Coded Cooperative Data Exchange for a Secret Key

We consider a coded cooperative data exchange problem with the goal of generating a secret key. Specifically, we investigate the number of public transmissions required for a set of clients to agree on a secret key with probability one, subject to the constraint that it remains private from an eavesdropper. Although the problems are closely related, we prove that secret key generation with fewest number of linear transmissions is NP-hard, while it is known that the analogous problem in traditional cooperative data exchange can be solved in polynomial time. In doing this, we completely characterize the best possible performance of linear coding schemes, and also prove that linear codes can be strictly suboptimal. Finally, we extend the single-key results to characterize the minimum number of public transmissions required to generate a desired integer number of statistically independent secret keys.Comment: Full version of a paper that appeared at ISIT 2014. 19 pages, 2 figure

Cooperative Data Exchange based on MDS Codes

The cooperative data exchange problem is studied for the fully connected network. In this problem, each node initially only possesses a subset of the $K$ packets making up the file. Nodes make broadcast transmissions that are received by all other nodes. The goal is for each node to recover the full file. In this paper, we present a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm to compute the optimal (i.e., minimal) number of required broadcast transmissions and to determine the precise transmissions to be made by the nodes. A particular feature of our approach is that {\it each} of the $K-d$ transmissions is a linear combination of {\it exactly} $d+1$ packets, and we show how to optimally choose the value of $d.$ We also show how the coefficients of these linear combinations can be chosen by leveraging a connection to Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes. Moreover, we show that our method can be used to solve cooperative data exchange problems with weighted cost as well as the so-called successive local omniscience problem.Comment: 21 pages, 1 figur

Optimal Deterministic Polynomial-Time Data Exchange for Omniscience

We study the problem of constructing a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that achieves omniscience, in a rate-optimal manner, among a set of users that are interested in a common file but each has only partial knowledge about it as side-information. Assuming that the collective information among all the users is sufficient to allow the reconstruction of the entire file, the goal is to minimize the (possibly weighted) amount of bits that these users need to exchange over a noiseless public channel in order for all of them to learn the entire file. Using established connections to the multi-terminal secrecy problem, our algorithm also implies a polynomial-time method for constructing a maximum size secret shared key in the presence of an eavesdropper. We consider the following types of side-information settings: (i) side information in the form of uncoded fragments/packets of the file, where the users' side-information consists of subsets of the file; (ii) side information in the form of linearly correlated packets, where the users have access to linear combinations of the file packets; and (iii) the general setting where the the users' side-information has an arbitrary (i.i.d.) correlation structure. Building on results from combinatorial optimization, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm (in the number of users) that, first finds the optimal rate allocations among these users, then determines an explicit transmission scheme (i.e., a description of which user should transmit what information) for cases (i) and (ii)

A Monetary Mechanism for Stabilizing Cooperative Data Exchange with Selfish Users

In this research, we address the stability issues in Cooperative Data Exchange (CDE), one of the central problems in wireless network coding. We consider a setting in which the users are selfish, i.e., would like to maximize their own utility. More specifically, we consider a setting where each user has a subset of packets in the ground set X, and wants all other packets in X. The users can exchange data by broadcasting coded or uncoded packets over a lossless channel, and monetary transactions are allowed between any pair of users. We define the utility of each user as the sum of two sub-utility functions: (i) the difference between the total payment received by the user and the total transmission rate of the user, and (ii) the difference between the total number of required packets by the user and the total payment made by the user. A rate-vector and payment-matrix pair (r, p) is said to stabilize the grand coalition (i.e., the set of all users) if (r, p) is Paretooptimal over all minor coalitions (i.e., all proper subsets of users who collectively know all packets in X). Our goal is to design algorithms that compute a stabilizing ratepayment pair with minimum total sum-rate and minimum total sum-payment for any given instance of the problem. In this work, we propose two algorithms that maximize the sum of utility of all users (over all solutions), and one of the algorithms also maximizes the minimum utility among all users (over all solutions). The second algorithm requires a broker, where each user has to trust the broker and use the broker to exchange payments, whereas in the first algorithm there is no such requirement. In the first algorithm, the users directly compensate user broadcasting the packet in that particular round. Our scheme minimizes the total number of transmitted packets, as well as the total amount of payments. We also perform an extensive simulation study to evaluate the performance of our scheme in practical setting

You Better Play 7: Mutual versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-link Experiment

This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowl- edge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimen- tal subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payo-dominant equilib- rium. In the mutual knowledge of level 1 treatment, the suggestion appears on every subject's monitor at the beginning of every round, with no common knowledge that everybody sees the same suggestion. In the mutual knowledge of level 2 treatment, the same suggestion appears on each subject's monitor, accompanied by the request to "send" the suggestion to the partner in the round, followed by a notication that the message has been read. Finally, in the common knowledge treatment, the suggestion is read aloud by the experimenter at the end of the learning phase. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and the percentage of e cient equilibrium play are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficient to signicantly increase the salience of the e cient equilibrium with respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 (as the one occurring in our "message" treatment) induces successful coordination more frequently than common knowledge.Coordination games; experimental philosophy; epistemic attitudes, weak-link game; conventions

You Better Play 7: Mutual versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-link Experiment

This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowl- edge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimen- tal subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff-dominant equilib- rium. In the mutual knowledge of level 1 treatment, the suggestion appears on every subject's monitor at the beginning of every round, with no common knowledge that everybody sees the same suggestion. In the mutual knowledge of level 2 treatment, the same suggestion appears on each subject's monitor, accompanied by the request to "send" the suggestion to the partner in the round, followed by a notification that the message has been read. Finally, in the common knowledge treatment, the suggestion is read aloud by the experimenter at the end of the learning phase. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and the percentage of efficient equilibrium play are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficient to significantly increase the salience of the efficient equilibrium with respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 (as the one occurring in our "message" treatment) induces successful coordination more frequently than common knowledge.Coordination games; experimental philosophy; epistemic attitudes, weak-link game; conventions