Novel Contract Signature based on Key Exchange

A contract signature is a particular form of digital multi-signature that only involves two signers. Contract signing plays a critical role in any business transaction, particularly in situations where the involved parties do not trust each other. One of the most significant concerns in exchange signatures is the fraudulent and unfair exchange, which occurs when one party gets the signature of another party without giving his own signature. In the view of these security concerns, this thesis presents a secure and fair contract signature scheme based on key exchange protocol. The security and protection of the proposed scheme is based on solving hard computational assumptions such as discrete logarithm problem (DLP). The proposed protocol is abuse-free. The proposed scheme targets to have lesser computational overhead and high-security features than existing scheme[1]. The proposed scheme has wide application in real life scenarios, such as in electronic cash system

TumbleBit: an untrusted Bitcoin-compatible anonymous payment hub

This paper presents TumbleBit, a new unidirectional unlinkable payment hub that is fully compatible with today s Bitcoin protocol. TumbleBit allows parties to make fast, anonymous, off-blockchain payments through an untrusted intermediary called the Tumbler. TumbleBits anonymity properties are similar to classic Chaumian eCash: no one, not even the Tumbler, can link a payment from its payer to its payee. Every payment made via TumbleBit is backed by bitcoins, and comes with a guarantee that Tumbler can neither violate anonymity, nor steal bitcoins, nor print money by issuing payments to itself. We prove the security of TumbleBit using the real/ideal world paradigm and the random oracle model. Security follows from the standard RSA assumption and ECDSA unforgeability. We implement TumbleBit, mix payments from 800 users and show that TumbleBits offblockchain payments can complete in seconds.https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/575.pdfPublished versio

Inductive benchmarking for purely functional data structures

Every designer of a new data structure wants to know how well it performs in comparison with others. But finding, coding and testing applications as benchmarks can be tedious and time-consuming. Besides, how a benchmark uses a data structure may considerably affect its apparent efficiency, so the choice of applications may bias the results. We address these problems by developing a tool for inductive benchmarking. This tool, Auburn, can generate benchmarks across a wide distribution of uses. We precisely define 'the use of a data structure', upon which we build the core algorithms of Auburn: how to generate a benchmark from a description of use, and how to extract a description of use from an application. We then apply inductive classification techniques to obtain decision trees for the choice between competing data structures. We test Auburn by benchmarking several implementations of three common data structures: queues, random-access lists and heaps. These and other results show Auburn to be a useful and accurate tool, but they also reveal some limitations of the approach

An Epistemic Approach to Coercion-Resistance for Electronic Voting Protocols

Coercion resistance is an important and one of the most intricate security requirements of electronic voting protocols. Several definitions of coercion resistance have been proposed in the literature, including definitions based on symbolic models. However, existing definitions in such models are rather restricted in their scope and quite complex. In this paper, we therefore propose a new definition of coercion resistance in a symbolic setting, based on an epistemic approach. Our definition is relatively simple and intuitive. It allows for a fine-grained formulation of coercion resistance and can be stated independently of a specific, symbolic protocol and adversary model. As a proof of concept, we apply our definition to three voting protocols. In particular, we carry out the first rigorous analysis of the recently proposed Civitas system. We precisely identify those conditions under which this system guarantees coercion resistance or fails to be coercion resistant. We also analyze protocols proposed by Lee et al. and Okamoto.Comment: An extended version of a paper from IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) 200