An Alternative Paradigm for Developing and Pricing Storage on Smart Contract Platforms

Smart contract platforms facilitate the development of important and diverse distributed applications in a simple manner. This simplicity stems from the inherent utility of employing the state of smart contracts to store, query and verify the validity of application data. In Ethereum, data storage incurs an underpriced, non-recurring, predefined fee. Furthermore, as there is no incentive for freeing or minimizing the state of smart contracts, Ethereum is faced with a tragedy of the commons problem with regards to its monotonically increasing state. This issue, if left unchecked, may lead to centralization and directly impact Ethereum's security and longevity. In this work, we introduce an alternative paradigm for developing smart contracts in which their state is of constant size and facilitates the verification of application data that are stored to and queried from an external, potentially unreliable, storage network. This approach is relevant for a wide range of applications, such as any key-value store. We evaluate our approach by adapting the most widely deployed standard for fungible tokens, i.e., the ERC20 token standard. We show that Ethereum's current cost model penalizes our approach, even though it minimizes the overhead to Ethereum's state and aligns well with Ethereum's future. We address Ethereum's monotonically increasing state in a two-fold manner. First, we introduce recurring fees that are proportional to the state of smart contracts and adjustable by the miners that maintain the network. Second, we propose a scheme where the cost of storage-related operations reflects the effort that miners have to expend to execute them. Lastly, we show that under such a pricing scheme that encourages economy in the state consumed by smart contracts, our ERC20 token adaptation reduces the incurred transaction fees by up to an order of magnitude.Comment: 6 pages, 2 figures, DAPPCON 201

A Blockchain-based Decentralized Electronic Marketplace for Computing Resources

AbstractWe propose a framework for building a decentralized electronic marketplace for computing resources. The idea is that anyone with spare capacities can offer them on this marketplace, opening up the cloud computing market to smaller players, thus creating a more competitive environment compared to today's market consisting of a few large providers. Trust is a crucial component in making an anonymized decentralized marketplace a reality. We develop protocols that enable participants to interact with each other in a fair way and show how these protocols can be implemented using smart contracts and blockchains. We discuss and evaluate our framework not only from a technical point of view, but also look at the wider context in terms of fair interactions and legal implications

Smarter Data Availability Checks in the Cloud: Proof of Storage via Blockchain

Cloud computing offers clients flexible and cost-effective resources. Nevertheless, past incidents indicate that the cloud may misbehave by exposing or tampering with clients' data. Therefore, it is vital for clients to protect the confidentiality and integrity of their outsourced data. To address these issues, researchers proposed cryptographic protocols called “proof of storage” that let a client efficiently verify the integrity or availability of its data stored in a remote cloud server. However, in these schemes, the client either has to be online to perform the verification itself or has to delegate the verification to a fully trusted auditor. In this chapter, a new scheme is proposed that lets the client distribute its data replicas among multiple cloud servers to achieve high availability without the need for the client to be online for the verification and without a trusted auditor's involvement. The new scheme is mainly based on blockchain smart contracts. It illustrates how a combination of cloud computing and blockchain technology can resolve real-world problems

Betrayal, Distrust, and Rationality: Smart Counter-Collusion Contracts for Verifiable Cloud Computing

Cloud computing has become an irreversible trend. Together comes the pressing need for verifiability, to assure the client the correctness of computation outsourced to the cloud. Existing verifiable computation techniques all have a high overhead, thus if being deployed in the clouds, would render cloud computing more expensive than the on-premises counterpart. To achieve verifiability at a reasonable cost, we leverage game theory and propose a smart contract based solution. In a nutshell, a client lets two clouds compute the same task, and uses smart contracts to stimulate tension, betrayal and distrust between the clouds, so that rational clouds will not collude and cheat. In the absence of collusion, verification of correctness can be done easily by crosschecking the results from the two clouds. We provide a formal analysis of the games induced by the contracts, and prove that the contracts will be effective under certain reasonable assumptions. By resorting to game theory and smart contracts, we are able to avoid heavy cryptographic protocols. The client only needs to pay two clouds to compute in the clear, and a small transaction fee to use the smart contracts. We also conducted a feasibility study that involves implementing the contracts in Solidity and running them on the official Ethereum network.Comment: Published in ACM CCS 2017, this is the full version with all appendice