Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR

There has been much discussion of the right to explanation in the EU General Data Protection Regulation, and its existence, merits, and disadvantages. Implementing a right to explanation that opens the black box of algorithmic decision-making faces major legal and technical barriers. Explaining the functionality of complex algorithmic decision-making systems and their rationale in specific cases is a technically challenging problem. Some explanations may offer little meaningful information to data subjects, raising questions around their value. Explanations of automated decisions need not hinge on the general public understanding how algorithmic systems function. Even though such interpretability is of great importance and should be pursued, explanations can, in principle, be offered without opening the black box. Looking at explanations as a means to help a data subject act rather than merely understand, one could gauge the scope and content of explanations according to the specific goal or action they are intended to support. From the perspective of individuals affected by automated decision-making, we propose three aims for explanations: (1) to inform and help the individual understand why a particular decision was reached, (2) to provide grounds to contest the decision if the outcome is undesired, and (3) to understand what would need to change in order to receive a desired result in the future, based on the current decision-making model. We assess how each of these goals finds support in the GDPR. We suggest data controllers should offer a particular type of explanation, unconditional counterfactual explanations, to support these three aims. These counterfactual explanations describe the smallest change to the world that can be made to obtain a desirable outcome, or to arrive at the closest possible world, without needing to explain the internal logic of the system

Eliminating Latent Discrimination: Train Then Mask

How can we control for latent discrimination in predictive models? How can we provably remove it? Such questions are at the heart of algorithmic fairness and its impacts on society. In this paper, we define a new operational fairness criteria, inspired by the well-understood notion of omitted variable-bias in statistics and econometrics. Our notion of fairness effectively controls for sensitive features and provides diagnostics for deviations from fair decision making. We then establish analytical and algorithmic results about the existence of a fair classifier in the context of supervised learning. Our results readily imply a simple, but rather counter-intuitive, strategy for eliminating latent discrimination. In order to prevent other features proxying for sensitive features, we need to include sensitive features in the training phase, but exclude them in the test/evaluation phase while controlling for their effects. We evaluate the performance of our algorithm on several real-world datasets and show how fairness for these datasets can be improved with a very small loss in accuracy

Fairness in Algorithmic Decision Making: An Excursion Through the Lens of Causality

As virtually all aspects of our lives are increasingly impacted by algorithmic decision making systems, it is incumbent upon us as a society to ensure such systems do not become instruments of unfair discrimination on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, etc. We consider the problem of determining whether the decisions made by such systems are discriminatory, through the lens of causal models. We introduce two definitions of group fairness grounded in causality: fair on average causal effect (FACE), and fair on average causal effect on the treated (FACT). We use the Rubin-Neyman potential outcomes framework for the analysis of cause-effect relationships to robustly estimate FACE and FACT. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach on synthetic data. Our analyses of two real-world data sets, the Adult income data set from the UCI repository (with gender as the protected attribute), and the NYC Stop and Frisk data set (with race as the protected attribute), show that the evidence of discrimination obtained by FACE and FACT, or lack thereof, is often in agreement with the findings from other studies. We further show that FACT, being somewhat more nuanced compared to FACE, can yield findings of discrimination that differ from those obtained using FACE.Comment: 7 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables.To appear in Proceedings of the International Conference on World Wide Web (WWW), 201