focus on the dialectical dimension of the fallacy. This dimension needs to be explicitly acknowledged in the defnition of the fallacy in order to distinguish it from a diferent, non-dialectical, fallacious argumentative move involving presuppositions.Publicación en abierto financiada por el Consorcio de Bibliotecas Universitarias de Castilla y León (BUCLE), con cargo al Programa Operativo 2014ES16RFOP009 FEDER 2014-2020 DE CASTILLA Y LEÓN, Actuación:20007-CL - Apoyo Consorcio BUCLE

Assessing relevance

This paper advances an approach to relevance grounded on patterns of material inference called argumentation schemes, which can account for the reconstruction and the evaluation of relevance relations. In order to account for relevance in different types of dialogical contexts, pursuing also non-cognitive goals, and measuring the scalar strength of relevance, communicative acts are conceived as dialogue moves, whose coherence with the previous ones or the context is represented as the conclusion of steps of material inferences. Such inferences are described using argumentation schemes and are evaluated by considering 1) their defeasibility, and 2) the acceptability of the implicit premises on which they are based. The assessment of both the relevance of an utterance and the strength thereof depends on the evaluation of three interrelated factors: 1) number of inferential steps required; 2) the types of argumentation schemes involved; and 3) the implicit premises required

A Normative Pragmatic Perspective on Appealing to Emotions in Argumentation

This is the author's accepted manuscript. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com.Is appealing to emotions in argumentation ever legitimate and, if so, what is the best way to analyze and evaluate such appeals? After overviewing a normative pragmatic perspective on appealing to emotions in argumentation, I present answers to these questions from pragma-dialectical, informal logical, and rhetorical perspectives, and note positions shared and supplemented by a normative pragmatic perspective. A normative pragmatic perspective holds that appealing to emotions in argumentation may be relevant and non-manipulative; and that emotional appeals may be analyzed as strategies that create pragmatic reasons and assessed by the standard of formal propriety or reasonability under the circumstances. I illustrate the explanatory power of the perspective by analyzing and evaluating some argumentation from Frederick Douglass's "What to the Slave is the Fourth of July." I conclude that a normative pragmatic perspective offers a more complete account of appealing to emotions in argumentation than a pragma-dialectial, informal logical, or rhetorical perspective alone, identifies a range of norms available to arguers, and explains why appealing to emotions may be legitimate in particular cases of argumentation

Manifesting Personal Brands in Politics: Strategic Manoeuvring by Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in the Third US Presidential Debate of 2016

In this thesis I investigate how the political brands of the two presidential candidates of the 2016 US presidential election, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, were manifested in their argumentation during the third and final presidential debate of 2016. The method used for the analysis is the extended theory of pragma-dialectics, which includes the notion of strategic manoeuvring. The theory allows the evaluation of how the candidates balanced the simultaneous objectives of adhering to the rules of argumentation while manoeuvring the discussion to a direction that was in their favour. The analysis focuses on a 15-minute segment of the debate, the topic of which was fitness to be the president of the United States. The analysis indicates that both candidates strategically manoeuvred the discussion toward topics that were beneficial for their brand or detrimental to the opponent’s brand. The most notable differences between Clinton’s and Trump’s argumentative strategies were related to the core characteristics of their brands: Clinton was a politically experienced insider, while Trump was a newcomer to politics and promoted the image of an uncorrupt outsider who “says it like it is.” Clinton highlighted her brand by demonstrating her well-preparedness with a full and coordinated argumentative strategy and premeditated argumentation structures. Trump, on the other hand, maintained his brand as a man of the people by arguing much more like an uneducated non-politician would. The most notable features of Trump’s argumentation were the copious violations of the rules of argumentation, which indicate that his desire to “win” the argument overruled his desire to argue reasonably. The findings of this study demonstrate that not complying with the rules of a critical discussion may be beneficial for the speaker’s brand when their brand as well as the expectations of the audience allow it. However, when a person who is branded as someone who “says it like it is” and uses fallacious argumentation, the danger of the introduction of more radical ideas presents itself. Thus, critical thinking and awareness of the copious strategies used in political branding are becoming increasingly important

Towards an authentic argumentation literacy test

A central goal of education is to improve argumentation literacy. How do we know how well this goal is achieved? Can we measure argumentation literacy? The present study is a preliminary step towards measuring the efficacy of education with regards to argumentation literacy. Tests currently in use to determine critical thinking skills are often similar to IQ-tests in that they predominantly measure logical and mathematical abilities. Thus, they may not measure the various other skills required in understanding authentic argumentation. To identify the elements of argumentation literacy, this exploratory study begins by surveying introductory textbooks within argumentation theory, critical thinking, and rhetoric. Eight main abilities have been identified. Then, the study outlines an Argumentation Literacy Test that would comprise these abilities suggested by the literature. Finally, the study presents results from a pilot of a version of such a test and discusses needs for further development

Rhétorique et cognition - Rhetoric and Cognition. Perspectives théoriques et stratégies persuasives- Theoretical Perspectives and Persuasive Strategies

This volume gathers contributions from two disciplines which have much to gain from one another – rhetoric and cognitive science – as they both have much to say in the broad realm of argumentation studies. This collection neither condemns the fallacious effects of specific argument schemes nor adds yet another layer to fallacy criticism, but studies how argumentation and fallacies work, hic et nunc. What are the linguistic and cognitive mechanisms behind the «performance » of fallacious arguments? How do rhetorical strategies work at the interface of cognition, language science and society?Ce volume met l’accent sur le lien entre démarches cognitives et art du discours qui a toujours été un des enjeux de la rhétorique. Sans ajouter une nouvelle couche à l’examen critique des sophismes, les contributions de cet ouvrage n’ont pas pour but de dénoncer les effets de certains schèmes argumentatifs que d’aucuns jugeraient fallacieux, mais d’étudier leur fonctionnement et leurs effets cognitifs hic et nunc. Quels sont les mécanismes qui expliquent la « performance » des arguments réputés fallacieux ? Comment fonctionnent les stratégies rhétoriques à l’intersection entre cognition, sciences du langage et société

Argumentation and disagreement:a pluralistic approach

In our everyday life and in the public sphere, we often find disagreements that the parties cannot resolve nor even overcome. We might call them persistent disagreements. The main question of this thesis is: “What can the parties do to overcome disagreements reasonably, especially when disagreements are persistent?” I argue that the most reasonable way to deal with disagreement is by using argumentation, whereby I approach argumentation pluralistically. This pluralistic approach implies an expansion of traditional approaches to argumentation like pragma-dialectics or informal logic. According to this pluralistic approach, rational persuasion need not be the only goal of argumentation, because it rarely succeeds, especially in the case of persistent disagreement. Therefore, a pluralistic approach to argumentation implies: a) that the parties might overcome their disagreements by reasonable means different from persuasion - among these means we can consider deliberation, negotiation and settlement; b) that if those means revolve around presenting reasons, they should be considered under the concept argumentation; c) that sometimes persuasion is necessary, but that even then, if the setting of the dialogue is sub-optimal, as in the persistent case, we need a general or nonspecific normative approach to evaluate the contributions of the parties; d) that when fallacies are presented, the proper response to them will depend on certain circumstances of the dialogue, considering the goal of overcoming disagreements reasonably; e) that for overcoming disagreements the parties may need to shift between different dialogue types, and that those shifts have special conditions of their own